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 ABSTRACT 
Poisoned Ground: The Roots of Eurocentrism 
Joseph McClellan 
 
The dissertation starts with the premise that Eurocentrism, in philosophy and many other 
areas, continues to be a problem. It comes from the belief in teleological history, which itself 
rests on hierarchical, anthropocentric metaphysics. To combat the negative effects of 
Eurocentrism, we must establish alternatives to the metaphysics it rests on and the historical 
attitudes that it constructs and maintains. 
 The dissertation is divided into three main parts, each with a number of subdivisions. 
Part one sketches the history of academic Eurocentrism and demonstrates that it is built on a 
combination of historical ignorance and certain presuppositions associated with Western 
religious thinking. Specifically, Eurocentrism, since the modern era, has substituted the 
monotheistic Deity with a peculiar notion of Reason, and has constructed a myth that Reason, 
and all the positive things it signifies, are uniquely European.   
 Part two is the longest section and it examines Hegel’s influence in building the 
Eurocentric world. He expounds a history that is unequivocally teleological, in which non-
European people and ways of thinking are stepping-stones to the more highly evolved 
European, Christian culture. The events of history have been the unfolding of a code, and that 
code, or Logos, was discovered in his Science of Logic. This underlying Logic explains both the 
life of the mind—described in his Phenomenology of Spirit—as well as the life of the world, 
described in other works, such as his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and Philosophy of 
History. However, is the Logos truly the source-code for historical events showing them to be 
completely determined by a preexisting fate? Or does it merely explain the conditions of the 
 possibility for events to arise, the way that they constantly do arise and have arisen? These are 
completely different alternatives and their implications are massive. I then compare diverging 
interpretations of Hegel that choose to focus on either his anthropocentric historical teleology, 
or else his more abstract and spacious metaphysics, which may undermine much of his 
historical theory. The thrust of these chapters is to show that anthropocentric metaphysics 
support beliefs in teleological history, which leads to political and social practices of inequality 
and injustice (e.g., Eurocentrism). To counter this tendency of Hegel’s, I consider Darwin’s 
insights against teleology, as well as contemporary object-oriented-ontology, which help us 
move beyond philosophical anthropocentrism. Rather than being absolute antipodes to these 
developments, Hegel’s theories are adaptable enough to be a useful resource for non-
teleological, non-anthropocentric, and non-Eurocentric theories.  
 Part three focuses on the role of language and metaphor in the Eurocentric canons of 
philosophy. For example, Hegel famously employs the metaphor of the master and slave to 
describe the dialectical process at work in both the mind and history. The metaphor has 
significant heuristic power, but it is still a metaphor. When taken literally, it can lead to 
dangerous misunderstandings about history and justifications for violence. Moreover, when 
Hegel writes about the Oriental and the African, those terms are hidden metaphors: they do not 
denote any real persons. However, what he says about them has historically been taken 
literally, thus leading to warped attitudes about real Asians and Africans in the world. I also 
analyze the role of literary style in establishing Eurocentric canons, suggesting that an 
important critical development against Eurocentrism would be the proliferation of alternative 
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This dissertation is the end of an unforeseen byway I entered when I first read Hegel in 2009. 
I entered Columbia’s Department of Religion in 2004 with the intention of pursuing Tibetan 
philosophy, Buddhism, and philology, which had been my primary personal and intellectual 
interests for about a decade. However, being surrounded by brilliant people and ideas at 
Columbia, I took the bait and waded deeper and deeper into western philosophical traditions, 
particularly those with some concepts in common with the comprehensive metaphysical 
theories and phenomenological methods of the Buddhist mādhyamaka, yogācāra, and 
dzogchen that were my specializations. Since I cut my teeth on Asian philosophy, the process 
of learning other traditions has always been one of translating terms and synthesizing ideas. 
Over time, it became clear that this comparative method provides certain benefits, and that 
Hegel could be a powerful resource for synthesizing with other thinkers. However, the 
comparative method also suffers from certain obstacles—some of which can be traced to 
Hegel. This dissertation arose from these considerations.  
 It was not merely a matter of intellectual curiosity that led me into new domains. Right 
when my academic commitments demanded that I pick up the pace, an untimely, lingering 
depression was rendering me academically unproductive and spiritually listless. With 
expectations of myself to write on some Buddhist topic with spiritual and even esoteric 
implications, I realized I was in no position to do so at the time. Reflecting on why, I realized I 
had been resting on dogmas, maintaining naive expectations, and suffering when I failed to 
meet the ideals I had set up much earlier. To feel better, I had to loosen my grip on false 
certainties and imagine new ways of being and feeling. Fortunately, I had plenty of 
philosophical and spiritual raw material around me for building new orientations toward 
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myself and the world. In academia, I was heartened when writers like Judith Butler 
explaining that her often-abstract work was coming from a place of personal need. In the 
preface to her remarkable book Gender Trouble, she writes, “Despite the dislocation of the 
subject that the text performs, there is a person here” who seeks to  
 
Uproot…ordinary and academic discourse on sexuality. The writing of this 
denaturalization was not done simply out of the desire to play with language or 
prescribe theatrical antics in the place of “real” politics, as some critics have 
conjectured (as if theatre and politics are always distinct). It was done from a desire to 
live, to make life possible, and to rethink the possible as such. What would the world 
have to be like for my uncle to live in the company of family, friends, or extended 
kinship of some other kind? How must we rethink the ideal morphological constraints 
upon the human such that those who fail to approximate the norm are not condemned 
to death within life (xx). 
 
Her book took shape not through academic ambition but a personal need to combine her 
work with her personal life. She says, “At the same time that I was ensconced in the academy, 
I was also living a life outside of those walls, and though Gender Trouble is an academic book, it 
began, for me, with a crossing-over, sitting on Rehoboth Beach, wondering whether I could 
link the different sides of my life (xvii).”  
 I had my Buddhist background, but I had developed habits around it that turned it into 
an antagonistic paradigm that I couldn’t relate to as I once did. I was somehow keeping myself 
from starting with the first Noble Truth of Buddhism that demands acknowledging your 
unromantic, unwanted painful condition before being able to move on to any approximation 
of ataraxia. Needing to feel more at home in that state of dis-ease, I found company in Cioran, 
Jean Améry, Kristeva, William Styron, Andrew Solomon’s Noonday Demon, and Sartre’s 
remarkable book on self-reinvention, Saint Genet. That is also around the time that I attended 
Mark Taylor’s seminar on Hegel and his interpreters, Kojève, Hyppolite, and Nancy, all of 
whom play an important role in the present work. Under this set of circumstances, I wrote 
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something on comparative depression for my MPhil exams, drawing on Buddhist discourses 
on suffering, Western melancholia, Hegel’s “unhappy consciousness” and so forth, and I 
intended to pursue the topic for my dissertation. Fortunately, working on that project was 
cathartic, and in combination with many other shifting conditions, I emerged from the hole I 
was in. The topic of comparative depression was still compelling to me, however, and I was 
going to start with a justification of my comparative methodology. As I started to write on 
comparative methodology, I began to see how thick was the wood of the history of 
philosophy, and that I needed to clarify what Western and Eastern canon even are, and how 
they could be brought together.  
 During this time, a minor event on my Facebook news feed made an impression on me. 
An old friend had posted a link to a CNN article with the headline, “Mindfulness as good as 
antidepressant drugs, study says.” Comments to the article included sentences like, “So long to 
the naysayers! Awesome.”, as well as, “But then the AMA can't sell their billions of $$$$ of 
brain-numbing toxic anti-depressants!” These commentators came from a Buddhist sub-
culture with which I have a long and complicated history. They perceived the article to be 
vindicating their own positions—Buddhist, spiritual, organic—over all others—presumably 
nihilist, materialistic, corporate and so forth. To them, Buddhism was triumphing over science 
and the psychotropics industry. To them, science had lent itself to the analysis of Buddhist 
teachings, and then laid down at the feet of Buddhist truth. Truth in the form of the syllogism 
Life is suffering; it has a cause; it can be mitigated; and the best way to do that is to follow the Buddhist 
teachings.  
 Was this what the article truly said? No. It outlined how some contemporary 
psychotherapists have incorporated “mindfulness therapy” into their treatment regimens for 
patients with moderate clinical depression. Those patients had already been treated with 
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psychotropics, and their doctors were trying to prevent relapse. According to the findings, 
mindfulness therapy was roughly as effective as psychotropics at preventing relapse. To me, 
this hardly seemed like a coup de grâce for any single ideology. The mindfulness therapy used in 
the study was part of the Buddhist meditative tradition; the therapists were trained and 
licensed by western psychiatric institutions; and the patients were benefiting from both as 
prophylaxes against something that tormented their quality of life. If there was any occasion 
for triumphalism, it was not of one credo over another, but of a discovery of new approaches 
to a major problem, a validation of alternative problem solving, and the possibility to 
contribute to the mitigation of suffering.  
 Often, converts to a heterogenous traditions like Buddhism take a competitive posture 
toward everything else. They believe they have discovered an ethics and metaphysics 
uncorrupted by the failings of the West, and they feel it their duty to balance the scales, 
cutting western hubris down to size. But this is really a correlate to western denigration of 
non-western thought. They compare in order to triumph. It is still a general truth that analytic 
philosophers scoff at the idealism of the East, which is often brought to them through pop-
culture or anti-intellectual pseudo-mysticism; continental philosophers remain tied to the 
Christian trinity or other such theistic roots, and they continue to claim a Greco-Roman 
copyright on philosophical thinking; adherents of Abrahamic religion glare at those without 
the Book, skeptical that any ethics or metaphysics is tantamount to their own. 
 But all of these orientations make it more difficult to find new paths away from the 
things that hurt us. Inhibiting prejudices shrink us and best us with pins and needles. 
Comparative philosophy, insofar as it demands some broadening, can help with that. One way 
is merely by providing more material to collide with other material, producing new reactions 
and combinations. Thus, comparative philosophy and interdisciplinary inquiry can ameliorate 
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a wide range of problems from institutional conservatism and cultural ignorance to personal 
dogmatism and failure to imagine new possibilities for being. Yet, despite the passage of 
considerable time, little progress has been made in building an institutional or coherent 
tradition of comparative philosophy. This is especially true compared to many other 
philosophical sub-fields like queer theory and feminism that have become much more relevant 
in a much shorter span of time. Those fields have succeeded because they have been looking 
for new ways for people to be and think; they affirm life and anything short of that is 
incomplete. Comparative philosophy, on the other hand, has often been an autistic cataloging 
of details and differences, or an obsession with scoring points in debate. For comparative 
philosophy to be anywhere as enriching as feminism and queer theory, like the method of 
natural sciences, it mustn’t settle on absolute conclusions but restlessly strive to go to new 
places beyond relativism and circular skepticism. On this point, the late Christopher Hitchens 
writes,   
It’s quite a task to combat the absolutists and the relativists at the same time: to 
maintain that there is no totalitarian solution while also insisting that, yes, we on our 
side also have unalterable convictions and are willing to fight for them. After various 
past allegiances, I have come to believe that Karl Marx was rightest of all when he 
recommended continual doubt and self-criticism. Membership in the skeptical faction 
or tendency is not at all a soft option... To be an unbeliever is not to be “open-minded.” 
It is, rather, a decisive admission of uncertainty that is dialectically connected to the 
repudiation of the totalitarian principle, in the mind as well as in politics.1  
 
He also spoke of how dispiriting it was for him to, “Have spent so long learning relatively so 
little and then to be menaced in every aspect of my life by people who already know 
everything, and who have all the information they need.”   
 What is standing in the way of realizing non-dogmatic methodologies? A major 
problem is that so many voices are simply not allowed into the conversation, or if they are, 
                                                
1 Hitchens, Christopher. Hitch-22: A Memoir. New York: Twelve, 2010 p. 420 
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they are misheard. This is generally what happens when trying to work seriously on non-
European philosophy in the western academy. Why is Eurocentrism so powerful and 
stubborn? It feeds off of the power of historiography. Who is arguably the most powerful 
modern historiographer? Hegel. How has Hegel fed the problem of Eurocentrism? In my 
case, I was immediately impressed with the subtlety and profundity of Hegel’s metaphysics, 
but I had no idea what to make of his historical philosophy, so deeply flawed in its 
Eurocentrism. For anyone with much knowledge of the traditions that Hegel so easily 
dismisses, many of his statements are hard to take seriously at all. At the root of this 
Eurocentrism I saw strong commitments to historical teleology, ontological hierarchy, and 
anthropocentrism, all of which struck me as anathema to the more abstract and expansive 
metaphysics of his Logic, especially the versions of it refined by commentators like Jean 
Hyppolite and Jean-Luc Nancy.  
 Teleology, hierarchy, anthropocentrism: Teleology posits that history had to look the 
way that it did because it is expressing some noble destiny, it is the unfolding of a primordial 
code. By hierarchy, I mean that Eurocentrism is aided by theories of ontological hierarchy, in 
which some things exist more than other things—some things are the beneficiaries of 
teleological destinies, and others not. Historically, this has manifested as the Eurocentric bias 
that other peoples are somehow less essential, that they are stepping stones lagging behind the 
crest of history. And the problem with anthropocentrism is that it always overlaps with 
teleology and hierarchy: If humans are what it’s all about, then we will naturally believe that 
humans have some destiny—some absolute is working through and for them. These attitudes 
in place, human subjectivity is more essential than anything else—it grants being to things less 
essential than it. A proliferation of ontological hierarchies ensues.  
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 Hegel inscribed all of these problems with very dark ink into the canons of philosophy 
and historiography, treating the African and the Oriental as inessential kindling feeding the 
European light. Having spent the bulk of my academic life engaged with Asian philosophies, I 
was not able to accept the conceptual accuracy of such a view, nor was I willing to accept its 
ethical implications. Eventually, I came to see that my focus on Eurocentrism was a pretext: 
teleology, hierarchy, and anthropocentrism also fuel misogyny, homophobia, and any number 
of other orientations that require a priori access to fixed essences, as well as an othering of 
inessential people and things. Yet Eurocentrism, especially in the academy, is a particularly 
good place to start The academy is where canons are built and guarded. Our three-headed 




The Separation of East and West: Eurocentrism and Canonization 
 
At the risk of stating the obvious, the canons of philosophy that we study in western 
academies are very small; they are very white; they are not very representative of the diversity 
of the world they claim to represent. The pillars of the canon, no doubt, attain their position 
through their own merits, which combine with external political, social, and economic factors 
that led to their entrenchment. Thus, merit is not sufficient for canonization, and many 
excellent resources are left on the margins, and the people connected to those resources are 
marginalized. Those on the outside of the canons suffer from illegitimacy—their voices are 
drowned out and their agency is weakened. Those on the inside evidently enjoy their position 
of power, but upon analysis, it can be shown that they are made small through their use of 
exclusion—they are not the open and expansive figures we have expected them to be. And 
yet, this state of affairs must be justified, and the self-interest at its core must be masked. 
Advantages and disadvantages must be explained as natural, and since canonization is a 
historical process, so history itself must be explainable as purposeful, as the expression of a 
necessity.  
 The social, political, and economic hierarchies that constitute what we would call 
Eurocentrism may be adequately explained as aleatory outcomes of geographical, nutritional, 
bacteriological processes, but such explanations do not satisfy our impulse to be more than 
aleatory beings. When we are down-and-out we do not go to the psychic reader to hear that 
this is our only life and that our situation is extremely circumscribed. We want to know that 
 2 
the kernel of our being was shared by Cleopatra or some courageous warrior, and that 
greatness will once again be ours someday. We like to know that we are of a noble code, that 
even if we are not at the very top, we are not at the very bottom, and that is for a reason.  
 In any society, individuals with advantages appeal to this reasoning, and on a global 
level, those who benefit from Eurocentrism have tried very hard to justify such beliefs. The 
process of canonization has been one of the most successful methods for justifying teleology. 
Not only do the canons need to be populated by the demographic in need of justification, the 
canonized theories themselves must sketch an elegant narrative of history as necessity.  
 Many left outside of the circle of legitimacy will not be happy to think that they belong 
there, but to convince themselves and others that the hierarchies are not unassailable, they 
must destabilize the canonical bulwarks set up to oppress them. We cannot stop thinking of 
others as inferior without an expansion of the canons we look to explain the world. Canons 
must open themselves to more voices within the very demographics they claim to represent, 
and they must also open to demographics that have been historically left out. This can be done 
through the practice of cross-cultural, comparative, or hybrid philosophy.  
  
Most people who have engaged in comparative philosophy up to this point have been 
philologists—of Sanskrit, Chinese, Japanese, Tibetan, etc. Philology allows them to engage in 
the hermeneutics of culturally heterologous texts. But to those invested in the dominant 
historiography, the many years the philologist has to spend acquiring odd languages leaves 
them with a suspicious air. Greek , Latin, and German, of course, are essential for philosophy, 
we’re told, but careful study of non-european languages simply indicates time wasted that 
could have been spent doing real scholarship. Brimming with these prejudices, Western 
philosophers, with the exception of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and a few others, have 
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generally not taken scholars of Buddhist and Indian philosophies seriously. The conversation, 
therefore, has been one-sided, with Buddhist philosophers showing great eagerness to present 
their ideas in more presentable Western terms, and Western philosophers rolling their eyes 
and sighing at the mention of non-European theories.   
 We can and should call this a willful, and frankly racist philistinism. We see a 
patronizing relegation of all Asian philosophies to the field of religious studies, as if the entire 
canons of thousands of philosophical texts are irreparably compromised by their proximity to 
eastern “religious” elements. This is still the reason you will not find Nagārjuna, Candrakīrti, 
Āryadeva, Dharmakīrti etc. taught in a philosophy department of a western university (with 
some very few exceptions, though the most common exceptions are most likely the addition to 
a syllabus of a one hour unit on Confucianism or some other non-canonical philosophy). 
Ironically, in many of the writings of these philosophers just mentioned one finds barely a 
mention of the word Buddha or any other term with overt religious connotations.  Certainly 
one finds no more use of what might be considered religious-sounding terminology than one 
finds in the writing of Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, and so forth. Yet those in a 
position to loosen this pinching of philosophy’s canon show no inclination to do so, and people 
with adequate knowledge to teach non-European philosophical traditions are not welcomed 
into the departments of philosophy. Scan the faculties of the top philosophy departments of 
Western research universities and you will find very few exceptions.2 Philosopher Owen 
                                                
2 Exceptions include the University of Durham and Liverpool University, neither of which grant PhDs. An 
informative list can be found here: http://www.h-net.org/~buddhism/GradStudies.htm 
The list is a fairly comprehensive compilation of post-graduate institutions offering Asian philosophy programs. 
The only universities whose philosophy departments house Asian philosophy experts are The University of 
Hawaii; Hong Kong University; University of Mumbai; University of Tasmania; and the University of Utah (I 
would add the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and SUNY Binghampton). Every other specialist in Asian 
philosophy is housed in a Religion department, with the exception of places like University of Tokyo and several 
Korean institutions, which have their own Buddhist philosophy departments or other culturally specific 
programs. 
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Flanagan, who works in one of the few philosophy departments that does tolerate non-
European research (at Duke University) has observed the elephant in the room that I am 
describing:  
There are some excellent Buddhist scholars, but almost none of them teach in 
philosophy departments at research universities in America that offer PhDs (although 
many excellent ones teach and do research in religion departments at research 
universities and in philosophy departments at excellent liberal arts colleges). This is 
strange given that Buddhism is so philosophically rich, contains ideas about personal 
identity and the metaphysics of nature and causation that ought to appeal to 
contemporary philosophers, and especially given that as many as one in twelve people 
on earth are Buddhists.3   
 
 One would think that chairs of philosophy departments, provosts and other gatekeepers of 
the Academy have justifications for the exclusion of non-European traditions, but we hear 
fewer and fewer explicit reasons for such exclusion. It definitely does not come from having 
studied canonical texts from other cultures, such as the rich and rigorous commentarial 
(śāstra) literature of India. Contemporary philosophers and scholars know better than to take 
up overtly biased cultural stances, and so they remain silent on the matter, relying on the 
sheer momentum of the dominant historiography constructed on the pillars of Plato, 
Christianity, German Idealism, and Anglo-empiricism. Philosophy has been considered a 
certain thing for so long, why rock the boat? But Western philosophy has already supplied the 
categories that undermine any claims of having a monopoly on philosophy. Those categories 
are the traditional branches of the discipline: metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. To deny 
that non-Europeans have philosophy proper is to deny that they worked on metaphysics, 
ethics, and epistemology in any systematic way. When Western philosophers and scholars 
remain silent on the inclusion of non-Western metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, they 
betray reservations about whether or not non-Europeans have ever achieved those levels of 
                                                
3 Flanagan, Owen. The Bodhisattva’s Brain. Boston: MIT, 2011 
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thinking. The accusation I am making is indeed broad, and I would not expect anyone to 
admit to it. Therefore, much of this essay will be dedicated to drawing out just how strong an 
influence the historiography of philosophy has had on our minds and institutions.  
   Philosophical advances result from considering something from another’s point of 
view, and then adding something of one’s singular experience to it. This is the basic notion of 
the history of philosophy and what sets philosophy apart from revelation. If a philosopher sees 
no benefit in considering the points of view of thousands of thinkers outside of his own socio-
cultural sphere, then it is hard to see how this does not add up to a certain intellectual penury. 
Of course, if he critically engages a significant portion of those philosophical canons and finds 
them lacking, that is another matter. That would be proper criticism, and the rigorous 
engagement with disparate philosophies would yield properly dialectical results. This is often 
what happens generationally within a single vein of philosophy: for example, the branching of 
Husserl to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre—each of whom are trying to correct blind 
spots; or in good polemic, like we might find in the Tibetan philosophical debates between 
luminaries like Tsongkhapa, Dolpopa, and Gorampa…    
 An important point must be made now and repeated often: comparative philosophy 
cannot demand that everyone become expert in a non-European tradition—it must be a 
matter of attitude more than of content. To ask a specialist in ancient Greek philosophy to 
spend several years plumbing the depths of medieval Chinese theories, or of modern Tibetan 
philosophy, is unreasonable. Such a person able to split their time and interests so evenly 
would be supernatural. There is simply not enough time in the day for most people to do so. 
Moreover, academic accomplishment rides on the wings of taste. People follow their unique 
interests and do what they like. To do otherwise is to invite burn-out or boredom.  Also, is 
such evenhandedness even a virtue in philosophy? How can objectivity coexist with polemic, 
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criticism, and dialectics? Philosophy without conviction is philosophy that nobody wants to 
read. One has to take a stand on something. Only the most ineffectual relativist will deny that 
there are degrees of right and wrong, true and false. But there is a difference between taking a 
stand and being dogmatic. The exclusion of non-European philosophy from the canons of 
philosophy is not the result of measured criticism, but of dogmatic, knee-jerk reactions to 
material that is historically and culturally alien to the West.  
 In his book Orientalism and Religion, Richard King analyzes the racial and cultural 
tension inside our historiographies of philosophy and religion:  
Specifically the characterization of Indian religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism 
as mystical has also tended to support the exclusion of Hindus and Buddhists from the 
realm of rationality... Indian forms of systematic thought have usually been excluded 
from the realm of philosophical debate on the grounds that they are tainted with 
“theological” assumptions that are culture-specific (as if this were not the case in the 
West).4 
 
Despite ontological proofs of God’s existence, rationalizations of the Trinity, proofs of the 
immortality of the soul and so forth, Western philosophers stubbornly insist that their 
tradition is free from superstition and has been the exclusive realm of reason since the 
Greeks—or at least since the Enlightenment; or if not, then Kant. This is possible because of 
the weight and influence of the historiography behind them. This historiography, 
paradoxically, begins with the planetary figures of Socrates and Plato and their successors 
contraposed to a handful of antagonistic figures: cynics, sophists, Epicureans, Pythagoreans, 
and so forth. Their crime? Mostly, they failed to bifurcate the world, to conjure a 
transcendent world. They kept their eyes on the ground and hence failed to see the Truth 
above their heads, above their own world.  
                                                
4 King, Richard. Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India, and the “Mystic East”. New York: Routledge, 
1999. 
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 The next pillar in our historiography is neo-Platonism and its great monotheistic 
proponents, particularly Christian ones such as Aquinas and Augustine. But this 
historiography did not grow organically out of preëxisting systems of thought. It was 
constructed carefully and willfully. It was imperative for Christianity to find a foundation for 
its vision of transcendence, denial of the material world, and Pauline fear of the body. A 
symbiosis was possible with Platonism and its realm of hovering, transcendent truth 
 The third pillar of this historiography is German Idealism: Kant, Hegel, and the long 
chain of phenomenological and existential philosophers from Germany and France. Before 
them, Anglo-empiricism had its dawn and was taken up by the encyclopedists of 
Enlightenment France, Hume, Utilitarians, and then merged with the explosion of scientific 
discovery in the 19th and 20th century and Pragmatism to create the powerful sub-genres of 
contemporary analytic philosophy and cognitive science. However, the Enlightenment 
capitulated to theology by allowing it the unassailable fortress of Deism—something that was 
only half offensive to both  theists and advocates of a Reason antithetical to it. Through the 
political power of European Christian institutions, God remained alive in the hearts of the 
people, and he stayed alive in the minds of philosophers, either for reasons of utility—“it is 
useful for people to believe in God, otherwise they will be unruly”—or as a depository for all 
the useful Platonic Ideas that had been carefully guarded by Neo-Platonist Christian writers.  
 Kant, though, gets the credit for uniting the empiricist tradition with the Idealism he 
inherited via his Christian European heritage. By sublimating both these traditions, Kant 
manages to maintain Plato-Christian Idealism while simultaneously buttressing it against any 
comparison to more primitive mystical-religious modes of thinking. Idealism becomes pure 
science. Ideas that were formerly part of the realm of scholastic theological philosophy now 
get divided between philosophy, which has no brook with anything beyond the pale of reason, 
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and theology, which goes after the intuitions of mystical experience. Figures of the latter 
project include influential theologians such as Swedenborg and Schleiermacher, and the 
progenitors of what we now call Religious Studies: Rudolph Otto and Max Müller especially. 
According to Kant, between rationality, mysticism, and empiricism, it is empiricism that puts 
all philosophical value in jeopardy: 
Guarding against the empiricism concerning practical reason is much more important 
and advisable; for, the mysticism [concerning practical reason] is in fact still compatible 
with the purity and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, stretching one’s power of 
imagination all the way to suprasensible intuitions is not exactly natural and 
commensurate with the common way of thinking, so that on this side the danger is not 
so general. By contrast, the empiricism [concerning practical reason] eradicates by the 
root the morality in attitudes (in which, after all, and not merely in actions, consists the 
high worth that humanity can and ought to procure for itself through morality), and 
substitutes for it something entirely different, namely in place of duty an empirical 
interest, with which inclination as such traffic among themselves. Precisely because of 
this, moreover, empiricism—along with all inclination which (no matter what style 
they are given) degrade humanity if they are elevated to the dignity of a supreme 
practical principle, and which are nonetheless so indulgent to everyone’s mentality—is 
for this reason far more dangerous than any fanaticism, which can never amount to a 
lasting state of many human beings.5   
 
Thus, empiricism that would insist that moral actions be judged in terms of their possibilities 
and effects in this world, is condemned as degrading, indulgent, and nihilistic. The supreme 
law standing under Kant’s ethics is not empirical, and so can make use of mystical discourse 
about other unempirical things, such as religious experiences. Like a Deist who keeps God 
around for his value as an ethical heuristic, Kant tolerates mystical discourse as one of the few 
avenues for taking seriously the a priori categories of Idealism. His aim is not as simple as 
diving the world into that which you can say something about and that which you can’t—we 
will see other philosophers who do this, without less of the theological foundation that I am 
pointing out in Kant. The more one engages in Kantian criticism, the more one is expected to 
                                                
5 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002 p. 93-94 
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see that belief —in a priori ethical and metaphysical principles—becomes necessity. Reason is 
the source of and the explanation for everything:  
In case practical reason were presupposed as pathologically conditioned, i.e., as merely 
administering the interest of the inclinations under the sensible principle of happiness, 
this demand could not be made on speculative reason at all. Mohammed’s paradise or 
the theosophists’ and mystics’ fusion with the deity, each [thinker] after his own mind, 
would have no reason at all as to surrender it in this way to all sorts of dreams. But if 
pure reason by itself can be practical and actually is, as is evinced by the consciousness 
and moral law, it is always one and the same reason which, whether for a theoretical or 
a practical aim, judges according to a priori principles.6  
 
Reason stands alone and becomes science, independent of religion or the religious history of 
all the terms that it uses. It sublimates Christian discourse into science: this formulation of 
Kant’s, which grew out of Plato-Christian Idealism, becomes the measure of all modern 
sciences, social and natural. Kant lets the deity out of the house and Reason steps in as 
custodian.7  
 This secularized idealism leads to what Georges Palante calls the secular priestly 
spirit:8 an outgrowth of Plato-Christian Idealism given yet another layer of credibility through 
secular inversion.  
The secular priest considers himself a laborer in a disinterested task. Nothing selfish 
must be mixed in with his mission. He works for the pure idea; at least he claims so, 
and sometimes even believes it. Nietzsche noted devotion to truth among our free-
thinkers and atheists, the final incarnation of the ascetic ideal. 
 
                                                
6 ibid. pg. 154 
7 A rigorous analysis of how Kant arrives at this can be found in Amos Funkenstein’s Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination: from the MIddle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986 chapt. VI:  
“Within the domain of pure reason, the infinite judgment permits the transformation of the concept of a 
“sum total of all possibilities” into that of a “most perfect being” or most real being. The methodological 
concept of God was banned from the interpretation of nature, but is still retained a certain role as a 
regulative ideal of reason (as the principle of complete determination). In our language we might say: God 
remained, even in the Critique of Pure Reason, a metatheoretical assumption, an assumption that, albeit 
redundant in the explanation of nature, is nonetheless almost “natural” to our reason. Kant expelled the 
methodological concept of God from the theory of science and grounded the universality of natural law 
and uniformity of nature without it; but its shadow persisted. The concept of God, he argued, is a natural 
shadow or projection of principles we used to structure nature. The shadow, Kant seems to have claimed, 
is virtually inescapable. But it is only a shadow.” 
8 http://www.marxists.org/archive/palante/1909/secular-priest.htm 
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Despite the protestations of Nietzsche, Palante and a few others, the secular priestly spirit 
became the standard orientation of both Idealists and self-professed non-Idealists 
(nominalists, materialists, empiricists etc.). A major figure in the latter group is the British 
empiricist, Bertrand Russell, who receives much credit for the doxographical split between 
Idealist Continental Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy. The former, it is argued, subjects 
Truth to cultural and social contingencies and remains distracted by metaphysical and 
theological speculation. Analytics, on the other hand, are seekers of Truth alone, and they find 
it by following Reason alone, unpolluted by any contingencies. Richard King analyzes 
Russell’s Mysticism and Logic (1914) pointing out how he attributes four damning 
characteristics to non-rational, non-scientific discourse:  
(1) valuing insight (intuition) over discursive analytical knowledge (reason), (2) belief 
in unity (i.e. a monistic inclination), (3) a denial of the reality of time and an assertion 
of the timeless (following on from 2.), and finally, (4) a belief that all evil is mere 
appearance (again derived from 2 and 3).9  
 
What does all this intellectual history have to do with race? While Russell does not necessarily 
fix these characteristics to races, these are the very characteristics that, since at least the 
Enlightenment, came to characterize the thinking of non-Europeans (subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate this, especially as is manifests in Hegel’s corpus). Kant made the clear distinction 
between systems of mystical intuition and those of discursive reason (“Oriental religions” 
belong to the former, whereas Christianity is sublimated into the latter), and we will see the 
large role that Hegel played in racializing this distinction.  
 The association of monism and intuition to the “mystical East” has been an indelible 
feature of western intellectual history: one only need to recall the popular joke about the 
proverbial Zen master or the Dalai Lama: “The Dalai Lama walks up to a hot dog stand and 
                                                
9 King 32. 
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says, 'make me one with everything’.10” While the West does harbor a good deal of intuitive11 
monist thinkers like Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, Tertullian, and so forth, they evidently do not 
fatally corrupt the Western tradition, because the Western tradition, it is assumed, invented 
Reason and maintains unique purchase on it. Any thinkers who drift into intuition and 
Spinoza-esque monism, or pantheism, simply render the history more colorful, but they are 
purified of their mistakes by proximity to the lights of Reason—lights that are invariably 
white and European.  
 Attempts to bring Asian and African philosophy into the discourse seldom get past the 
terminological redoubt set up against them. Perhaps except for some contemporary Neo-
Confucian/Marxists in China, and the figures of Japan’s Kyoto School of the mid 20th 
century, almost no philosophers of Asia escape a qualifying prefix that relegates their thinking 
to a pseudo-philosophical pigeonhole, an "ethno-philosophy" or theology far removed from the 
discursive realm of Reason so carefully described by Kant and his successors. They become 
“Buddhist Philosophy,” or “Hindu”—both bugaboo words embodying every negative 
connotation loaded onto the words mystical, monist, intuitive. Perhaps less mystical, but 
equally exotic and therefore problematic are Confucians; and even more obscure: some 
strangers who advocate something called Nyāya,12 or sundry other Indian pretenses of 
rigorous thought. Terms like "Buddhist philosophy" and "Hindu philosophy" are bandied 
about with confidence, but the guardians of Western philosophical history have yet to 
consider the history of those terms. These guardians are often the same people who bristle at 
reductionistic broadsides against Religion, Christianity, and Monotheism, for example, from 
                                                
10 Youtube hosts an amusing video of a reporter addressing the Dalai Lama with the joke, “the Dalai Lama walks 
into a pizzeria and says, ‘make me one with everything,’” which is entirely lost on him. 
11 Implying paradoxical direct perception or direct knowing of the ineffable, the sublime. 
12 One of the most logic-heavy, epistemologically rigorous systems of thought in India, or the world. 
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those of the New Atheism movements. Outright rejection of the monotheistic paradigm, they 
argue, fails to appreciate the diversity of religious outlooks, many of which do not resemble 
fundamentalist caricatures. We must recognize the epistemological advancements made by 
someone like William of Ockham and his nominalists; the radical Idealism of George 
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne; of course the Catholic scholastics; the philosophical implications 
of Luther and Calvin; Hegel’s exegesis of the Trinity, and so forth.  These thinkers made such 
revolutionary additions to the canon; it would be absurd to reduce them all just because they 
hail from the monotheistic tradition, however prone that may be to criticism. We recognize 
their philosophies, and we recognize that those philosophies arose from places with their own 
histories and conditions. We have no problem with the philosophical renaissance associated 
with the Protestant Reformation. We are even ready to attribute many new directions of 
European thinking directly to that very event, so deeply embedded in context. Hegel, as we 
will see in the next chapter, even goes so far as to identify the Protestant Reformation as a 
necessary condition of high-level philosophy and absolute knowledge.  
 In pointing out these problems, I mean to suggest that rigorous deductive reasoning 
has always coexisted with esoteric, non-deductive, alternative ways of thinking in the West 
just as much as in the East. However, the West has never acknowledged that the East 
possesses something akin to Reason—some sense of a distinction between different modes of 
thinking: one that is linked to intuition, the sublime, ineffability, and another that tries to 
cultivate knowledge based on reasoning, verifiable propositions etc. In the intellectual history 
of Europe and the rest of the world, it is important to continue to uncover the variety of 
traditions that follow the mode of Reason in the sense just explained, while remembering that 
they developed alongside modes of thinking that fall outside the strictures of Reason. Rational 
and non-rational thought enjoy a complex and productive relationship in the West, and the 
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same goes for other parts of the world. The main difference is that elsewhere; intellectual 
traditions emerged from radically different contexts than we know in the West (systematic 
atheism, polytheism etc.). For example, the Tibetan philosophical tradition theorizes 
extensively about various modes of knowing: one that is conceptual, discursive, language-
bound, based on ordinary object-subject dualist-epistemology; and another mode that 
unmediated by language, unlinked from the chain of thought-after-thought, one in which 
dualist epistemology loses traction. The former mode of knowing is the domain of study, logic, 
reasoning and rational thought, while the latter mode is the domain of meditation, of letting 
those frameworks drop away and having a subtly different mode of experience.13 There is 
                                                
13 Such matters are discussed endlessly in Tibetan commentarial and polemical literature—the two literary forms 
that house arguably the bulk of its massive philosophical canon. See, for example, the following summary of the 
views of the Tibetan philosopher Gorampa (15th c.), which mentions his famous polemics with the great 
Tsongkhapa (14th c.), arguably the most influential Tibetan philosopher of all time:  
Kassor, Constance, "Gorampa [go rams pa]", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/gorampa/>: 
“In order to explain the difference between a conceptual understanding and a nonconceptual realization 
of the ultimate truth, Gorampa divides it into two types: the nominal ultimate (don dam rnam grangs pa) 
and the actual ultimate (don dam dngos). The nominal ultimate corresponds to an ordinary person's 
understanding of the ultimate, while the actual ultimate is what is perceived by enlightened beings. 
Similarly, Gorampa contends that the conventional truth is also divided according to the perspective of 
ordinary and enlightened beings: the former perceive conventional truth (kun rdzob bden pa) while the 
latter understand it as mere convention (kun rdzob tsam). 
Again, the conventional truth is that which is true for ordinary, unenlightened beings (such as 
the Eiffel Tower). Mere convention, on the other hand, is a term that corresponds to the perspective of 
enlightened beings. When highly realized beings (āryas, who are superior to ordinary beings on the 
Buddhist path, but not yet fully enlightened buddhas) engage in meditation (rnyam gzhag), they directly 
and nonconceptually perceive the ultimate truth. Once they emerge from their meditative states (rjes 
thob), however, they realize that the things that they had previously understood to be conventionally 
“true” are not actually true. After an ārya has directly realized the ultimate, conventional things appear 
as merely conventional. This mere convention is not false; it is simply understood as a mode of perception 
that is subordinated to the ultimate truth that has been directly experienced in meditation. 
It is important to note that conventional objects, such as the Eiffel Tower, tables, persons, 
ideas, and so on, are the same regardless of whether their existences are understood as conventionally 
true or mere conventions. The difference between conventional truth and mere convention is based 
entirely on the subject who apprehends these objects. The same table appears as truly existent to an 
ordinary being, and as a mere conceptual imputation to an ārya. (Tsongkhapa, on the other hand, 
distinguishes the two truths on the basis of the object, arguing that every object consists of an ultimate 
and a conventional aspect (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad). Tsongkhapa contends that these two aspects are 
not substantially different, but only differ conceptually. Nevertheless, the important distinction here is 
that for Tsongkhapa, the difference between the two truths is made on the basis of the apprehended 
object (yul), while for Gorampa, the distinction is made on the basis of the mind of the apprehending 
subject (yul can). 
 14 
such an awareness of the distinction between these different modes of knowledge that rich 
lexicons developed to denote their subtlety. For example, there is an elaborate system 
outlining the proper progression of knowledge. First one “listens,” or studies by means of 
language and empirical evidence (Tib: thos), attaining what they call the “acumen arising from 
listening” (thos pa las byung ba’i shes rab);14 then one reflects (bsam), synthesizing what one has 
learned, making judgments, clarifying understanding; then finally one meditates (sgom), 
bracketing the frameworks that guided the previous two steps, suspending judgment and 
relaxing the machinations of the mind. This final stage is meant to give the opportunity for 
insights or breakthroughs to occur spontaneously. These insights are important as subtle 
destabilizers of habitual epistemes. Without them, learning and thinking may only be a 
fruitless cycle of exhaustion.  
 In his memoir, former Tibetan monk and current professor at Williams College, 
Georges Dreyfus writes about these three stages of learning that guided his many years of 
study in a Tibetan monastery:  
A similar model exists in the Western Christian tradition, particularly in the monastic 
culture of the High Middle Ages. Then, too, the path to wisdom involved three levels 
of practice. First, texts were read with reverence and often memorized. There were 
then meditated on to pierce their deeper meaning. This meditation, the equivalent of 
what I described above as thinking, leads us to a higher perception (contemplation) 
that is not unlike what Buddhists call meditation. The similarity between these two is 
obviously only partial, but it suggests substantial converges between Western monastic 
culture and Indian monasticism that are quite relevant to our exploration of Tibetan 
scholasticism.  
 This threefold model of monastic culture was gradually replaced during the late 
Middle Ages by a scholastic model based on commentary, debate, and preaching. 
                                                                                                                                                       
With respect to the ultimate truth, the nominal ultimate is an ordinary being's conceptual 
understanding of what the ultimate truth is like. After studying Buddhist scriptures and learning 
philosophy, ordinary beings come to understand the ultimate truth in the Madyamaka sense as 
emptiness. The actual ultimate truth corresponds to that which is directly experienced by fully 
enlightened buddhas, and āryas in meditation. The real ultimate truth is free from all concepts, including 
the concepts of emptiness and interdependence. It is a state that is entirely nonconceptual, and is the end 
goal of the Buddhist path.” 
14 See Dreyfus, 2003:165. 
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Rather than focus on cultivating wisdom by ruminating on texts, Christian medieval 
intellectuals moved toward an ideal of useful knowledge, which could be used in 
preaching, teaching, and so on. Similarly, Tibetan scholasticism has tended toward 
high intellectual culture less directly tied to the process of meditative internalization; 
the change began in the twelfth century, and culminated around the turn of the 
sixteenth century with the consolidation of scholastic institutions in the Ge-luk 
tradition. But Tibetan scholasticism never severed its connection with the ideal of 
developing wisdom.15   
 
Awareness of a distinction between epistemological modes shows itself in distinct bodies of 
Sanskrit and Tibetan literature, as well as distinct institutions. One can attain the rank of 
great scholar (Sanskrit: paṇdiṭa)) by mastering the “five sciences” (pañcavidyāsthāna): science 
of language (śabdavidyā), science of logic (hetuvidyā), science of medicine (cikitsāvidyā), science 
of fine arts and crafts (śilakarmasthānavidyā), and science of spirituality (adhyātmavidyā). These  
sciences composed the curriculum of the ancient world's most illustrious university, Nālandā, 
founded in the fifth century. The university attracted tens of thousands of students from as far 
as Sumatra and Korea until its demise at the hand of Turkish invaders in the twelfth century. 
I will have much more to say on the topic throughout this essay, but when Eurocentric 
intellectuals cite the West's relatively higher rate of discovery in the material sciences as proof 
of teleological history, it is fair to speculate on what may have been accomplished at Nālandā 
and similar institutions had they not been completely destroyed by the savage spillover of the 
crusades happening to the West.16 To defend teleological western historiography one must 
                                                
15 ibid. 167 
16 Consider the scholars at work for the few hundred years that Nalanda and its sister university, Vikramashila 
were functioning: at Vikramashila were: Buddhajñānapāda; Dīpaṁkarabhadra; Jayabadhra; Śrīdhara; 
Bhavabhaṭṭa; Bhavyakīrti; Līlavājra; Durjayacandra; Samayavajra; Tathāgatarakṣita; Bodhibhadra; 
Kamalarakṣita 
As well as Vāgīsvarakīrti, Ratnavajra, Jñānaśrīmitra, Prajñākaramati, and the extremely influential Naropa. 
 Nalanda’s roster was even more impressive, including many of the most influential Asian philosophers of 
all time who continue to grow in influence as the western world discovers them: Nagarjuna (c. 2nd century 
C.E.); Aryadeva (c. 3rd century C.E.) ; Asanga (300-390 C.E.; Vasubandhu (c. 4th century C.E).; Dignaga (6th 
century C.E.); Dharmakirti (600-660 C.E.); Gunaprabha (c. 9th  century C.E.; Shakyaprabha; Buddhapalita 
(470-550 C.E.; Bhavaviveka (500-578 C.E.); Dharmapāla (530-561 CE.); Chandrakirti (600-650 C.E.);  
Silabadhra (the chinese philosopher Xuanzang, 7th century); Shantarakshita (725-788 C.E.); Kamalashila (c. 8th 
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systematically demonstrate how a intellectual hub like Nālandā was conceptually misguided, 
showing how the internal logic of their work could not lead to modern knowledge. I suspect 
that this will not or cannot be done. The other alternative is much easier: simply explain the 
history retrospectively, as if IIkhtiyar Uddin Khilji, the Turkish destroyer of Nālandā, was 
truly a messenger of the noble plan of history that was unfolding itself through the orgiastic 
violence that produced him. Perhaps it really was the pre-destined end for the land that first 
developed nearly every major mathematical concept,17 the world’s first formal grammar 
system,18 and countless major astronomical discoveries. Meanwhile, China completely 
dominated the realm of technology until the colonial age.19       
 To further the comparison, there is also a massive body of doxographical literature that 
exhaustively ranks and criticizes all the known philosophical positions of the Indo-Tibetan 
world. The word for that literature, (Tib.) grub mtha’, can, and many argue should, be 
translated as the English word “theory.” There are “schools of teaching” (Tib. bshad grwa), 
where one studies academic treatises (gzhung) including those of the highly developed field of 
reasoning (rigs pa, tshad ma etc.);20 and there are “schools of meditation” (sgrub grwa), where 
texts are generally abandoned and the focus is directly on the practice of meditation, though 
the genre of “songs of realization” (Skt. dōha; Tib. nams mgur) for inspiration. The stages of 
learning and thinking lead one to ever-refined levels of conceptual thinking (Skt. vikalpa; Tib. 
rnam rtog). The subtlety of one’s learning sets up conditions conducive to insights, “non-
                                                                                                                                                       
century C.E.); Haribhadra (700-770 C.E.); Vimuktisena (c. 6th century C.E.); Shantideva (c. 8th century C.E.) ; 
Atisha (980-1054 C.E.) 
17 zero, the decimal system, algebra, trigonometry, negative numbers, Pi etc. 
18 Pāṇini’s Sanskrit grammar, 6th century BCE. 
19 printing, gunpowder, crossbow, compass, paper, seismoscope, saddle and stirrups, porcelain, canal locks, 
mechanical clock, paper money, land mines, natural gas fuel, to name just a few. 
20 See, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-language-tibetan/ 
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conceptual” states of meditation.21 Different teachers from different lineages emphasize one 
episteme more than another: depending on one’s inclinations and abilities, one can follow the 
path of study, like scholastic monks, or one can almost wholly reject study in favor of arduous 
meditation and solitude, like Tibet’s most famous meditator, Milarepa. Most of Tibet’s famous 
philosophers tried to strike a perfect balance between these two.     
 These examples are adduced to show how a non-European tradition has distinguished 
between different levels of epistemology, and how the differentiation of discourses is not a 
Western invention. Drawing these connections is one valuable function of comparative 
philosophy, but it is not the intent of the present work. I will limit myself to just a few more 
examples.      
 A pioneering scholar of Indian logic, Theodor Stcherbatsky,whose 1930 book, Buddhist 
Logic influenced a generation of specialists, writes in his preface:  
There is a widely spread prejudice that positive philosophy is to be found only in 
Europe. It is also a prejudice that Aristotle’s treatment of logic was final; that having 
had in this field no predecessor, he also has no need of a continuator. This last 
prejudice seems to be on the wane. There is as yet no agreed opinion on what the 
future of logic will be, but there is a general dissatisfaction with what it at present is. 
We are on the eve of a reform. The consideration at this juncture of the independent 
and altogether different way in which the problems of logic, formal as well as 
epistemological, have been tackled by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti will possibly be of 
some importance.  
 The philosopher in thus considering and comparing two different logics will 
perceive that there are such problems which the human mind naturally encounters on 
                                                
21 See Thurman 1991: 158 (glossary):  
“conceptualization (vikalpa). This brings up another important group of words that has never been treated 
systematically in translation: vikalpa, parikalpa, samarōpa, adhyarōpa, kalpanā, samjñā, and prapañca. All of these 
refer to mental functions that tend to superimpose upon reality, either relative or ultimate, a conceptualized 
reality fabricated by the subjective mind. Some translators have tended to lump these together under the rubric 
“discursive thought,” which leads to the misleading notion that all thought is bad, something to be eliminated, 
and that sheer “thoughtlessness” is enlightenment, or whatever higher state is desired. According to Buddhist 
scholars, thought in itself is simply a function, and only thought that is attached to its own content over and 
above the relative object, i.e., “egoistic” thought, is bad and to be eliminated. Therefore, we have chosen a set of 
words for the seven Skt. terms: respectively, “conceptualization,” “imagination,” “presumption,” “exaggeration,” 
“construction,” “conception” or “notion,” and “fabrication.” This does not mean that these words are not 
somewhat interchangeable or that another English word might not be better in certain circumstances; it only 
represents an attempt to achieve consistency with the original usages. 
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his way as soon as he begins to deal with truth and error. Such are, e.g., the problems 
of the categories and of relations; of the synthetical and analytical judgments; of 
infinity, infinite divisibility, of the antinomies and of the dialectical structure of the 
understanding. From under the cover of an exotic terminology he will discern features 
which he is accustomed to see differently treated, differently arranged, assigned 
different places in the system and put into different contexts. The philosopher, if he 
becomes conversant with the style of Sanscrit compositions, will be tempted not only 
to interpret Indian ideas in European terms, but also to try the converse operation and 
to interpret European ideas in Indian terms.22  
 
However, since these words were written in 1930, very few people have ventured into such 
comparative work. Granted, three quarters of a century ago, it would have been difficult 
indeed to become “conversant with the style of Sanscrit compositions” without knowing 
Sanskrit one’s self. Translations of primary texts were scant. But the same was true of texts 
from any language. For example, it took fifty-seven years for Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to 
be translated into English. Access to texts is no longer a valid excuse for completely ignoring 
vast swathes of literature. More than a hundred years of philological toil combined with 
modern technologies of distribution have produced a critical mass of material that is easily 
available. While it is wonderful to learn Sanskrit or some other canonical language, and the 
work of translation is virtually inexhaustible and should continue, it is now possible to use 
translated non-European texts, just as we in the Anglophone world use translations of 
everything from Plato to Derrida. Thus, rather than unfold a lengthy apology of another 
tradition, I believe it suffices to refer people to the shelves and shelves of material now 
available in English, but which collects dust, except in the hands of a very few.23  
 The highly regarded contemporary logician, Graham Priest, is one of the few 
“Western” philosophers to engage with translated material germane to his field. In a 2010 
                                                
22 Stcherbatsky, Th. Buddhist Logic. vol. 1. New York: Dover, 1962 pg. xii 
23 The work of Stcherbatsky, K.N. Jayatilleke, Tom Tillemans, John Dunne, and Georges Dreyfus are 
exemplary, but there are countless others who have contributed to the field. So much so, that it is quite absurd to 
still wonder if there are proper non-European logical traditions. Cursory internet searches for 
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article, he analyzes an idea central to classical Buddhist logic, the catuṣkoṭi (Greek: 
tetralemma). Eighty years after Stcherbatsky’s suggestion, Priest suspects there is something to 
be gained from looking closely at this logical concept, which does not quite fit with the canons 
of Western logic. He does not make a show of his open mindedness, as if as a great Western 
logician he is doing some favor to the Indian tradition by speaking about them. He just wants 
to understand an important logical concept, assuming that he is missing out by not studying it: 
The catuskoti is a venerable principle in Buddhist logic. How it was deployed seems to 
have varied somewhat over the thousand-plus years of Indian Buddhism. However, it 
was clearly a contentious principle in the context of Indian logic. It is equally 
contentious to modern commentators, though the contention here is largely in how to 
understand it—including how to interpret it in terms of modern logic. As one modern 
commentator puts it (Tillemans 1999, 189): 
   
  Within Buddhist thought, the structure of argumentation that seems most resistant to our  
 attempts at a formalization is undoubtedly the catuskoti or tetralemma. 
 
For a start, the catuskoti, whatever it is, is something which sails very close to the wind 
of violating both the Principles of Excluded Middle and of Non-Contradiction. 
Commentators who know only so-called “classical” logic, in particular, are therefore 
thrown into a tizzy. 
 The point of this article is to make sense of the catuskoti from the enlightened 
position of paraconsistent logic. I shall not attempt to discuss all the historical thinkers 
who appealed to the catuskoti. I shall be concerned mainly with how it functioned in 
the thought of Nagarjuna and his Madhyamaka successors. Here, its use is, perhaps, 
both the most sophisticated and the most puzzling.24 
 
Priest shows an awareness of the catuskoti’s provenance—that it is quite different from what 
he and his colleagues are accustomed to. However, he simply acknowledges this and proceeds 
to study it. It’s foreignness is not turned into an epistemological obstacle. Once he studies it, 
he understands it. He does not see this particular logical problem as hopelessly tangled in 
webs of Oriental obscurity.  
                                                                                                                                                       
“bibliography+Buddhist logic” yield extensive results: http://www.ontology.co/biblio/buddhist-philosophy-biblio-
one.htm 
24 Priest, Graham. Comparative Philosophy Volume 1, No. 2 (2010): 24-54 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 
www.comparativephilosophy.org 
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 Such context is not usually a stumbling block in Western philosophy. Philosophical 
developments may very well have been constituted out of a complex of social, technological, 
and political conditions, but as long as those conditions are white and European, their 
legitimacy is ensured. Kant’s Reason rises out of the raw material of the contingent world and 
abides over and above it as a decontextualized Idea, however, one that is still inexplicably 
linked to white Europe.  
 Long ago, Augustine argued that Reason, the will to choose, was a gift from God 
belonging to an ordered system conceived by God himself: “Our wills themselves are in the 
order of causes, which is, for God, fixed, and is contained in his foreknowledge, since human 
acts of will are the causes of human activities.”25 The Reason given to human beings is 
structurally the same as God’s Reason; it is a splinter of it with the same molecular make up, 
so to speak. It is the cause of good action, because it can be the efficient cause of those actions, 
whereas, it cannot cause bad actions, since those actions have an intrinsically different 
character that cannot have been part of the wholly positive causal chain that comes from 
God’s order. Aquinas developed this rational theology even more, rendering God’s Reason the 
organizing principle and first cause of everything in the natural world.26 Abstracted away 
from the turmoil of all sentiment and contingency, God’s Reason, and by implication our own 
                                                
25 Augustine. City of God. New York: Penguin, 2003 p. 192 
26 Not all that much had changed by the mid 17th century when Milton wrote the following theological verses in 
Paradise Lost:  
but that the will 
And high permission of all-ruling Heaven 
Left him at large to his own dark designs, 
That with reiterated crimes he might 
Heap on himself damnation, while he sought [ 215 ] 
Evil to others, and enrag'd might see 
How all his malice serv'd but to bring forth 
Infinite goodness, grace and mercy shewn 
On Man by him seduc't, but on himself 
Treble confusion, wrath and vengeance pour'd. 
-http://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/pl/book_1/index.shtml 
 21 
Reason, is the perfect basis for the philosophical visions of Kant and Russell much later. Mark 
Taylor summarizes Aquinas’ contribution to this kind of thinking in his book, After God:  
He makes this all-important point concisely in his Summa Theologica: “There is will in 
God, just as there is intellect: since will follows upon the intellect.” Because God’s will 
is informed by his reason (or intellect), the world is always rational. “Now God is the 
cause of all things by His intellect,” Aquinas explains, “and therefore it is necessary 
that the exemplar of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has 
gone before. Hence, the exemplar of the order of things ordered towards an end is, 
properly speaking, providence.” In brief, Aquinas concludes: “Providence is the divine 
reason itself, which seated in the Supreme Ruler, disposes all things.”27 
 
Importantly, Aquinas was writing at the time when the Catholic Church was the strongest it 
had ever been. Whatever he published had more than enough economic and political support 
to catch on. This does not only mean that his version of Christianity would come to dominate, 
but also his version of Platonism and Aristotelian essentialism on which he based his 
theological system. Michel Onfray observes the historiographical implications of the Church’s 
power:  
Christianity, having become the official religion and philosophy, discards that which 
generated its lineage—Abderitan materialism; Leucippes’ and Democritus’ atomism; 
Epicurus and the Greek Epicureans; the late Romans; cynical nominalism; Cyreniac 
hedonism; sophist perspectivism and relativism—privileging what can pass as a 
propedaeutic to the new religion: dualism, the immaterial soul, reincarnation, the 
denigration of the material body, hatred for life, the taste for the ascetic ideal, and the 
post-mortem salvation or damnation of the Pythagoreans and Platonics suited it 
perfectly... Later on, Christianity watched, with unfeigned gladness, the flourishing of 
the spirit and tone of medieval scholasticism, experiencing the joy of its greatest hours 
again with the German idealism initiated by Kant and glorified by Hegel...28 
 
While the Protestant Reformation certainly destabilized a great deal of Augustine and 
Aquinas’ edifice and planted seeds for radical new visions to emerge, it did not, generally, 
assassinate the divine Subject operating under the principle of divine Reason, as is evident in 
                                                
27 Taylor 52 
28 Onfray 58. My translation. 
 22 
Kantian Idealism and even the absolutization of Reason promoted by Idealism’s Anglo-
American analytic antagonists.  
  Again, what does all of this have to do with race? When Reason becomes the defining 
characteristic of philosophy, and when Reason is defined in highly contextual, specifically 
theological ways, any people—though possessing analogous knowledge—who do not share 
the same terms and history are excluded from the realm of philosophy and the social and 
political capital it provides. While every philosopher today repudiates Aristotle’s taxonomy of 
intrinsic natures which render some humans slaves and others masters (corresponding to their 
geographical provenance, and by implication, skin color), it is fair to ask if such repudiations 
are sometimes only lip-service. Nearly every syllabus and every lecture on the introduction to 
philosophy29 starts with something like Daniel N. Robinson’s influential lectures for the 
Teaching Company, an institution that is very representative of the canons of the western 
academy. Robinson starts his lecture series with the question “What is philosophy and did the 
Greeks invent it?” The answer to the latter question, clearly enough to him, is yes, and he 
offers compelling reasons for why it is so. In chapter twelve we will see others influential 
writers like Antony Flew and Pierre Hadot arguing the same thing. Robinson defines 
“philosophy” in simple enough terms, saying, “The central aspect of the philosophical 
perspective, is a critical one, criticality, criticism, self-criticism. This is what is at the very 
center of the philosophical project, the philosophical way of thought, it's at the very center of 
the philosophical enterprise.” Despite the accomplishments of Homer, Aeschylus, the 
Egyptians, and others, Robinson argues—in chorus with the western tradition—that the truly 
critical and skeptical mind did not manifest until Pythagoras and Parmenides in the sixth 
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century BCE. But the justifications for this myth are far from clear. Despite his lasting 
contributions to mathematics and geometry—two favorite tools of later philosophers—
Pythagoras was nothing if not a mystic and believer of eternal truths unaffected by criticism 
and doubt. As summed up by Arnold Hermann in his book To Think Like a God: Pythagoras and 
Parmenides, The Origins of Philosophy, “A ‘philosophy’ that has to advocate corporeal purification 
and death for the potential obtainment of a more reliable insight does not inspire much 
confidence as a well-though-out approach (123).” The Pythagorean worldview was one of 
profound faith and belief in a non-empirical truth awaiting one in the afterlife, an unfounded 
confidence in the transmigration of the soul that included Pythagoras’ own claim to recall his 
previous existence. This could be a tale right out of the Indian or Tibetan esoteric traditions. 
However, those traditions—no matter how philosophical they may appear—must remain 
merely religious and not sufficiently critical to be included in the category in which we place 
the Greeks. We over-mine the rationality of Pythagoras at the altar of Reason, and we 
undermine his radically esoteric elements. Pythagoras’ esotericism does not and should not 
discredit him as a philosopher in the world canon, but we see similar esoteric commitments 
discrediting the entirety of Buddhist or Hindu traditions, not to speak of African, Pacific 
Islander, and other possible styles of systematic thought. In an excellent article for the New 
York Times’ philosophy column, Justin E. H. Smith concludes the following about 
“Philosophy’s Western Bias”:  
The West has an extremely rich philosophical tradition — one of the two or three 
richest, in fact — and it is eminently worthy of preservation and transmission to future 
generations. But its richness has always been a result of its place as a node in a global 
network through which ideas and things are always flowing. This was true in 500 B.C. 
and is no less true today. Increasingly, moreover, this interconnectedness is something 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 For example, Columbia University’s Core Curriculum course, “Introduction to [the foundations of] 
Contemporary [Western] Civilizations,” (brackets mine) begins with Plato’s Republic; it is up to individual 
instructors’ discretion to say anything at all about pre-Socratic philosophy. 
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that is not only of interest to the antiquarian trivia collector who can’t wait to tell you 
where the printing press really comes from. It is fast becoming the defining fact about 
our geopolitcal reality. In this reality, Western academic philosophy will likely come to 
appear utterly parochial in the coming years if it does not find a way to approach non-
Western traditions that is much more rigorous and respectful than the tokenism that 
reigns at present.30 
 
He notices that non-European philosophy is no longer closed off to only the few determined 
philologists that can penetrate difficult foreign languages. Geopolitical reality, including 
technology and the cumulative scholarship of generations, have piled the philosophical 
banquet tables high, but most of us stick to the bread and potatoes of European ancestors. It’s 
not that we taste the other food and dislike it, we seldom acknowledge that it’s there, don’t 
know it’s edible, or don’t know how to take off the shell. More important than even eating it 
and liking it is to simply acknowledge its place at the table—that somebody made it or 
harvested it—and not to dismiss it out of hand. The Western canon is parochial enough in its 
dismissal of pre-Socratic philosophy and those thinkers who retained its spirit through the 
centuries; it needn’t repeat the same mistake by trying to wall out everything else too. As 
Smith suggests, the opening of the canon in the coming decades may be inevitable, but 
whether the gates swing open smoothly or creak on rusty hinges will depend on how 
philosophy reforms the rationales of exclusion. These rationales, I believe, are fueled by 
metaphysics that reify teleology and thus lead to faith in a teleological history of the world—a 
history that includes the building of the canons of philosophy. The following chapters will 
criticize these metaphysics, mostly by looking into the ideas of a giant of metaphysical and 
historical philosophy: Hegel.      
 
  
                                                




The Special Case of African Philosophy 
 
With the help of Orientalism and the studies it inspired, Asian philosophies have managed to 
legitimize themselves slightly over the last fifty to one hundred years, even if they are still not 
sanctioned by university philosophy departments. African philosophy, however, has faced 
similar  but even more intransigent resistance from the philosophical establishment. Standard 
questions persist in academic conferences, classrooms, and conversations amongst white 
western philosophers: “Can we even speak of African philosophy? Has anything like 
philosophy arisen from Africa (excepting the Mediterranean regions with long ties to the 
Greco-Roman world)? Or most famously, Saul Bellow’s NY Times interview in which he 
asked, “Who is the Tolstoy of the Zulu’s? The Proust of the Papuans? I’d like to read him.” 
These questions are not as innocently historical as they try to sound. They are not so much 
concerned with excavating an African philosophy by looking at its cultural productions; nor 
are they much interested in explanations about all the historical factors that may have put 
African culture on a much different path than that of Europe. They assume an African ontology 
that lacks the necessary conditions for doing philosophy.  
 Of course, Aristotle told us, “The deliberative part of the soul is entirely missing in the 
slave”;31 and European history told us that the slave is nearly always African. Furthermore, 
when the Christian scholastics began to define human beings as those endowed with reason, 
those with slave natures who lacked the deliberative part of the soul were by necessity 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/philosophys-western-bias/ 
31 Aristotle. Politics. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998 p. 22 
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excluded from humanity itself. However, while slavery very slowly went out vogue, 
presuppositions about populations from whom slaves used to be drawn and their capacity for 
thinking remained. Mogobe B. Ramose inveighs against the damage this has not only caused 
Africans, of course, but also philosophy writ large and the institutions that support it:  
To deny the existence of African philosophy is also to reject the very idea of 
philosophy. It is to foreclose in advance the doors of communication with what we do 
not know. Yet, if the philosopher is the lover of wisdom, surely it is common sense that 
one cannot acquire wisdom by improving one’s skills to avoid listening to others. 
Hearing others is one thing but listening to them is quite another matter. The latter 
involves the possibility for communication. Accordingly, to deny oneself the 
opportunity for dialogue is to reject the possibility condition of becoming a 
philosopher. Dialogue being the basis of deliberation, it is clear that the liberation of 
philosophy is possible only through dialogue. For this reason it is imperative to take 
seriously Gracia’s warning to Continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophers, namely, that 
‘...the sorts of questions raised by Continental philosophers are frequently dismissed by 
analysts as illegitimate, and the questions they regard as legitimate are dismissed by 
Continental philosophers as trivial ... This technique of dismissal is a serious matter, 
for it clearly points to a kind of antiphilosophical dogmatic attitude that runs contrary 
to the very nature of the discipline as traditionally conceived... To reject at the outset 
any attempt and possibility of communication with those who oppose us is something 
that has always been criticized by philosophers and that, nonetheless, is generally 
accepted in the profession today. The curiosity to understand those who don’t think as 
we do is gone from philosophical circles to the detriment of the discipline. The 
situation, therefore, is intolerable not only from a practical standpoint but more 
important, because it threatens to transform the discipline into one more of the many 
ideologies that permeate our times, where differences of opinion are settled not 
through argument but through political action or force.’32 
 
The source of this problem, Ramose argues, is that European philosophies have unabashedly 
arisen out of European lived experiences, but similar productions from non-Europeans have 
been resisted or denied. Therefore, it is imperative for non-Europeans, and even disaffected 
Europeans to push back with their own philosophical productions that arise from life 
experience. For Ramose, “Resistance to this is tantamount to the rejection of liberation. It is 
precisely standing firm in the position of the de-liberation of philosophy”(6). For Africans to 
be liberated from an episteme that does not accurately process their experience, Ramose and 
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other African philosophers advocate the positive construction of new philosophies that are not 
mere “ethno-philosophies”; not meager and mimetic attempts at rigorous thinking, but 
philosophies that arise from the time and place of real living Africans, just as Western 
philosophies arise out of the real lives of Western men (and, much later, women).  
 Richard King argues, “The introduction of a variety of epistemic traditions is, in my 
view, the single most important step that post-colonial studies can take is to look beyond the 
Eurocentric foundations of its theories and contest the epistemic violence of the colonial 
encounter”(199). The violence of the colonial encounter and the historiography that it built 
even affects the way we read King’s prescription: “Indigenous epistemic traditions” do not 
have the ring of legitimate epistemological systems on the level of those of Western 
philosophy. However, the building of alternative models of doing philosophy is precisely what 
is needed to unchain majuscule Philosophy from its Platonic-Christian-Idealist pillars. It is 
also what is needed so that people outside of those three overlapping epistemes can still 
benefit from the perennial consolations of philosophy. As extant and future African, Indian, 
Chinese, and other non-European philosophies are better understood, they not only empower 
those associated with them, but they critically destabilize the static field of philosophical 
history and philosophical possibility. Richard King explains the benefits of this very clearly; 
and while he is speaking in the context of religion (I suggest that simply replacing ‘religion’ 
with ‘philosophy’ makes the same point):   
...It is important that the proliferation of such perspectives does not lead to 
fragmentation, and scholars wishing to explore alternative cultural models for 
understanding religion must be prepared to consider this to be a truly comparative 
exercise. Replacing Western models of religion with Indian, African, or Chinese 
conceptual frameworks not only creates the danger of falling into the trap of cultural 
isolationism and a chauvinistic indigenism, but may also into the heterogeneity of these 
cultures themselves. There is no single ‘Indian’, ‘Chinese’ or ‘African’ way of looking at 
                                                                                                                                                       
32 Ramose, Mogobe. The African Philosophy Reader. London: Routledge, 1998 p. 7 
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the world, just as there is no definitive ‘gender-critical stance’ from which to approach 
the study of religion. A lesson to learn from the explosion of feminist approaches to the 
study of religion, I think, is not to fear a heterogeneity of perspectives, so long as the 
goals of such approaches remain reasonably consonant with each other (that is, the 
critique of patriarchy and the end of masculinist oppression of women and men), 
however differently conceived.33  
 
Subsequent chapters will unpack much of what King suggests. While Orientalist scholarship 
has made a good deal of Asian philosophy accessible to those with an interest in it, there has 
not yet been an adequate proliferation of such interest. Around the 1970’s, Orientalist 
scholarship yielded slightly to scholarship done by practitioner/converts to Buddhism or 
Hinduism, and they effectively carried out a “second-wave” of scholarship on those traditions’ 
religious beliefs and philosophies. Quite often, though, these scholars did fall into the trap the 
King recognizes—that of simply advocating a replacement of current values with alternative 
ones. As noted, this not only ignores or misunderstands the heterogeneity of those alternative 
traditions, it also does very little in the way of escaping the rigid paradigms that bother such 
scholars to begin with. 
 However, a phase of advocating alternative approaches remains necessary. They must 
find their feet and make noise to be heard. If we have made any progress in equality between 
the sexes, we cannot discount the role played by radical, militant feminists such as Mary Daly, 
who called for literal gynæcocracy and described the benefits of a world without—or with 
fewer—men.34 Similarly, for Africans of the continent and diaspora to be heard, they must 
pass through the stage of Afrocentrism, advocated by Professor Molefi Kete Asante of Temple 
University and many of his colleagues. Many of us, trying to go beyond the moral systems 
handed down to us, read the scatological erotics of Marquis de Sade, Masoch and Georges 
Bataille. Their radical inversions of the Christian ethics of purity and chastity help us dislodge 
                                                
33 King 212 
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certain habits and achieve a degree of freedom from repression. However, simply flipping the 
model on its head, holding the Christian ideal in place and raising a middle finger to it, does 
not necessarily sunder the pernicious structure itself.35  
 There will always be a place for proponents of alternative approaches. Both 
philologists and more biased converts are the excavators of ideas that have been swept under 
the rug. What they uncover provides material for constructing new visions. In some cases, as 
with Asian philosophies, ample amounts of material have been excavated. It remains up to the 
guardians of the main traditions to look at that material; to simply use it as material for 
building, not as something to be competed against—something from which the dominant 
traditions need to be protected. Again, the point is not to expect those interested in classical 
European philosophy to become pseudo-Buddhists or Afrocentrists, but until those voices are 
listened to and given a place within the institutions of philosophy, we can continue to charge 
the gatekeepers and guardians of those institutions with racist and willful ignorance.  
 One place to begin this critical work is to uncover the influence that Hegel has on the 
construction of the philosophical canon, and the way that his metaphysics can and has 
affected our relationship to other people and things. At its worst, Hegel’s corpus has provided 
ample fuel for a view of the world as the expression of a necessity, of history as unequivocally 
teleological, and of some things being ontologically superior to others by virtue of their share 
in the Logos that structures them and moves them along. But to reduce his corpus to these 
points is to ignore its expansiveness and to miss out on some of the resources he developed 
that could work against his own commitments to teleology, hierarchy, and anthropocentrism.  
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Hegel and His Legacy   
 
Despite evident revolutionary contributions that Hegel made to philosophical method, he also 
did some egregious damage to its historiography. One of his great strengths is the 
expansiveness that earned him the reputation as the great totalizing philosopher, the system-
builder par excellence. Hegel saw himself as the apogee of a great ideological march. His 
thought was the free flowing waters of the ocean, collected from the glacial snows of all 
thought that came before him. Unlike a prophet of revelation, Hegel knew that his thinking 
was not performed in a vacuum and that it was built of the disparate elements that would 
become the parts of his all-encompassing dialectic. In one sense, he divested philosophy of the 
“purity” that so many thinkers of the past insisted upon: the purity of reason, the purity of 
mathematical universals, the purity of the Word that transcends the World. For him, there 
could be no such functioning of a mind or Spirit outside the milieu and context of the concrete 
world. Spirit, the object of all our difficult philosophical operations, is like the mist that must 
be fathomed by traversing the ground it lies on. Or more accurately, Spirit and the concrete 
are mutually penetrating, co-dependent, and co-emerging. Philosophy is not the descent of 
ideas from the sky, but is an expression of history and the work that builds it. Though in being 
constructed of the totality of events, History itself is a universal that provides the backdrop 
for the unfolding of all things particular. So Hegel endeavors to account for the different 
threads that make up the vast fabric of History, which is nothing other than the history of 
philosophy. But in doing so, Susan Sontag observes, “Hegel could not help presenting his own 
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system as true—that is, beyond history—because of its incorporation of the historical 
perspective.” He writes, famously, of an "end of history" that results from the Absolute 
Knowledge that his system conveys. In other words, Hegel gathers the disparate threads of 
history together and discovers their hidden code, like a contemporary biologist mapping 
organisms' genomes. Those who populated that earlier history had not yet attained absolute 
knowledge, so they were bound by the limits of their historicity. Hegel, however, uses the 
material history as a ladder that he is finally able to dismount into a boundless and ahistorical 
Absolute. Sontag adds that this hubris, which allowed him to carry out a project of such 
scope, contributes to making “Hegelianism bankrupt as a system, though not as a method” 
(76).  
 Hegel’s method succeeds in its rigorous description of the mind and the mind’s 
activity— phenomenology—and in its attempt to place that mind in a context, to connect it to 
the concrete world. But where it fails, it drags behind it a bramble of contradictions, willful 
ignorance, and racial prejudice that have retarded the development of the history of 
philosophy and the institutions built around it. This is a result of an overemphasis on 
historical determinism—something that is present in Hegel’s writing, but which exists in 
tension with its opposite. There is a sense in Hegel that history had to happen the way that it 
did: Europe became dominant and Africa and Asia fell behind because of a certain destiny. 
Napoleon’s reign, Robespierre’s Terror and the revolutions that followed Hegel were all part 
of a movement from and toward something.   Such events were the expression of a code, just 
as the images of a computer program are the unfolding of an anterior language. This language, 
in Hegel’s philosophy, is called Logic, Logos, and is the underlying structure, an irreducible 
heart-matter of reality in all its multiplicity. It is the Word of God in John 1:1, to which Hegel 
is profoundly indebted. It is what is described in the hundreds of nearly impenetrable, 
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marvelous pages of his book, The Science of Logic. This underlying Logic explains both the life 
of the mind—described in his Phenomenology of Spirit—as well as the life of the world, 
described in other volumes, such as his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Philosophy of History, 
and so forth. However, it is not always clear in what way the Logic explains these things. Does 
it explain them by supplying us with the source-code for those events, showing them to be 
completely determined by a preexisting fate? Or does it merely explain the conditions of the 
possibility for events to arise the way they do and have? These are completely different 
alternatives and their implications are massive. 
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4. 
The Historical Confusion of Anthropocentrism 
 
Hegel left behind an ocean of words, and within that ocean are many currents leading in 
different directions. As already mentioned, Hegel had the great ambition to explain the course 
of the world by the very same logic that he could explain the course of the mind. He believed 
it possible to discover and show that diachronic history and the events that constitute it have 
exactly the same structure as the units that make it up—the synchronic structure of mind is 
simply another mode of expression of a single logic. In his system there is only one underlying 
logic, however, since he follows a phenomenological method—that is, since the mind is the 
only medium through which we can discover the logic—the mind ends up hypostetized as the 
guarantor of all existence. As such, the human subject follows a different logic than other 
things: it is primary, the only true substance, and the objective world is merely fuel for its self-
expression. This formulation, in which the objects and events of the world submit themselves 
before the absolute Being of the subject, makes perfect sense of the violence and hierarchy 
that we find all around.36 The subject preexists and is always in the process of carrying out the 
teleology intrinsic to it. It doesn’t need to become, to construct its own teleology, and it gazes 
out at the objective world complacently, believing that all previous moments have been the 
fuel for its inexorable self-expression. Whatever things there are in the world that cause pain, 
they do so for a reason; they are ineluctable elements constituting the noble unity of the self-
expressing human subject.  
                                                
36 For example, misogyny benefits from this metaphysics, since it posits subordination and hierarchy as natural 
and justified—it is just the structure of reality. Judith Butler writes of this problem in Gender Trouble p. 17: “In 
the philosophical tradition that begins with Plato and continues through Descartes, Husserl, and Sartre, the 
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Alexandre Kojève advanced an historical, anthropological, and diachronic reading of the 
relationship between Hegel’s Logic and the world of appearances. Hegel himself said plenty to 
warrant this reading, as we will see in many selections below, but it was championed by the 
influential Kojève in a series of lectures in France in the 1930’s that were attended by the likes 
of Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, André 
Breton, Jacques Lacan and Raymond Aron. While those thinkers absorbed Kojève’s influence 
and went on to build their own nuanced philosophies, others took advantage of his thesis’ 
political tone and used it to justify and spur on Eurocentrism in politics and the Academy. 
These included Leo Strauss, Allan Bloom, and Francis Fukuyama.  
 Based on his reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Kojève asserts the existence 
of—indeed the metaphysical centrality of— an “essential” human subjectivity. This human 
subjectivity enters into, even produces, an essential relationship to the world of objects: one in 
which there is a definitive metaphysical split between them. The subject establishes itself as 
ontologically supreme, while objects become dependent on it. This creates an immovable ideal: 
human subjectivity must either fulfill its ontological destiny, or it falls away from it, losing its 
being, its value. Therefore, the subject is ruled by a teleological imperative to be a certain way. 
The possibility of non-teleological “becoming” is thereby foreclosed, along with the 
phenomenological, social, and political benefits that might accompany such becoming. 
Subsequent chapters will explore the possibility of a non-teleological Hegelianism, but Kojève 
takes us in the other direction.  
                                                                                                                                                       
ontological distinction between soul (consciousness, mind) and body invariably supports relations of political and 
psychic subordination and hierarchy. 
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 Kojève's interpretation was based on Hegel’s famous Master-Slave Dialectic—the 
multivalent discourse of the struggle for recognition that takes places in the subtle inner 
journey of consciousness toward self-consciousness, and also plays itself out macrocosmically 
in the events of history, especially the violent ones.  
 To summarize briefly, the dialectic begins by positing Desire as the a priori element of 
animal life. Animals have desire, and the same basic force exists within the human, compelling 
it to act. An animal desires something, for example food, and consumes it. Thus desire is 
essentially destructive and negative. By destroying or consuming the desired object, desire is 
not fulfilled (only for a brief moment), but it creates a division between those objects and the 
subject that beholds them. This is consciousness.  
 Self-consciousness, the special characteristic of the human, requires more than this 
relationship. It must behold something that beholds it back: another consciousness, another 
desire. This unfolds internally, with consciousness turning back on itself, becoming self-
consciousness; and it unfolds externally, as society—a group of self-consciousnesses looking 
back and forth at each other. Kojève says, “Man can appear on earth only within a herd,” and 
that “human history is the history of desired Desires”(6). For neither Kojève nor Hegel, is is 
this process affectionate or erotic.37 It is a struggle, it is violent. Hence the very terms it is 
couched in: the Master-Slave Dialectic. Unlike animal consciousness, human self-
consciousness does not satisfy itself by directly consuming or destroying others self-conscious 
humans. To do so would be to take away the only means one has to validate oneself as human. 
The two self-consciousnesses stare at each other and battle for recognition, for a way to come 
into being and remain self-consciousnesses. The victor of this battle is the master and the one 
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who gives up—out of fear of death and nothingness—becomes the slave. This is human 
nature. Much more Hobbes than any of the innate empathy espoused by others like Rousseau, 
Smith, or Mill. And therefore, society and history will be marked by the inequality and 
violence that is part of this structure: “The first anthropogenetic action necessarily takes the 
form of a fight...(11),” “He must, therefore, ‘provoke‘ the other, force him to start a fight to the 
death for pure prestige” (13).  
 However, the master does not satisfy himself through this victory. He comes to realize 
something awful. By risking his life and coming to dominate, he has alienated everyone and 
finds himself in barren isolation. There is another self-consciousness there that could validate 
him, but he has stripped that other of its dignity. As a master, his relationship to his slave is 
essentially lonely. Moreover, he is the master only in relation to this degraded being before 
him. His identity depends on a wretch who is not his equal. Still more, the wretch makes the 
things the master needs for his own survival. The master is idle, the slave works, producing 
things that the master relies on. At some point, they both come to realize this and they start to 
change places. By working and producing things outside of himself, the slave sets himself up 
against the objective world, thereby developing his subjectivity. Kojève notes, “It is only by 
work that man is a supernatural being that is conscious of its reality; by working, he is 
‘incarnated’ Spirit, he is historical ‘World,’ he is ‘objectivized’ in History”(25). The slave, 
though once the loser, gains his freedom through work, while the master comes to the cold 
realization that he remains unfree. He must go through the same struggle that the slave went 
through and submit to the fear of death in order to work his way back into the fullness of life. 
For Hegel and Kojève, this happens through political activity. Specifically, it was 
                                                                                                                                                       
37 For a philosophy that describes a similar movement as erotic, see Jean-Luc Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon. 
Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 2006. Also, for a discussion of Hegel’s ideas about the limited role of love in his 
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Robespierre’s Terror that ushered in the dominating shadow of death that would allow 
European man to submit to negation and then rise up like a phoenix. Outwardly, this phoenix 
was Napoleon, “the wholly ‘satisfied’ Man, who, in and by his definitive Satisfaction, 
completes the course of the historical evolution of humanity”(69). However, Napoleon is 
simply the full expression of this moment of satisfaction, of a completely immanent man, but 
he does not necessarily have self-consciousness of what he is. His being and actions are 
spontaneous and unreflective, like the animal that consumes what it desires. It is Hegel who 
supplies the self-conscious element to Napoleon’s immanent manhood. Posterity can then 
never shake off the combination of Being (Napoleon) and self-consciousness (Hegel) that 
came to be through this process. Hegel made humanity self-aware to a degree it never was 
before. Kojève sums up some of the implications of Hegel’s system:  
...If we see that Hegel’s system actually is circular, we must conclude in spite of 
appearances (and perhaps even in spite of common sense) that History is completed 
and consequently that the State in which this system could be realized is the perfect 
State. This, by the way, is what Hegel himself did, as we know. After the fall of 
Napoleon, he declared that the Prussian State (which, in other respects, he detests) 
was the definitive or perfect State. And he could not do otherwise, given that he was 
convinced of the circularity of his system.  
 Therefore, the whole question for us reduces to this: if the Phenomenology is actually 
circular, we must accept it outright, along with everything that follows from it; if it is 
not, we must consider it a hypothetical-deductive whole, and verify all the hypotheses 
and deductions one by one (98).  
 
Hence, Kojève’s reading of Hegel, which is clearly justified by many of Hegel’s own 
statements, demands that we accept that the way that history has unfolded could not have been 
otherwise. If we accept the compelling arguments that define what animal and human life are—
that they are processes of desire and becoming through desire—then we will understand 
history and the moments it is composed of as being inevitable expressions of an underlying 
logic. The subtle structures of consciousness and self-consciousness, then, are like a source 
                                                                                                                                                       
system, see Kojève’s footnote #32 pg. 243, as well as pages 241-245. 
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code that produces what we are seeing in the World, just like the code of a video game 
produce the phantasmagoric images that are its expression. Since that code preexists, the 
images that result from it could not be otherwise. Appearances are fated. There is an eternal order 
and reason behind every event. The rise and fall of every community, the proliferation of 
species and types of human, the forms and trajectories of religions and cultures, the pogroms, 
bloodbaths, and plagues of the world are all inscribed in the structure that Hegel identified at 
the heart of all of it. Like Kojève says, if we accept that the system is indeed circular—without 
openings—then we must accept this picture of fated appearance. The truth is arrived at 
through a theodicy that differs from Calvin’s only in its terminology.38 But should we accept 
this? What are some of the consequences of this kind of determinism?  
 This worldview would mean that there is no such thing as human potential, let alone 
perfectibility. Man would always already be all that he can be. We could not have been 
without Robespierre, Napoleon, or by extension, Hitler and Pol Pot, since what those people 
expressed was simply a natural outpouring of the Logic. There would be no point imagining a 
world in which those things didn’t happen. There were no mistakes. Christianity and its 
dominance are justified merely through their mere being. The same can be said for conditions 
endured by oppressed and wretched groups.  
 The problem here is Kojève’s and often Hegel’s conflation of history with the structure 
of consciousness. They are used as false synecdoches for each other. In fact, Logic, the 
structure of reality and the mind, which has as its essential characteristic negativity, “the 
genuine motor of the dialectical movement” (253), is a restless generator of contingent 
appearances. “Individuals, Freedom, and History,” Kojève’s three elements of Hegelian 
Totality, all appear not because they are pre-inscribed in the Logic, but because the Logic 
                                                
38 This comparison clarified later in this chapter. 
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allows them to be. It is the infinite field of codependence and contingency that is the condition of 
the possibility for any of these things to arise. It is also the condition for their opposites to 
arise—things that might completely destabilize this recipe of Totality the way that Kojève has 
imagined it. Things that have appeared, which are the world before us, share a structure with 
the mind only insofar as they are both contingent appearances out of a common, insubstantial 
ground. They follow different arches and are not co-extensive.  
 In his discussion of Individuality, Kojève says that because man is “never only ‘this 
particular man here’”(237), and must be a part of a community that perceives of him as a mere 
part of a whole, he does not achieve the recognition demanded by the movements of his mind 
(from consciousness to self-consciousness).  
That is why he actively and freely (i.e., by negation) transforms the given social and 
political reality, in order to make it such that he can recognize his true Individuality in 
it. And this progressive realization of Individuality, by the active and free progressive 
satisfaction of the desire for Recognition, is the “dialectical movement” of History which 
Man himself is.   
 According to Hegel and Kojève, Individuality can be fully realized, the desire for 
Recognition can be completely satisfied, only in and by the universal and homogenous 
State. For, in the homogenous State, the “specific-differences” (Besonderheiten) of class, 
race, and so on are “overcome,” and therefore this State is directly related to the 
particular man as such, who is recognized as citizen in his very particularity. And this 
recognition is truly universal, for, by definition, the State embraces the whole of the 
human race (even in its past, through the total historical tradition which this State 
perpetuates in the present; and in its future, since henceforth the future no longer 
differs from the present in which Man is already fully satisfied).  
 By fully realizing Individuality, the universal and homogenous State completes 
History, since Man, satisfied in and by this State, will not be tempted to negate it and 
thus to create something new in its place (237).  
 
Even in Kojève’s time, such a conclusion must have had a pernicious ring. Is this the best that 
human kind can do? Satisfaction through a universal and homogenous State? Since we are 
demonstrably mortal, we are historical, we have a beginning and an end and we do things in 
between. That is what makes us individuals. We do not possess some atomic particularity. We 
are free in that we can affect history in our short time within it, by changing courses and 
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destroying things as necessary. “Individuality ‘reveals’ Totality to the extent that it implies 
Identity; Freedom ‘manifests’ this same Totality as implying Negativity; and Historicity is the 
“appearance of Totality as such”(241). 
 So far in this analysis, Kojève is not wrong. A human being is historical insofar as she 
is limited, finitely determined by his possibilities and impossibilities (250). “Therefore, Man 
can be individual and free only to the extent that he implies in his being all the possibilities of 
Being but does not have the time to realize and manifest them all”(251). To speak of Man, the 
term and idea can only be formed by posing him against all that is not Man. Hence, Man, who 
lives but shortly in a particular time and place, is implicated in—that is, carries within him—
the infinite things that are not him but which are everything else.  
It is solely because he is potentially infinite and always limited in deed by his death 
that Man is a free Individual who has a history and who can freely create a place for 
himself in History, instead of being content, like animals and things, passively to 
occupy a natural place in the given Cosmos, determined by the structure of the latter 
(251). 
   
This is where Kojève becomes murky. In his view, Man is a free actor and not determined by 
the structure of the Cosmos, but once a man acts, it is shown that he could not have acted 
otherwise. In a rich footnote, Kojève comments,  
If an animal, or a man as animal, comes to a fork in the road, it can go to the right or to 
the left: the two possibilities are compatible as possibilities. But if it actually takes the 
road to the right, it is impossible that it has taken the road to the left, and inversely: the 
two possibilities are incompatible as realized. An animal that has set forth on the road 
to the right must retrace its steps in order to take the road to the left. Man as animal 
must also do this. But as Man—that is, as historical (or “spiritual” or, better, dialectical) 
being—he never retraces his steps. History does not turn back and nevertheless it ends 
up on the road to the left after it has taken the road to the right (251).  
 
He admits that there were once possibilities for the world and the things within it to go this 
way or that, but they went this way. They had to have gone this way, because now that they 
are done, they cannot be undone. Moreover, things did not go this way by chance, or even 
 41 
through Man’s whimsy; they went this way for a reason; they went this way for a hidden 
reason. This hidden reason is actually the structure of reality which expresses itself in one way 
only: as a world that is the reflection of the code of Being. This is a highly theological claim. 
Compare it to Calvin’s worldview, summarized in Mark C. Taylor’s chapter on the Protestant 
Revolution in his book, After God:  
From the beginning of time, the direction of the world has been predestined in God’s 
omniscient gaze. Within this theological framework, there is no such thing as fortune 
or chance, because everything “is directed by God’s ever-present hand.” God’s hand is 
not, of course, always visible; to the contrary, God’s hand is “secret” because “the true 
causes of events are hidden to us.” The hand of providence, in other words, is invisible; 
though never properly present, God is never absent from creation. (73).  
 
In Kojève’s discussion of possible paths, when he says that someone “takes” a path, he cannot 
mean that he chooses it, or even that a path simply happens for someone (which would be the 
case from the point of view of a natural—biological—determinism, which we will examine in 
the next section). He only figures out how history works based on the present state of affairs. 
Things are the way they are because they had to be this way. From current appearances we 
can figure out the code that wrote them.  
 For Kojève, history is a diachronic march forward. And as we already saw, for him it is 
one of the three elements of Totality, along with Individuality and Freedom. We know 
inductively that History is unidirectional and diachronic. Even if, like Hume, we are skeptical 
of such inductive certainty, we still infer that it is the case since we have never observed 
History behaving any other way. We have seen how Kojève thought that the movement from 
consciousness to self-consciousness and the attainment of absolute knowledge (the synchronic 
structure of the Logic) was inextricably linked to the unfolding of History in just the way it 
has unfolded. He thought they were mirrors of each other; even though we speak of two 
discourses—the synchronic and diachronic, the Logic and the Phenomenology/History—they 
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are indistinguishable and always follow the same movements. They are each other’s hidden 
reasons. Hegel had convinced himself that his metaphysics (the synchronic) and his history 
(the diachronic) were consistent.  
 However, and this is the heart of the matter, the diachronic History of the world—which 
Kojève and Hegel both lay out—does not follow by necessity from the synchronic structure of 
reality laid out in Hegel’s Logic. Put more plainly: the way that Hegel says reality is 
structured does not necessarily lead to the same World that Hegel describes in his Histories. 
The world could have turned out very differently. That it did not turn out another way does 
not mean that there was a code it had to follow. Current appearances cannot be traced back to 
a hidden cause. Following these traces back to some primordial source code would be the kind 
of backward time travel that Kojève admits is impossible (251). It would be theodicy, which 
Hegel himself did not object to, but which, for ethical and metaphysical reasons that will 
become clearer, we should now demand a moratorium on. Current appearances, i.e., the 
World, might lead us to a synchronic insight about how they came about, but that cannot be 
reduced to or conflated with the diachronic history of the World. If they are linked at all, it is 
in language and metaphor. Historical events can only be metaphors for the movements of the 
mind; they are not the literal events of the Mind. A mistake occurs when we believe that the 
movement of the mind is pegged to the movements of History in their specificity. 
 The theodical attitude has always turned the mistakes of history into ornaments. 
Tsunamis and death camps are not real, they are only shadowy forms passing through the 
ultimate substance of the subject, drawing attention back to the subject as if it can never be 
satisfied in its need for validation. In the face of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake and Auschwitz, 
Voltaire and Adorno respectively pointed out that historical catastrophes are as ugly as they 
seem, they are absolute tragedies that are not party to some cosmic expression of a primordial 
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teleology.39 The gravity of their pointlessness rends the fabric of the theodical veil and gives us 
the opportunity to understand the utterly contingent genesis of things, which also gives us a 
chance to play an active role in that contingency. We can enter into networks with other 
things in order to shape and steer an undetermined future instead of abiding in a self-absorbed 
present that understands itself as some kind of effulgence constituted by the all the moments 
of the past. Not only does this theodical ignorance make us calloused toward tragedies, it is 
the foundation for all kinds of pain-inflicting habits, since it justifies any and all hierarchies as 
historically necessary and reflective of the fundamental ontological hierarchy that holds 
subject and object apart. For all of these reasons, misogyny, homophobia, and the xenophobia 
of Eurocentrism can only be addressed through a critique of the metaphysics that allows for 
the belief in historical necessity.  
                                                
39 Adorno, Theodor. Negative Dialectics (1966), trans. E. B. Ashton, New York: Seabury Press, 1973. 
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5. 
TELEOLOGY AFTER DARWIN?  
 
Hegel and Kojève’s anthropocentrism demands that all things figure into a noble plan, that all 
objective appearance manifest through and for the human subject. To support this claim, they 
focus on human intellectual and political history, imputing patterns onto the flux of events and 
imagining a secret purpose behind the patterns of history. As suggested in the conclusion to 
the last chapter, the ontological stratification that results from such anthropocentrism displays 
itself concretely as social and political stratification of all types, including the type isolated in 
this study, Eurocentrism. However, this cleaving to planned history is shockingly 
anachronistic. After Darwin, we have almost entirely abandoned faith in the teleology of 
mosquito evolution or the morphology of lichens; but because of our anthropocentrism, 
human evolution expresses something organized. Our ability to describe the complexities of 
societies, economies, aesthetics and so on provide us with a vast field of significance. We then 
argue from significance to necessity, loading aleatory complexity with teleological fantasies. 
But if Darwin shows us the uselessness of teleological fantasy in explaining the complexity of 
speciation, it should also show us the error of explaining the recent history of the West and 
East in terms of their participation in a cosmic plan.    
 
To repeat a bit, the approach that Hegel lays out in his Philosophy of History is deeply 
theological, an upgraded version of Leibniz’s theodicy. As Leibniz wanted to justify the ways 
of God through understanding God’s creation, Hegel wants to understand Reason, through 
understanding what has unfolded according to Reason. In some ways, merely the terms are 
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different40. Hegel says, “‘Reason’—which is said to rule the world—is just as indefinite a word 
as ‘Providence’”(PH 18).41 Hegel does not have a problem with this. It is his task to figure out 
what Reason is, as well as where it fits into the big picture: Totality consisting of Spirit, 
World, and History, or to use other terms Logos, Absolute Knowledge, and Philosophy of 
History.  
 His view of the active, creative role of Reason is not only theological, but specifically 
Pre-Darwinian. In the same section of the Philosophy of History he backs up his methodology 
with the following reasoning:  
For some time, it was customary to admire God’s wisdom at work in animals, in plants, 
and in the destinies of individuals. If we grant that providence reveals itself in such 
objects and materials, then why not also in world history? Here the material seems too 
great. Yet the divine wisdom, i.e., Reason is one and the same on the large scale as on 
the small scale, and we must not consider God to be too weak to apply His wisdom on 
a large scale. In our knowledge, we aim for the insight that whatever was intended by 
the Eternal Wisdom has come to—as in the realm of nature, so in the realm of spirit 
that is active and actual in the world. To that extent our approach is a theodicy(18).   
 
It is not fair to expect Hegel to know the things that Darwin would discover a couple of 
decades after his death. However, the statements he makes here should not be dismissed as 
insignificant lacunae based on the scientific ignorance of the time. He argues that Reason 
(Divine Wisdom, God’s Will etc.) works the same way on the natural world of objects as it 
does in the human world of consciousness and self-consciousness. Observing the clear order 
and Reason that governs objects (e.g., oaks from acorns and not from rice seeds) then we can 
inductively reason that the all other things, all of human History, must also be bound by rules, 
and that these rules have a purpose. This purpose, moreover, is a human purpose. The rules 
exist for us. History is the unfolding of Spirit, which is the becoming of self-consciousness. 
                                                
40 I qualify that because of the fundamentally different metaphysics undergirding Hegel’s and Leibniz’s 
philosophies, even if Hegel himself did not always appreciate how far away he had drifted on the raft of his 
discoveries. 
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Natural history—the history of objects—is only important insofar as it gives us insight into 
the structures that guide human history. History is entirely anthropocentric. So if this is 
Hegel’s project, how can it hold up in todays world in which very few well-informed people 
would subscribe to such a view of the natural world as divinely engineered? After Darwin, 
how can we keep chasing the trail of providence through natural and human histories?  
 Contemporary philosopher Levi Bryant sums up how Darwin’s contributions have 
much wider implications than they are usually given credit for.42 They are not limited to 
biology and the theological controversies that followed his discoveries. Darwin’s methodology 
and conclusions also have major philosophical impact. Bryant explains how in the pre-
Darwinian idealist world, “the individual and the species were understood as two distinct 
entities, with the species functioning as an ideal norm defining individuals, an essence, distinct 
and existing in its own right, and individuals being measured in terms of how closely they 
approach this ideal form.”43 To this one might object that Hegel did not see the world in such 
an atomized way, citing his rigorously built metaphysics of relation and preservation of 
identity and difference in all things. That is true, but he would still see the development of a 
species as the playing out of a teleology. He holds a “firm and unconquerable belief that there 
is Reason in history, together with the belief that the world of intelligence and self-conscious 
will is not subject to chance, but rather that it must demonstrate itself in the light of the self-
conscious Idea”(PH 13). The comparison holds. Bryant continues:  
Darwin’s remarkable contribution was to show that individual difference is the motor 
of speciation or the genesis of form. As a result, form is no longer treated as an ideal 
norm or eternal essence to which the individual is subordinated, but rather form 
becomes a result or product of these individual differences. Species become not ideal 
                                                                                                                                                       
41 Hegel, G.W.F. Introduction to the History of Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988 
42 April 2, 2012. From Bryant’s excellent philosophy blog, Larval Subjects:  
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/eight-darwinianposthumanist-theses/ 
43 July 3, 2009. http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/07/03/darwin-philosophy/#more-1854 
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and eternal, unchanging essences, but rather become statistical regularities within a 
population, produced as a result of the accumulation of individual differences through 
natural selection and reproduction. Where essentialist thought faces the problem of 
how it is possible to explain the heterogeneity of individuals, the issue now becomes 
that of it is possible to explain homogeneity insofar as heterogeneity is the norm. As 
Whitehead famously observes, “the abstract does not explain, but must be explained. 
 
Whitehead’s statement is especially applicable to Hegel. The “self-conscious Idea” must be 
explained; it is too obscure to shed explanatory light on other things. Moreover, it must be 
explained through a theodicy that simply takes it for granted and then seeks to justify it. The 
natural world of objects and matter cannot be the starting point for such a theodicy, since it a 
different substance, and not the primary substance. The self-conscious Idea is presupposed to 
be inherently reasonable, but after Darwin we can no longer defend a Reason that guides the 
natural world. Either the natural world and the self-conscious Idea have profoundly different 
structures, or they share a single one, but that structure would have to be profoundly different 
from the one that Hegel emphasizes.   
 Elsewhere, Bryant has noted five specific ways in which Darwin has (or should have) 
changed philosophy. Some of them are harmonious with Hegelianism, other are not. The most 
important disagreement with Hegelianism (at least its Kojèvean strand) is  
1) Nature is not supposed to be something:44 With Darwin this conception of nature as 
Nature is thoroughly abandoned. There is no way things are supposed to be, there is 
only the way things are and the way things are becoming.  
 
The vast majority of Hegel’s words argue the contrary. His approach is a theodicy45 because 
things are supposed to be the way they are. To be fair, his philosophy is also deeply concerned 
with the “becoming” that Bryant mentions, and we will see later how other interpreters shift 
the emphasis of his system to becoming and away from the archeo-teleological project of using 
                                                
44 For Bryant’s full essay: http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/eight-darwinianposthumanist-theses/ 
45 PH 18, “Our approach is a theodicy...” 
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the present given world to discover the eternal truth that underlies it. However, before 
Hegelianism can benefit from such apologetics we must recognize its firm belief in teleology.  
 Darwin’s discoveries not only made sure that teleology had no place in discussions of 
Nature, they also problematized the entire notion of Nature with a capital N. Abstract nouns 
like Nature are Platonic. They employ capital letters to mark their pregnancy. To speak of 
Truth, Justice, Happiness, and Nature is to speak of normative ideals that are supposed to be 
this or that. Justice speaks of ought and ought not because Justice is supposed to be something. 
Even if it remains inchoate or inaccessible to us directly, we still believe that there is 
something out there behind the veil that is some kind of saturated object, Justice, that 
distinguishes itself from all that it is not. Teleology is inherent to it. We know that Justice is 
different from justice because justice is not what it is supposed to be. Then it would be Justice. 
The same holds for Nature. When we speak of it in the majuscule, we endow it with an 
otherness that set it apart from the objects that it consists of. Each of those objects must 
conform to the plans that Nature has for it. Thus, Nature is inherently teleological and the 
nasty things that happen within it are justified as means to an end. However, as Richard 
Dawkins, one of today’s preeminent Darwinists notes, “Nature has no evil intentions. Things 
simply follow from ‘laws acting all around us’” and “For something to happen in nature, the 
only requirement is that the same happening in ancestral times assisted the survival of the 
genes promoting it”(Dawkins 400). The world that appears to us is not a set of first principles 
we can use to deduce the design behind it. If Nature itself is teleological, then all the things 
within it—every object!—is not the appearance of an infinitely complex set web of causes and 
conditions, but the manifestation of a code—a pixilated image written in ones and zeros by 
some primordial programmer.   
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 Diogenes and Nietzsche, until most recently, were nearly alone in their opposition to 
the idealist thinking that would posit a majuscule Nature. It was as harmful in Diogenes’ day 
as it is now. In ethics, we have seen countless people burned and oppressed for contravening 
what is natural. In politics, we have seen perverse justifications for the natural rights of kings, 
the natural wretchedness of women, and the natural stratification of people in all different 
kinds of hierarchies. In modern times, interdisciplinary theorist Timothy Morton describes the 
pernicious effects of idealism on ecology. Since the inception of ecological thinking, it has 
depended on the idea of majuscule Nature. Nature has had to be pristine, replete with 
qualities that can only be sullied by Man, its less-pure, antagonistic inhabitants. Industry 
became the enemy; development a cancer. For modern thinkers, Man cannot do his thing 
without hurting Nature and also himself. Morton Reflects,  
In Nature, they saw the reflected, inverted image of their own age—and the grass is 
always greener on the other side. Nature was always “over yonder,” alien and 
alienated. Just like a reflection, we can never actually reach it and touch it and belong 
to it. Nature was an ideal image, a self-contained form suspended afar, shimmering and 
naked behind glass like an expensive painting. In the idea of pristine wilderness, we 
can make out the mirror image of private property: Keep off the Grass, Do Not Touch, 
Not For Sale. Nature was a special kind of private property, without an owner 
(Morton 2010: 5).    
 
Nature as Mother can, at best, merely cradle humanity within its arms. But humanity will 
always grow up to break her heart. Humanity and Nature remain oppositional in this model: 
Humanity is the antagonistic force, the dark energy, while Nature is pristine and light. Nature 
is harmonious and sturdy, forever adjusting to balance out the disruptive, sickly influence of 
parasitic Humanity. However, Nature only obtains this seat of privilege because, as Morton 
says, it is Man’s mirror image. Man has really placed himself on the throne; He is the center of 
things. Anthropocentrism invented its own Other in Nature. Seeing itself as sickly in contrast 
to the boundless health of Nature, Humanity justifies everything it does as ineluctable—the 
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deterministic outcome of its faulty essence. In this model, Man can never be part of Nature; 
they are not interconnected. Nature seems to transcend Man, who merely putters around in 
its shadow, but in fact, it’s Man in his anthropocentrism that transcends Nature. Therefore, if 
ecology is to ever accomplish anything other than the reinforcement of this opposition that has 
likely been the cause of the ecological problems we find, Morton proposes a rethinking of the 
model to recognize the interdependence between Humanity and Nature, and indeed all 
objects. He calls for an Ecology Without Nature,46 a doing away with the idealized image of 
nature as a something autonomous and transcendent. Unless we knock Nature off of its 
throne, it will remain inaccessible to us and there will be no way to enter into a real ecology. 
Nature always ought to be a certain way, some way that is wrapped up in its own nature. 
Having a different nature of its own, Humanity can never know the nature of Nature. Of 
course, it is not only Nature which must be demystified. It is just as important for Man—or 
any other object for that matter—to be divested of his transcendence. The contemporary 
militant anti-idealist, Michel Onfray, explains Diogenes’ attempt to do this:  
Diogenes looks around for a Man in the streets of Athens. He holds out a lit lantern in 
broad daylight… Hegel calls this a “schoolboy’s farce” and passes over it. But the true 
sage would call this a philosophical lesson. He is looking for a Man, with a capital M, 
the idea of Man, his concept, his immateriality that manifests his nominalist 
materiality. Of course, he doesn’t find it, since it doesn’t exist, because all that exists is 
tangible, material, concrete reality.47 
 
Man has no more of this than Nature, as Morton points out. To bring it back to Bryant’s 
original observation, Darwin’s greatest contribution was to so clearly demonstrate that 
idealized Man and Nature are merely nominalist man and nature. They are useful terms for 
labeling appearances of like type; nothing more. Neither of them are supposed to be this way or 
                                                
46 The title of one of his rich, virtuoso books: Morton, Timothy. Ecology Without Nature. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. 
47 Onfray, Michel. La Puissance d’exister. Paris: Grasset, 2007 p. 166. My translation. 
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that, they just happen to be this-way-and-that through unintentional processes. In 
evolutionary terms, organisms do not adapt, in order to survive; it simply happens that organisms 
with certain adaptations are the ones that survive. Man, Nature, Truth are not supposed to be 
this or that way. And Nature and Truth do not exist for Man. So when Kojève says,  
Truth, in the strict sense of the term is supposed to be a thing that cannot be either 
modified or denied: it is, as we say, “universally and necessarily” valid—i.e., it is not 
subject to changes; it is as we also say, eternal or nontemporal. On the other hand, there 
is no doubt that it is found at a certain moment of time and that is exists in time, because 
it exists through and for Man who lives in the World (100).   
 
It is difficult to corroborate these claims. Man is another object in the World. The World does 
not exist for Man, and neither can man be the conduit for and the subject of Truth, which 
Kojève has claimed exists “through and for” him. 
 For Hegel and for Kojève, all this Truth and Purpose are found in Self-Consciousness. 
It is the goal and it is what gives meaning to life. Man’s existence is unique in its ability to be 
philosophical—to enter into self-consciousness and take it as a path. This sets him apart from 
the animal and vegetable world and it is what allows Being/Truth to be revealed. Being—the 
underlying Truth—is revealed by Man’s being because man possesses the self-consciousness 
that allows him to call himself “I”, thereby opposing his being as revealer to the being of 
things as revealed. By doing so, Being has unfolded through and for Man. But, Tim Morton 
points out how “We assume that consciousness is a special bonus prize for being more ‘highly 
evolved’—a suspicious idea from a Darwinist point of view.”48  
 Self-consciousness is simply an occurrence, however complicated it may be. The 
objects that appear to its intentionality are just occurrences too. It is not the Truth that gets 
revealed through and for self-consciousness. Truths are just the apodictic appearances that 
happen for no reason at all. There are causes for them, but not reasons. The Truth that lies 
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behind things is not eternal and unchanging, as Kojève and Hegel say. Such a Truth could 
only be a code written by a designer so that whatever happens, happens as it was supposed to. 
If we said they happen as they are supposed to, the statement wouldn’t mean as much; it could 
simply be interpreted that things happen as they are supposed to, simply because they happen 
to have turned out that way and there is no point in wondering about the reason behind it. 
This is what Darwin does by abandoning teleology, which provides us with the philosophical 
opportunity to adopt an orientation toward what things are now and what they may become. 
Such an orientation is represented by Nietzsche’s amor fati—turning his back on ressentiment, 
which is all about the “why?” of things.  
 Teleology, a remnant of theology, has always been an unnecessary appendage to 
Hegel’s philosophy, which was pointed out only a generation after his death when Marx 
adopted his dialectic and criticized his teleology. Darwin’s ideas, especially as supporting 
evidence has built up to this day, make the world a much less hospitable place for teleology, 
just as it has done for theology. Žižek, who has dedicated a large part of his career to 
reconciling Hegelianism with Marx and Darwin, agrees that one of the keys is to embrace 
contingency: things happen because somehow enough conditions came together for them to 
happen. Moreover, each of these conditions, individually, comes about through its own 
conditions, so that none of them can ever be pinned down. Certainly no source code for the 
entire show can be excavated. In his massive new book Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow 
of Dialectical Materialism, Žižek cites Marx’s famous passage from the Grundrisse about how the 
structure of today’s bourgeois society tells us very much about what societies must have 
                                                                                                                                                       
48 Morton, The Ecological Thought. 73 
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preceded it—which is analogous to how the current human anatomy can tell us much about 
the ancestors we must have come from.49 Žižek observes, 
It is a profoundly materialist thesis in that it does not involve any teleology (which 
would propose that man is “in germ” already present in ape; that the ape immanently 
tends toward man). It is precisely because the passage from ape to man is radically 
contingent and unpredictable that one can only retroactively determine or discern the 
conditions (not “sufficient reasons”) for man in the ape.50 
 
Once we stop believing in the myth of sufficient reasons, for which there is no reliable 
evidence, the clouds break and Hegelianism becomes the vast and useful system it aspired to.  
Going back to Levi Bryant, he lists several Darwinian discoveries that this kind of 
Hegelianism would not necessarily object to:  
2) Difference is creative, not deviant: Difference is now the motor, the engine, by which 
nature creates. The three pillars of speciation in Darwin are random variation 
(difference), heritability (the transport of difference across generations), and natural 
selection (the selection of differences carried on). It is now difference, not God, that 
creates. 
 
No problem here at all. Open nearly any page of the Logic or Phenomenology, and you will find 
Hegel making this exact point. There is never a flat oneness in Hegel, no homogeneity. His 
metaphysics of internal difference insists on the ever-present abundance of difference, which 
is always accompanied by identity. We naturally assume there is identity, so we can call that 
the static aspect of reality, but it is really difference that is the engine of appearances. Of 
course, Hegel does not adumbrate the same categories as Darwin or explain the process of 
                                                
49 Marx, Karl. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: Norton, 1978. p. 241: “Bourgeois society is the most developed 
and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the 
comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and the relations of production of 
all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still 
unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance 
within it, etc. Human anatomy contains the key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher 
development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher 
development is already known.” 
50 Žižek, Slavoj. Less Than Nothing. New York: Verso, 2012 p. 230. 
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speciation, but there is an undeniable linguistic and conceptual agreement between the two 
systems on this point. 
3) Nature is creative: We now know that matter is capable of generating pattern,     
        of self-organizing, of maintaining pattern across time, and so on. Matter is not     
       simply billiard balls bumping into one another on a pool table, it is not simply  
     “stuff”, but is also energy, forces, flows of energy through systems and all the  
     rest… And it is all this without need of recourse to vitalistic and animistic  
     hypotheses. At the core of Darwin’s thought is the thesis that matter has the  
     capacity to self-organize, to form pattern, to generate life. 
 
Again, a completely Hegelian thought. Life, Spirit, etc., are self-organizing. They require no 
extrinsic forces to spur them along. The contradiction that each thing carries within it ensures 
its own motility. This is why Hegel has been useful for contemporary complexity theory and 
systems theory.51   
4) Design without a designer: Pattern is something that emerges from blind and stupid 
processes, not something that is directed by any aim at the outset. It is for this reason 
that nature is not supposed to be any particular thing. There is no aim that directs 
these processes, no God that “selects” and “arranges”, for example, “eternal objects” or 
“potentialities” for the sake of “intensifying” being. 
 
While Hegel does have faith in teleology, and teleology has theological implications, Hegel’s 
descriptions of genesis do not attribute it to an intentional designer, and certainly not an 
anthropomorphic designer.  His God remains ambiguous; it is the very creative force at the 
                                                
51 For example, Taylor, Mark C. The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 
2002. Taylor, a contemporary Hegelian, sees no conflict between the principle of self-organization and 
Darwinian evolution:  
“A new morphological type emerges, remains relatively stable for a period, and then unexpectedly 
transforms or disappears. The unpredictability of this process does not necessarily mean it has no 
direction. Rather than a teleological process, self-organizing systems can be understood as following a 
teleonomic trajectory tending toward increasing complexity. While each organism ‘is itself on the 
boundary between sub- and supra-criticality, by trading their stuff, they collectively produce a 
supracritical biosphere, one that inexorably becomes more complex’”(193). And citing theoretical 
biologist Stuart Kauffman, he writes “Kauffman notes that Hegel actually anticipated the logic of 
networks over two hundred years ago: ‘Hegel gave us thesis, antithesis, synthesis... These ideas now 
stand discredited. Yet thesis, antithesis, synthesis sound more than a little like the evolution of the 
hundreds of millions of species that have come and gone, or the evolution of technologies that have 
comes and gone.’ While Kauffman overstates the similarites between Hegel’s dialectical logic and the 
logic of evolvinf self-organized networks, his reference to Hegel desrves careful consideration. Hegel 
realized long ago that nature and culture, as well as objectivity and subjectivity, are spun together to 
form dangling threads in the the complex composition I have been weaving...”(194). 
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heart of his metaphysics; the Absolute writ large.52 So while Hegel does not admit a 
theological designer, and Kojève even less so, they both keep faith in an aim that guides the 
processes of human and natural history. Hegel certainly retains the sense of a march toward 
the goal of absolute knowledge—he is the one who coined the much used phrase “the end of 
history”—and for Kojève the goal was the subject’s absolutization of itself and its 
appropriation of the non subjective world. Kojève’s philosophical protagonist takes control of 
history and becomes itself through concrete action on the world. But it is possible to remove 
teleology from Hegel’s system without too much violence. Above all, Hegel’s system is not 
sensitive or brittle. And when we do, he complements Darwinian understandings of becoming 
and change. Which brings us to Bryant’s final Darwinian thesis:    
5) Humans are animals: Insofar as being is without teleology or aim, humans are, like all 
other creatures, an accident. If the evolutionary processes that led to us were rewound 
and started all over again, it’s entirely probable that we wouldn’t come to be. Likewise, 
as the becoming of being continues apace–as it always and unceasingly does–humans53 
will at some point pass out of existence either through being destroyed as a result of 
our own agency or the agency of some other cause or we will evolve into something 
else. 
 
This is a crucial point for modern Hegelianism to figure out. Kojève’s Hegelianism can never 
accept this Darwinian insight. For Kojève, an absolute truth has been revealed by Hegel, and 
this truth is anthropological: History is for man. The only things of value are intentional acts 
carried out on the wings of desire, which is man’s essence. The absolute subject that Hegel 
discovered has taken over the natural world so that the natural world has become the subject’s 
mirror. The subject either acts on the world, or the things of the world unfold for the subject 
                                                
52 The theologian John Milbank acknowledges this when he writes, “Hegel points toward a more consistent 
nihilistic materialism, since he dispenses with all voluntarism and vitalism. If, for Hegel, both thought and reality 
really begin with nohting, then it is this very ‘atheism’ which requires the dialectical principle of determinate 
negation. Hegel radicalizes the Christian creatio ex nihilo by God into a spontaneous generation of something from 
nothing...”(Žižek and Milbank, 149). 
53 I take Bryant to mean “humans” not as Humanity, but just what we currently classify as humans. That is why 
he allows for us to “evolve into something else.” 
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to relate to, therein obtaining to some level of reality. The natural world does not act on the 
subject, because the natural world lacks desire. Therefore, the natural world is not dialectical. 
It is the fuel for and ground upon which the subject performs its own dialectics. But since it 
lacks the element of negativity—desire—it cannot join in the adventure of becoming, except 
through the (human) subject. Only something endowed with desire can achieve and bestow 
recognition, one of the main goals of Hegel’s system, and one that carries with it all sorts of 
other benefits—like a universal State. Human beings, therefore, realize this goal through a 
State of radical democracy in which all members are mutually recognized. Because they 
cannot even recognize each other, let alone court the recognition of the all-powerful subjects 
that have conquered them, objects are left out of this final State. For Kojève, even though 
subjects only come to their self-understanding by recognizing themselves in objects, subjects 
are not objects. They remain ontologically apart and elevated. Thus, there can be no 
“democracy of objects,” as Levi Bryant and Timothy Morton call for.54 If subjects cannot be 
reduced to objects, then an ontological stratification is necessary, and where does it end? 
Whose job is it to interpret it? If subjects are above objects, then mustn’t there—logically, 
                                                
54 Bryant, Levi. The Democracy of Objects. Anne Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 
“The democracy of objects is not a political thesis to the effect that all objects ought to be treated equally 
or that all objects ought to participate in human affairs. The democracy of objects is the ontological thesis 
that all objects, as Ian Bogost has so nicely put it, equally exist while they do not exist equally. The claim 
that all objects equally exist is the claim that no object can be treated as constructed by another object. 
The claim that objects do not exist equally is the claim that objects contribute to collectives or 
assemblages to a greater and lesser degree. In short, no object such as the subject or culture is the 
ground of all others. As such, The Democracy of Objects attempts to think the being of objects unshackled 
from the gaze of humans in their being for-themselves. 
       Such a democracy, however, does not entail the exclusion of the human. Rather, what we get is a 
redrawing of distinctions and a decentering of the human. The point is not that we should think objects 
rather than humans. Such a formulation is based on the premise that humans constitute some special 
category that is other than objects, that objects are a pole opposed to humans, and therefore the 
formulation is based on the premise that objects are correlates or poles opposing or standing-before 
humans. No, within the framework of onticology—my name for the ontology that follows—there is only 
one type of being: objects. As a consequence, humans are not excluded, but are rather objects among the 




structurally—be some subjects above other subjects? Which subjects are which? Does history 
tell us about the ontological value of different subjects? Are those subjects that express power 
and are not as fragile as others the ones with more Being? Is ontological status pegged to 
maleness? Whiteness? Social and economic status? 
 However, if subjects can be reduced to objects, true democracy is possible, without 
much of the deleterious political and social fallout of a metaphysical hierarchy lorded over by 
the human subject.   
 For Kojève, though, History, and indeed the universe, must remain anthropocentric. 
We cannot speak of “accidents” having a role in the appearance and development of man. 
Logically, as a mere thought experiment, we may be able to entertain the notion that perhaps 
man may never have existed if things had gone differently many millions of years ago. But an 
anthropocentrist like Kojève must dismiss these thoughts. It would be like contemplating the 
present King of France or the traits of the son of a barren mother. Once man appeared and his 
consciousness appropriated the world that preceded him, the world became real. The same 
cannot be said for the more ancient, hypothetical world that preceded him. Given the general 
tendency for things to end, as well as the evident fragility of life, we can deduce that human 
kind will someday vanish. But at that time, the natural world that remains will no longer be 
“real,” for it will have lost the conqueror that gives it meaning.  
 Hegel himself, however, was not so confident that his “absolute knowledge” would 
result in a reorientation of the universe around man. In a famous passage at the end of his 
preface to the Phenomenology he writes,  
At a time when the universality of Spirit has gathered such strength, and the singular 
detail, as is fitting, has become correspondingly less important, when too, that 
universal aspect claims and holds on to the whole range of the wealth it has developed, 
the share in the total work of the Spirit which falls to the individual can only be very 
small. Because of this, the individual must all the more forget himself, as the nature of 
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Science implies and requires. Of course, he must make of himself and achieve what he 
can; but less must be demanded of him, just as he in turn can expect less of himself, 
and may demand less for himself (72).    
 
This is hardly the man-as-ruler worldview constructed by Kojève. Of course, when Hegel 
says “Science” he does not have Darwin in mind. Hegelian Science is that which 
systematically aspires to universality. In this context, the objectivity of the Truth uncovered 
by real Science takes priority over merely individual, subjective truths. While Hegel’s Spirit is 
usually talked about as subject-oriented—its main characteristic being self-consciousness—
there is also another level, a more hidden discourse in which the Subject is not necessarily the 
main protagonist in the drama.  
 Judith Butler points this out in her excellent study of French interpretations of Hegel 
since Kojève. Describing Hyppolite (the topic of the next section), she notices, “Hyppolite 
distinguishes two tendencies in Hegel’s work, one that begins with the point of view of the 
subject and one that begins, as it were, with the point of view of substance, the ‘adventure of 
being,’ the subject-less sojourn of metaphysics” (Butler 1987:82). Despite Hegel’s tendency to 
privilege human subjectivity, it is not all that there is in his system. Butler frequently mentions 
that Hegel believes in “ontological harmony”: there is but one substance between subjects and 
objects, and their common structure is the one he plumbs in his abstruse Logic. If this 
ontological harmony is true, then the essential structure of one thing will be the same for all 
other things. Hegel, evidently, found the subject more accessible and built his system around 
it, as did later phenomenological thinkers—as the etymology of the term suggests. But if, as 
Hegel writes in the quote above, the individual needs to humble itself and reconcile itself with 
its own relative insignificance, then Hegel is leaving his system open to a democratization of 
objects and to the Darwinian embrace of accidents, contingency, and the sundering of 
teleology and anthropocentrism. Hegel and Darwin’s ontological harmonies can be combined 
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to inform our view of the world and ourselves. Stuck with subjectivity, we must, as Hegel 
said, do with it what we can. But this will never be the kind of dominance promoted by 
Kojève—or that Hegel admired in Napoleon. A democratization of objects—including the 
reduction of the human subject to an object—may give us as individuals a much easier garden 
to tend, since we no longer feel obligated to stake claims on the entire terrain of metaphysics: 
there are objects that do not reply on us and that we cannot master.  
 An ontological leveling of subject and substance does not erase that subject’s own 
experience. Those experiences remain vivid and primary. But if the subject having those 
experiences does not believe it has a privileged place in an ontological hierarchy, it will let 
itself change, adapt, and live through its experiences rather than appropriate them as fuel that 
strengthens its essential Being. Kojève’s subject is a Being identified with itself and enhanced 
through its relations to other things. A Being like this has difficulty acting on things, which 
will forever remain apart from it. It confronts things rather than moving through them and 
picking up traces of other things in the passage. As a hypostasized Being, it must be a certain 
way. It has duties to live up to itself and the identity that it holds. Even if Darwin was right 
that this subject appears fortuitously, the now discounted external teleology of history gets 
internalized, and the subject must carry out its private purpose. This puts an imperative on the 
subject to be how it ought to be, so one either is the way one is supposed to be, or one is falling 
away from that. Going about it this way, the subject cannot become. Its restlessness and 
anxieties become attributes contained within the vault of Being rather than mere occurrences 
that make up part of a boundless flux of objects, some of them characterized by subjectivity 
and some not. Those who possess subjectivity must, for their own comfort, work with it and 
“achieve what it can,” but they should also understand their status as elements in an 
indifferent universe of objects rather than as the creators and givers of meaning to the world. 
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Only then does the world and subject’s experience of the world make sense; only then can we 
really come to terms with the evidence all around us that tells us we crawled out of the mud 
for absolutely no reason; and only then can we stop believing that the present state of affairs is 
the way that it is because it needs to be this way. 
 As has already been mentioned, pick an injustice and it can be partially attributed to 
these subtle anthropocentric, teleological, and hierarchical metaphysical orientations. 
Misogyny and homophobia are among the most important consequences of faith in unmovable 
ideals and anxiety about the violation of those ideals. In this study, however, I focus on the 
racism of Eurocentrism since Eurocentrism is so deeply inscribed in the canons of intellectual 
history; it is so well-reasoned and justified. Misogyny and homophobia are defended on 
theological and vaguely naturalistic grounds, but Eurocentrism tries to up the ante by 
appealing to rational philosophical discourse. Eurocentrism fantasizes about the invention of 
philosophic reason, supposes that this reason can uncover the world’s purpose, and then 
explains that the writers of this story—their desires and self-preservation—are the purpose. 
Such error is the foundation of our historiography, which shapes the scope of our canons and 
the structures of our academies. It is thus locked in a circle of reinscription until its linchpin of 
anthropocentric and teleological ignorance is knocked out of it.  
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6. 
Subject as Thing, Not King 
 
The previous chapter focuses on many of the unwanted consequences of anthropocentric 
teleology in light of Darwin’s gutting of those two orientations. The present chapter will come 
at the same problem from an ethical perspective. So far, I have been describing the 
dissatisfactory content of the canons of philosophy and the deluded version of that those 
canons construct and maintain. These are dissatisfactory because they cut many people off 
from a means of intellectual legitimization that could ameliorate the pain caused by being in 
positions of political and social disadvantage. Moreover, they are dissatisfactory because they 
are deluded on their own terms: anthropocentric metaphysics and teleological versions of 
history do not stand up to analysis. Finally, they are dissatisfactory because they result in the 
insularity of those who create these deluded canons and histories to begin with, and thus 
become invested in their preservation. Anthropocentric teleology fails to recognize suffering, 
and having posited the subject as transcendent, fail to understand the subject’s role in 
networks that create suffering. Thus, paradoxically, the suffering of human subjects is an 
effective starting point for undermining the human subject’s supreme ontological status.   
 As human subjects we are constantly suffering. We are sensitive and react in pain to a 
great deal of what we encounter. Our anxieties surge up out of nowhere and spill out onto 
those we come in contact with. People stab each other, terrorize each other, get electrocuted, 
or simply drop dead in the middle of a round of golf. Because we are self-aware, we call these 
things tragic, and this puts us at a higher level than the beetle being gutted by the wasp. At 
the same time that we are surrounded by affliction and hostility very much beyond our 
control, we think of ourselves as free and self-determining. When people do awful things to 
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other people, we assume that there is accountability because the harm-doers are free to act or 
not to act; the victims become sacrifices to some higher principle. Those opened up on 
history’s slaughter-bench are giving themselves up to progress toward a goal, toward the 
fulfillment of some latent potential in the species. This is the sense in which Hegel reconciles 
the tragic with the rational. There are no accidents. All is for the best. 
 But as discussed in the last chapter, Darwin has shown that accidents are amazing 
engines. They are collisions of objects and need no sanction from human subject to do their 
work. Thus, the human subject is not the primary substance that feeds off of objective 
appearances and abides in roiling self-absorption. Rather, subjectivity appears and operates in 
groundless space that allows for the productivity of the aleatory. When the subject loses its 
seat in this way it no longer serves as the one absolute substance, the ontological North Star 
that all other entities use as a reference point. When this ontological hierarchy no longer 
makes sense, neither do the teleological destinies of different things, or of different people 
associated with different cultures, geographies, and ideologies.  
 
It is unthinkable for Hegel and Kojève that human beings would not have appeared if the 
clock had been rewound and the universe had to start all over. For the former, the world is 
what it is through the dance of constantly interpenetrating subjects and objects; for the latter, 
absolute knowledge is arrived at through anthropology, because the human subject is all that 
matters. This is the way it has been at least since Kant, who turned Being into a matter of a 
subject’s access to objects. If a subject cannot access the Being of an object, its Being is 
nonsense. Things that are not bestowed their being by the mind that knows them are, 
tautologically, unknowable, and therefore have no being. We might speculate on the 
possibility of things in themselves, independent from minds, but those things can never 
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appear, they must pass through space and time—the primary mediums of our knowledge—
and then be synthesized into intelligible objects (phenomena) by an active mind. Thus, the 
entirely anthropocentric world of Kojève and much of Hegel is part of a lineage going back to 
Kant’s radical correlationism—a term coined by the contemporary French philosopher Quentin 
Meillassoux.55  
 Meillassoux asks Kant some simple but difficult questions that come down to “How 
can we speak of a universe four million years before the appearance of humans?” Kant, Hegel, 
and many other giants of philosophy have a hard time address such an inquiry. For them, it is 
thoroughly established that there can be no Being except in relation to a human subject: one 
that either synthesizes intuitions, gains recognition through desire etc. So in order to talk 
about an ancient universe before man, we must talk about its prior existence as for man. It 
must have been something like a nest lying in wait for its occupant. Based on geological and 
chemical observation, scientists can infer what the world would have been like prior to human 
subjects living in it, but those conclusions are only arrived at through data given to human 
subjects, therefore, that ancient world remains a construction of the human mind, and gains 
its sense/being from it.   
 Despite its self-assuredness, this position does not handle these questions with much 
grace. For one thing, it fails to define human subjectivity and seems to posit a static universal 
entity that exists more or less the same way at all times. If human subjectivity does what 
correlationists say it does, then it must have somehow been hatched full-grown, so to speak, 
like the legendary garuda of Indian mythology.56 Human consciousness/self-consciousness 
                                                
55 Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude. London: Continuum, 2010. 
56 The garuda is an important mythological beast resembling a giant eagle with arms. It is born from an egg, but 
when it hatches, it immediately flies with fully developed skill and power, unlike a typical egg-born animal that 
must still come to maturity after hatching. 
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could not have developed over time, going from an animal-like consciousness to something 
more complex. The correlationist position would scarcely seem to accept a kinship between 
the two types of consciousness, let alone account for the original genesis of consciousness out 
of unconscious matter. At what point, exactly, did consciousness or self-consciousness become 
what we call them today? Like a seed turning into a sprout, it may be impossible to locate any 
distinct advent of those things.  
 Hegel and Kojève, might admit that these are difficult questions, but that we can make 
sense of them in retrospect. Given our current perfectly developed self-consciousness and its 
sense-bestowing powers, a coherent story can be constructed of the past. Indeed, these 
questions have only arisen because of and for self-consciousness as it stands now. There never 
was anything prior. A preconscious, organic realm is still just a more abstract, less vivid 
shadow of the world given to self-consciousness now. Scientific data suggests an ancestral 
world, but it is still just a distant thread in the narrative that has brought us to the present. 
Judith Butler discusses this issue of Hegelian retrospective knowledge:  
Throughout the commentary [Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit], 
Hyppolite argues that phenomenological presumptions regarding the progressive 
movement of history and the satisfaction of the subject are historically conditioned 
ideas. Hence, only from a perspective beyond the Phenomenology do the historical 
origins of the text become clear. This very claim, however, is a result of the “structure” 
of the Phenomenology itself: the privilege of the retrospective point of view as the most 
wise, the most all-encompassing, the one that can discern the condition that makes any 
given unified picture of the world break into dissension and dissolve. In effect, 
Hyppolite makes use of the principle of retrospective wisdom to criticize the 
Phenomenology for its presumptions of progressivity, elaborating the reflexive structure 
of Hegel’s narrative transitions to effect a transition beyond the Phenomenology itself. 
That the Phenomenology requires a commentary at all indicates the problem of reading 
this text within an historical experience that can no longer support the optimism of 
Hegel’s ever-buoyant narrative. To question the teleological model of history, and still 
to remain an Hegelian, one must find the posthistorical prefigured in the text itself. 
Kojève finds this experience of modernity embodied in the slave who, shaken with 
terror, flees from the body to a life of dissociated abstraction and becomes the 
philosophical craftsman, carving out history and metaphysical truth in a single act. 
 65 
Hyppolite stops Hegel’s phenomenological narrative further back, at the moment of 
Life and the infinite labor of desire (Butler 1987: 80).  
 
She quotes Hyppolite on the necessity to adjust where we lay our emphasis in Hegel: “In the 
modern world, the tragic never seems to disappear. We can well perceive that human 
existence, in its precariousness, is jeopardized, but we are not sure, as Hegel was, that this 
coincides with the rational. This coincidence is once again a kind of optimism that we can no 
longer postulate” (Butler 1987: 79). Hegel’s faith in the rationality of history, including its 
bloodiest and most chaotic chapters, flies in the face of Darwinism. As Bryant noticed, one of 
Darwin’s main insights was that all things—their appearance and development—are entirely 
accidental. They come about because of conditions that are ungoverned, except by an infinite 
mesh of other conditions. The parasitic wasp bores through the body of its host not in pursuit 
of a rational goal, but simply because its ancestors had done the same thing and it seemed to 
work out for them: they survived and reproduced. Male black widows have no sense of 
tragedy when they submit to the cannibalistic embrace of their stronger mate; they do it 
because they have fallen into a pattern in which the conditions of their existence depend on 
their self-destructive act. Hyppolite starts to question if these kinds of concrete events are 
indexed, ontologically, to some rational order. Hegel’s Logic provides us with a map for 
comprehending the synchronic structure—the ontology—of appearances, but Hyppolite is not 
satisfied that it proves that the chain of concrete events—diachronic history—are the 
teleological expression of such an ontology. 
 This is what Butler is getting at with the somewhat cryptic, but telling statements: 
“Kojève finds this experience of modernity embodied in the slave who, shaken with terror, 
flees from the body to a life of dissociated abstraction and becomes the philosophical 
craftsman, carving out history and metaphysical truth in a single act. Hyppolite stops Hegel’s 
 66 
phenomenological narrative further back, at the moment of Life and the infinite labor of 
desire.” Kojève adopts Hegel’s faith in theodicy as the effective methodology for arriving at the 
Absolute. They both start by surveying the present state of affairs—the world of appearances 
organized into a diachronic History. Then, recognizing patterns and discovering a certain 
structure in this diachronic History, they trace it back, logically, to discover the hidden 
synchronic truth that underlies it. However, for Hyppolite, it is not necessary or even 
desirable to reach Hegel’s Absolute by means of a theodicy. We do not necessarily need to 
wait for the complex fabric of diachronic History to unfold in order to comprehend the 
structure of reality. The structure of reality is not pegged to the patterns that happen to be 
recognizable in the world of myriad appearances. The structure of reality is a palate of 
conditions of possibility. This is why Hyppolite “stops Hegel’s phenomenological narrative 
further back, at the moment of Life and the infinite labor of desire.” Obviously, having 
dedicated his life to expounding its merits, Hyppolite is impressed with the power of Hegel’s 
phenomenological narrative, but he sees a subtler, personal narrative as the essential one. The 
narrative of human history unfolding over hundreds of thousands of years is something else. 
They can be linked metaphorically, as we will look at in more detail later, but they are not 
metaphysical fractals of each other. The long chain of human history is composed of 
consciousnesses doing things, so it is with the first stirrings of this consciousness that we 
should begin our analysis. Subjects and objects grappling with each other is the beginning of 
the narrative, which can be translated into the metaphor of masters fighting with slaves. It 
doesn’t start with the concrete masters and slaves that populate history. The very subtle story 
of phenomenology’s beginning, with the quivering of subjects and objects and their 
relationship to each other, is where we get an insight into the synchronic structure of reality. 
From there we can see how it was possible for what constitutes diachronic, concrete history to 
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appear. But the reverse is not true. If we start from the diachronic and trace it back—as in 
theodicy—we can’t see the wood for the trees; we take metaphors literally. 
  In light of Meillassoux’s questions about the preconscious world, don’t we need to 
stop the phenomenological narrative even further back than Life? All the way back to the vast 
and ancient, pre-biological universe? This is not an easy task, but Darwinism has been 
nudging us toward such a speculative endeavor for more than two hundred years. The 
Darwinian retrospective glance doesn’t explain the mess of history in terms of its underlying 
sense; it merely describes the paths that led to the present. The invisible hand that guides the 
Protestant universe is shown to be, like so many invisible things, nonexistent. Instead, we 
begin to notice the things we didn’t see before, out there in the background: tiny and random 
mutations, shifting phenotypes with no more bedrock than writing on water, massive, utterly 
senseless geological calamities. Darwin showed us what Hume had suspected: that causality 
only describes what has already happened. Evolution is a great edifice of causality, but it does 
nothing to predict the future, nor does it discover the first principle and final causes of things. 
By tracing and cataloging the mutations that organisms went through for millions of year, 
evolutionary biologists now speak of species as a helpful way of organizing living things with 
similar phenotypes. However, evolutionary biologists may be the only ones who realize the 
illusoriness of the term “species” itself. As Tim Morton notes, “Causality works backward. 
You can name something only retroactively. Something identical happens in evolution. When 
you look at a ‘species,’ you are looking at the past”(ET 62). He quotes Darwin himself, who 
sounded utterly confident in his insight on this point: “Nothing can be more hopeless that to 
attempt to explain [the] similarity in pattern in members of the same class, by utility or by the 
doctrine of final causes”(64). Yet we have continued to explain nearly everything in these 
ways, shutting our eyes and ears to Darwin’s discoveries and refusing to open up to the world 
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of contingency that he opened up for us. Hegelianism, with its obfuscation and abstraction, 
has been a perfect bastion for this cryptoteleology, but Hyppolite was the first to show that 
Hegel could survive in post-Darwinian world, the first major commentator to consider 
Hegel’s system without the Subject at the absolute center. Judith Butler writes that Kojève’s 
point of departure is the fully developed self-conscious subject fully capable of relating to and 
acting on its objects, whereas Hyppolite stops the Hegelian narrative at the moment that life 
begins. I would go a step further and posit that the groundless metaphysics that can be got 
from Hegel requires no life at all, but comprehends and enhances the life that can and does 
appear. Without the human subject at the center, metaphysics must speculate into what allows 
for the accident of the subject to enter into accidental networks with other objects. If subjects 
can understand themselves as the products of processes, and not the beginning of all 
processes, they may stop looking for the teleological first principle that is the essence of their 
self-absorption. They may stop inventing their purpose through the construction of deluded 
theodicy, and they may stop justifying past and habitual present social and political affairs as 




Negativity as Condition, Not Property 
 
If anthropocentric teleology is untenable metaphysically and ethically, what alternative is 
there? Does it have to be positivism? Do we have to accept a single slab of being that obviates 
Hegel’s insights about difference and negativity? Must Hegelian difference and negativity 
always be implicated in the anthropocentric and teleological structures that produce and 
perpetuate injustices for the benefit of those who prosper from imaginary ontological 
differences? They do not. If Hegelian negativity can cease being a quality of the human 
subject, and instead become a condition for being in general, a new horizon opens in which 
Hegel becomes a resource for overcoming the pernicious structures of anthropocentric 
teleology.      
  
Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence extends his critique of Hegel’s Phenomenology as Butler already 
mentioned above. Unable to reconcile his appreciation for Hegel’s metaphysics with the world 
of contingency and suffering that he saw all around him, Hyppolite abandons the tidy 
narrative of the Phenomenology in favor of the subtle and more pliable Science of Logic. The Logic, 
at first glance, is a very un-Darwinian text. It analyzes the a priori structure of the Logos, the 
very underlying principle or set of principles that Darwin makes impossible. The 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, represents concrete history, a narrative with details and 
events. When taken together, the Logic unfolds as history (or “experience” as in the title of the 
book). Therefore, the Logic explains history in some important ways, but neither is reducible 
to the other, unlike Kojève’s formulation in which the Logic is reducible to human experience. 
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Hyppolite, however, admits “It is true that the historicity of this absolute knowledge poses at 
the very heart of Hegelianism new and perhaps unsolvable problems”(LE I36).   
 Unlike Kojève, Hyppolite does not believe there is an ontological difference between 
man and nature, or between Logos and Experience, for that matter: “The Logos is nature”(126). 
However, it is not a hidden cause that magically produces nature. Were the Logos the final 
cause of things, like a god, it would have some kind of ontological primacy distinguishing it 
from its results. But Hyppolite can’t support such a claim. He insists,  
We have to take appearance just as it is, and not as the appearance of a hidden being; 
what Hegel calls the Logic of Essence is this apprehension of reflection as the 
movement of appearance in which there is really a duality, a division, the very division 
of being which reflects itself. This duality, however, is entirely in the appearing; it is 
not beyond. Thus immediacy is reestablished in reflection, actuality as self or concept, 
the concrete unity of mediation. Essence would be like the secret of appearance, but 
this secret is itself only an appearance. Absolute knowledge means the elimination of 
the ontological secret... The only secret is that there is no secret (90). 
 
Hyppolite, therefore, can’t accept Kojève’s ontological hierarchy that put human subjects at 
the top. This passage is representative of any analysis of Hegel’s Logic, since it removes the 
narrative of the subject that we are so used to and which frames the entire discourse of the 
Phenomenology. Or, rather than removing it, this analysis is looking at the state of things prior 
to the emergence of the human subject and its complicated story. Kojève’s philosophical goal 
is intimately tied to the destiny and duties of the human subject, so he is unwilling to 
relinquish its privilege and prefers to keep it apart from everything else. It stands firmly in the 
middle of reality and acts upon it like a magician acts on his magical display. Nature and its 
objects don’t penetrate the subject; they are its fuel and material for constructing a reality that 
is definitively for human consciousness. But Hyppolite follows “Hegel’s postulation of an 
ontological unity that conditions and resolves all experiences of difference between individuals 
and between individuals and the external world…”(Butler 1987: 63). This ontological unity, 
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or “harmony” (Butler’s other term) leads to a kind of “monism”(81), in which there are no 
special ontological statuses between things, whether subjects or not. One thing that tipped 
Hyppolite off about this was Kojève’s blindness to the obvious limitations of his hero-subject. 
All our evidence and good sense tells us that no subject is eternal and omnipotent, as the 
Kojèvian story would have us believe. Just like things, subjects come into being and either 
turn into other things, or are squelched into nothing. Since even the great historical heroes 
who embody Kojève’s ideal must succumb to temporality, temporality is a great ontological 
leveler, not allowing the subject to get too presumptuous about its place among things. 
Without this ontological leveling, the proud human subject continues to ride into the 
teleological sunset. According to Butler, “Although Kojève criticizes the notion of teleological 
history, he has not cured himself of the belief in a telos to human existence. Hence, For 
Kojève, the teleological view of history is less rejected than internalized as a potential feature 
of an individual life…”(81). But for Hyppolite, an internalized teleology or any suggestion 
that the human subject is perfected throws into relief the completely tragic nature of the 
human condition. How can human acts be the one thing that has ultimate ontological value? 
Human acts are brittle and ineffectual, just as subject to the negating force of time as anything 
else. As Butler puts it, any responsible Hegelian who attempts to think about the world the 
way that it is now, must “learn to think time itself, and this thought is of necessity an 
experience of anxiety, placelessness, inevitable transience”(83). But these terms are not only 
applicable to the human experience—anxiety, placenessness, and transience are the marks of 
any object passing through time and space—humans are just one of infinite objects that have 
no place and succumb to time. 
 Hyppolite’s most cogent criticisms of Kojève’s Hegelianism are contained in the 
concluding chapter of Logic and Existence. Without naming Kojève, he highlights the difference 
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between his own interpretation of Hegel’s significance, saying, “We can extend Hegel’s 
philosophy in two different directions. One direction leads to the deification of Humanity; the 
other, the one that we have followed in this work, leads to the Absolute’s self-knowledge 
across man”(177). Hyppolite’s attachment to human subjects as the center of his philosophy is 
slightly misguided, however, his essential insight into Hegel’s flat ontology57 rehabilitates the 
latter’s system and allows it to remain relevant in the contemporary world. Not only does it 
allow for the appreciation of tragedy that Hyppolite thinks has become necessary for us, it 
also reconciles Hegel’s system with the radically non-teleological discoveries of Darwin. Only 
by going in this direction can Hegelianism start to become post-theological, which is to say, 
post-teleological. It will always have its roots in the Teutonic Protestantism of its time, but the 
elements emphasized by Hyppolite can be used in combination with other ideas to begin to 
reshape the world instead of simply describing the world as we find it.  
 One of the most famous statements in the entire Phenomenology is Hegel’s claim that 
“Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in 
                                                
57 “Flat ontology” is a term coined by the contemporary philosopher, Manuel Delanda. When he uses it, he 
means that all things are of only one ontological type, namely, individuals. Bryant explains:  
“Thus for DeLanda the relationship between species and organism is not a relationship between the 
universal or essence that is eternal and unchanging and the particular or the organism as an instance of 
the species. Rather, both species and organisms are individuals that are situated in time and space. If 
species are not eternal essences or forms defining what is common to all particulars of that species, if 
they exist in space and time, then this is because species, as conceived by biology are not types but rather 
are really existing reproductive populations located in a particular geography at a particular point in time. 
For DeLanda, then, being is composed entirely of individuals.”  
-https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/02/24/flat-ontology-2/ 
 
However, for others like Bryant and Harman—and the way that “flatness” will be used in this essay—flatness is 
less about type (i.e.., individual vs. universal) but about whether there is ontological difference between type. It is 
not inherently misguided to speak about individuals and universals as different kinds of things, but there is not 
enough reason to project different ontological statuses onto them. For Plato and other idealists, universals are 
more real than individuals. For Delanda, the opposite is true. Even Harman speaks of “real objects” vs. sensual 
objects, the latter being incomplete phenomenal showings of the former. For this reason, Harman does not fully 
embrace the term “flat ontology”, though he does maintain that both his “real” and “sensual” objects are the same 
ontologically in being objects. Bogost clarifies this position with an aphorism: “All things equally exist, yet they do 
not exist equally.”- http://www.bogost.com/blog/materialisms.shtml 
 73 
itself and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth”(174), for which 
Hyppolite provides the following exegesis:  
Actuality is conceived necessity, and the analysis that Hegel provides of the relations 
of the possible, of the real and the necessary, is perhaps the most illuminating of all the 
dialectics of essence. Actuality does not have its ground in a possibility that would be 
beyond it. It is itself its own possibility. Certainly being is grounded, but it is grounded 
upon itself; it is because it is possible, but it is possible because it is. This 
transcendental chance, which Kant spoke of in The Critique of Judgment and which was 
the encounter of contingency and conditional necessity, is for Hegel absolute necessity, 
because actuality refers to nothing else, and yet it is grounded, it is conceived. The 
Logos is not the possibility of the existent, outside of the existent; it is the conception 
of the existent, and the existent as other is included in its own conception. The 
possible, which is only possible, is impossible; it contradicts itself. This is why it is 
possible because it is, just as it is because it is possible… Comprehended necessity, 
however, is not necessity comprehending itself (175).    
 
There is only appearance. Appearance is not the shadow or emanation of essence; they denote 
the same thing, which is really just appearance. If things that appear could only do so 
according to some prior plan, then appearances would always be references pointing back to 
something ontologically prior and transcendent. This leads to the problem of Hegel’s unhappy 
consciousness, for which the truth is always somewhere else, or Nietzsche’s nihilism, which 
amounts to the same thing. But if there is only appearance, only surface, then things stand on 
equal footing and there is no hopeful pining for the truth behind the veil of appearance. In an 
early attempt to bring Hegel’s system down to earth, Marx criticized the use of the term Self-
Consciousness at the center of the system. Self-Consciousness was too vague and disembodied 
to serve any purpose, which for Marx was above all the amelioration of injustices between 
men. It too much resembled a God sitting above and beyond the realm of man, even though 
man could supposedly partake of it. Such an ontological hierarchy could only blind men to the 
world around them and to each other, leading to political and economic hierarchies that are 
                                                                                                                                                       
That is, the most fleeting hallucination and the sun both exist as objects, but the sun’s existence will matter much 
more in the big scheme of things; it is an example of what Morton calls “hyperobjects.” 
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the scourge of existence. To put things right, Marx replaces Self-Consciousness with, quite 
simply, man. This gets rid of the idealist Self-Consciousness and turns history from a pseudo-
mystical unfolding of some Spirit into the concrete history of human beings and their 
experiences. For Marx, the human being is situated in a material world that preceded him, 
and there is nothing about the human being that makes him ontologically superior to the 
material world, we simply have to carve out the best existence he can within it. This ontology 
is the source of the Marxist positions against gods and other imaginary abstractions, such as a 
transcendent Logos, or even the alienation of man from nature and from his fellow men, 
which is the basis of capitalism. Like Epicurus, Marx’s world is intrinsically positive: man and 
the objects that surround him are irreducible things that populate and are distinct from empty 
space. This has been a valuable reevaluation of Hegel’s ideas, but Hyppolite warns us not to 
overlook something very important in Hegel:  
Hegelianism preserves in its immanence the negation at the heart of every position; in 
actual history, there is a real negation, but the Logos comprehends this negation since 
negation is ontological… While remaining an anthropology, he opened perspectives 
that Marx neglected, and these perspectives bear precisely on the fact that for him 
every determinate objectification is an alienation. He discovered this dimension of pure 
subjectivity which is nothingness. (184). 
 
But if negation is truly ontological the way that Hyppolite highlights here, then negativity 
cannot belong only to subjectivity. This would render a pre-human, or pre-animal world 
impossible, since such a world would be lacking one of the principle conditions for being, 
which for Hegel is objective positivity and subjective negativity. But Darwin and 
Meillassoux’s insights should now have us thinking that it is important to be able to think of 
the pre-conscious world in-itself, and the mind-dependent reality of Hegel and Hyppolite is 
still not getting us where we need to go. But he is on the right track. By shifting the focus 
away from man as the culmination of a teleology and turning it to the ontological issue of how 
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positivity and negativity play together to produce appearance, Hyppolite is shining light on 
the prehuman world in which appearances still appeared, though not to consciousnesses. In 
such a world, objects appeared to each other and related to each other, without the aid of the 
human observer naming everything and arrogating the realm to himself.  
 In Levi R. Bryant’s book The Democracy of Objects, he summarizes Quentin 
Meillassoux’s simple argument against correlationism, the idea that we cannot think a world 
without our subjectivity implicated in it: it is like trying to removed a piece of double-sided 
tape from our finger, it only gets stuck to the one trying to remove it. Like the creationist 
argument that God must have planted dinosaur bones in the ground for us, the correlationist 
argument says that to imagine the pre or post-human world is simply to imagine a world that 
carries us in it as an absence, since its very existence relies on our thinking it in the first place. 
This, Meillassoux contends, is about as satisfactory as arguing that we cannot die, because by 
imagining death and the world without us, we make that world dependent on our thought of 
it. Therefore, I must simply go on living since the thought of my nonexistence depends on my 
existence, thereby making my nonexistence an impossibility.”58 Not only does this offend most 
rules of logic, it also offends the psychological anxieties produced by the thought of death, the 
gut feeling, fed by logic, of the inevitability of our absence through death. Bryant continues in 
his summary, “If it is conceded that our annihilation is, in principle, thinkable, then we are also 
conceding that a world without humans is thinkable.” Yet it would make little philosophical 
sense to posit two separate ontologies for the unconscious world and the conscious world. We 
would like to think that any ontology we can discover for our own conditions of existence 
would apply universally to the world without us—when the conditions for our existence have 
tilted against our favor, but for the favor of other things. Therefore, the negativity that 
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Hyppolite emphasizes cannot be equated with subjectivity, even if it can be shown, 
phenomenologically, that a major quality of subjectivity is negativity. In another dense 
passage, Hyppolite talks about the negativity of being less in terms of subjectivity and more as 
an irreducible ontological category: 
Existence, however, as mere sublation, as the impossible adventure of man, is also an 
impasse. It defines man by the freedom of being-for-itself which is simultaneously 
always opposed to being-in-itself and always related to it. Man does not possess the 
freedom that allows him to wander from one determination to another or to be 
dissolved in abstract nothingness; rather, freedom possesses man. Nothingness is not 
then between the for-itself and the in-itself; it is the very nothingness of being or the 
being of nothingness. It opens to man, not the mere real negativity that makes history 
objective, but the dimension of the universal at the heart of which all sense is 
determined and engendered. Through this freedom, which Hegel says is immanent to 
all history, which Hegel says is the absolute Idea of history (and of course equivocity is 
evident in the relation of the philosophy of history to the Logos in Hegel, and in this 
very term “freedom”), man does not conquer himself as man, but becomes the house (le 
demeure) of the Universal, of the Logos of Being, and becomes capable of Truth. In this 
opening which allows the existents of Nature, and history itself, to be clarified, to be 
conceived, Being comprehends itself as this eternal self-engendering; it is Logic in 
Hegel’s sense, absolute knowledge.59 
 
Man does not accomplish being by breathing life into the barren objective world that depends 
on his gaze. Man is one of the members of the objective world. His coming to absolute 
knowledge is something meaningful and satisfying for himself and can indeed change the way 
he and his fellow sentient beings experience the world, but he does not act as a conduit for 
being to express itself. In other words, being does not lie in wait for self-consciousness. It is 
already there and self-consciousness starts to relate with it in a different way than the pond-
scum and amoebas relate to it. Natural history was already going on in a dramatic way, 
leaving behind thousands of feet of shale deposits, cliff faces, subterranean oil reservoirs, 
aquifers, mountains, and icebergs. Human history then grafted itself onto this foundation, 
adding to it only variety and drama, but no extra being, no ontological upgrade. As Hyppolite 
                                                                                                                                                       
58 Bryant. The Democracy of Objects. 54 
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says, “Being is grounded in itself. It is because it is possible; but it is possible because it 
is”(188). Being is appearance, a surface, with no depths. The Logos is not any code expressing 
itself from the reaches of some rich sea of being beyond our access to it. The Logos is the 
negativity of being that can’t help but appear as any and all things. After Darwin, we are fools 
to talk of the present in terms of the plan that produced it. The present appears as it does 
because it was possible for it to appear this way; but the only way that it was made possible 
was by appearing. In retrospect, we can explore and talk about how things took the path they 
did, but not why. Following Hyppolite’s focus on Hegel’s prehuman ontology, we can start to 
rehabilitate Hegel’s insights and use them against the residues of teleologies and invisible 
hands that we find in his histories of the world and of philosophy.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
59 Hyppolite. Logic and Existence. 187. 
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8. 
The Relationships Between Things 
 
Jean-Luc Nancy (b.1940) is an heir to Hyppolite’s ontological refocusing of Hegel. In his 
concise, accessible, but scarcely read work Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, he ventures 
even further away from identifying negativity with the human subject, and posits it as 
something purely ontological that recedes from our attempts to pin it down to this or that. 
While negativity and subjectivity are intimately related, negativity is the primary term. It is 
the ontological ground that allows for subjectivity to emerge. Thus, subjectivity unsurprisingly 
maintains negativity as a quality, but it is not the same negativity that was already effectuating 
itself in subjectivity’s absence. Subjectivity is an event in the world, an instantiation of 
negativity that dwells anywhere that a positivity can or will be found. It has become 
particularly important for us humans, because it is the site of the drama that fills up our 
existence and from which we can’t escape except through death. Subjectivity changed the 
world by introducing a new kind of relationship between things—a new wrinkle of 
complexity in the community of objects—but it did little to nothing to change the way that 
grains of sand relate to each other in a Sahara windstorm, or the activity of sea vents and 
thermal currents. We know of many kinds of subjectivity already, and there are surely ones 
we don’t yet even detect or may never be able to. Human subjectivity is just a peculiar kind 
among them. Things manifest to themselves and each other, not necessarily in an 
epistemological way, but first ontologically. There doesn’t need to be perception in every 
manifestation, for any perception presupposes the presence of at least two objects that 
achieved themselves as if by magic. Nancy shows us how Hegel imagined a ground of being 
that was not dependent on his thought, a groundless ground that is the ground of object 
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relations as much as for subject-object relations. Thus, he helps us rethink the caricature of 
Hegel’s system as closed and totalizing, instead following him on a speculative adventure that 
steps off of the firm ground of certitudes.  
 It is important to note that Hegel’s negativity is ontological instead of epistemological. 
Unlike Kant or Berkeley, Hegel does not posit the negativity of being based on any kind of 
direct access to it: one does not perceive it as one would a flame or an orange. You could say it 
is inferred through his dialectics, but his inferences are not necessarily pegged to sense 
perceptions.  As Bryant explains, “Epistemologically-driven arguments will always pitch 
questions of what beings are in term of our access to these entities”(DO 63). So for Berkeley, 
the only thing we have access to is the ever-changing flux of the mind, which is capable of 
taking an infinite variety of forms and can perceive itself. Since independent objects are 
inaccessible, he reasons that the only thing that is is mind. Likewise, Kant’s metaphysics are 
second to his epistemology. Our perceptions give us access to phenomena, but their being is 
only partial, since true being lies beyond the pale of any perception or human knowledge. 
Epistemological metaphysics like these tend to result in ontological hierarchies. What really is 
is either perceived or not perceived—the perceived and unperceived cannot exist equally.  
Hegel, however, shows that epistemology must not have anything to do with it. Of course, 
as conscious beings, we are circumscribed by our perceptions, but those limits do not bear on 
anything’s being. We might only have phenomena at our disposal, but, as Kant suggests, it 
would seem that there is more out there than just phenomena. However, we do not need to 
conclude that the phenomena have a different ontological status than those things that are not 
accessible. For a perception to happen and for a phenomenon to manifest, the two sides of the 
transaction must already be present. Such simultaneity goes against any assumption that it is 
the perceiver that really exists, and therefore, cancels out the purported existence of other 
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things. How else can we understand being, if it does not depend on a subject-object 
epistemology? Nancy describes Hegel’s vision:  
The “phenomenon” is not appearance: it is the lively transport of self and the leap into 
manifest existence. Manifesting itself, it is in relation. It singularizes itself. Every thing 
is singular, and the totality is also singular: it is the singularity of manifestation, or of 
the world: it is that singularity manifests itself to nothing other that itself, or to 
nothing. Manifestation surges up out of nothing, into nothing. The manifested is 
something, and every thing is manifested. But there is no “manifester” that would be 
yet another thing than manifestation. Me with my knowledge, I am also in 
manifestation: I am manifest and I manifest, in turn, that I am manifest. Manifestation 
is therefore of itself or it is nothing; it is of itself as much as it is nothing (33). 
 
If the manifester and the manifest are of the same ontological status, then they do not efface 
each other’s being. The subject for whom epistemology matters, cannot denigrate the being of 
its objects, since it can do nothing to add or subtract from its existence. Each of them must be 
spontaneously present, equally existent. In this way Hegel starts with some suppositions: 
there is some ground that must be the condition for all the things that are, but this ground is 
not spatial or temporal; it cannot be a progenitor or some dense positivity that pumps itself 
out as purely positive manifestation; there can be no beginning to manifestation, since nothing 
could muster the resources to become the fountain of being out of nothing; neither can there 
be an end to manifestation, since there is no source that can be squelched. 
 Kant and Berkeley are not the only philosophers to demand that epistemology validate 
metaphysics. The same issue is very much alive in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl 
and his heirs. This tradition began when Descartes stripped away the objectivity of the world 
by doubting its autonomy and stability. All that was left was the pure cogitating ego whose 
absence is inconceivable. Husserl refined this reduction, or rather radicalized it by saying that 
we cannot even establish the ontological status of internal psychic phenomena that make up 
the subject. This transcendental reduction radically splits the objective and subjective, 
distilling everything down to the transcendental-phenomenological ego. There is not a violent 
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negation of the objective that requires a radical epistemological shift, but a gentle epoché, a 
suspension of its truth status. With this, one realizes that the entire objective world “derives 
its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the 
transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with transcendental-phenomenological 
epoché” (CM 65). It would seem, then, that everything of the objective world is a genetic 
product of an underlying synthesizing subjectivity.  
 Such a view has a strong temporal quality: there is a primordial, absolute foundation 
out of which come temporally subsequent objects and meanings. Jacques Derrida, in his early 
book The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy writes, “…in order to be authentically genetic 
and phenomenological, it must describe the conditions of the founding without deforming 
them, that is to say, it must describe the arising of meanings in the becoming of experience, 
conceived in the largest and most originary sense as including the experience of the founding 
itself” (PG xxvi).60 Husserl’s phenomenology relies on the starting point of a consciousness 
                                                
60 One of the most satisfactory descriptions of this phenomenological arising of subjectivity is found in a lecture 
by the contemporary Tibetan Buddhist teacher, Chogyam Trungpa: 
Fundamentally there is just open space, the basic ground, what we really are. Our most fundamental state 
of mind, before the creation of ego, is such that there is basic openness, basic freedom, a spacious 
quality; and we have now and have always had this openness. Take, for example, our everyday lives and 
thought patterns. When we see an object, in the first instant there is a sudden perception that has no 
logic or conceptualization to it at all; we just perceive the thing in the open ground. Then immediately 
we panic and begin to rush about trying to add something to it, either trying to find a name for it or 
trying to find pigeonholes in which we could locate and categorize it. Gradually, things develop from 
there…   
  This development does not take the shape of a solid entity. Rather, this development is illusory… 
The beginning point is that there is open space, belonging to no one. There is always primordial 
intelligence connected with the space and openness. Vidyā, which means “intelligence” in Sanskrit—
precision, sharpness, sharpness with space, sharpness with room in which to put things, exchange 
things. It is like a spacious hall where there is room to dance about, where there is no danger of 
knocking things over or tripping over things, for there is completely open space. We are this space, we 
are one with it, with vidyā, intelligence, and openness.  
 But if we are this all the time, where did the confusion come from, where has the space gone, what 
has happened?  Nothing has happened, as a matter of fact. We just became too active in that space. 
Because it is spacious, it brings inspiration to dance about; but our dance became a bit too active, we 
began to spin more than was necessary to express the space. At this point we became self-conscious, 
conscious that “I” am dancing in the space.   
 At such a point, space is no longer space as such. It becomes solid. Instead of being one with the 
space, we feel solid space as a separate entity, as tangible. This is the first experience of duality—space 
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that is intentional, that is, as always aimed at an object. For him this was an empirical fact; but 
its worth remains heuristic, and not philosophical. While Husserl’s method facilitated a kind 
of descriptive observation and analysis of the experience consciousness, it did not resolve the 
issue of a founding experience, as demanded by Derrida. If the foundation of the 
transcendental consciousness is something different from that of objective being, then 
consciousness is autonomous and therefore not intentional: there must have been a moment 
where subject was unaccompanied by an object. But if somehow objective being is self-
constituted—or naturally constituted somehow through transcendental conscious—then this 
                                                                                                                                                       
and I, I am dancing in this space, and this spaciousness is a solid, separate thing. Duality means “space 
and I,” rather than being completely one with the space. This is the birth of “form,” and “other.”  
 Then a kind of blackout occurs, in the sense that we forget what we were doing. There is a sudden 
halt, a pause; and we turn around and “discover” solid space, as though we had never before done 
anything at all, as though we were not the creators of all that solidity. There is a gap, Having already 
created solidified space, there we are overwhelmed by it and begin to become lost in it. There is a 
blackout and then, suddenly, an awakening.   
 When we awaken, we refuse to see the space as openness, refuse to see its smooth and ventilating 
quality. We completely ignore it, which is called avidyā. A means “negation,” vidyā means “intelligence,” 
so it is “un-intelligence.” Because this extreme intelligence has been transformed into the perception of 
solid space, because this intelligence with a sharp and precise and flowing luminous quality has become 
static, therefore it is called avidyā, “ignorance.” We deliberately ignore. We are not satisfied just to dance 
in the space but we want to have a partner, and so we choose space as our partner. If you choose space 
as your partner in the dance, then of course you want it to dance with you. In order to possess it as a 
partner, you have to solidify it and ignore its flowing, open quality. This is avidyā, ignorance, ignoring 
the intelligence… 
 Suppose in the beginning there is an open plain without any mountains or trees, completely open       
land, a simple desert without any particular characteristics.  That is how we are, what we are. We are 
very simple and basic. And yet there is a sun shining, a moon shining, and there will be lights and colors, 
the texture of the desert. There will be some feeling of the energy that plays between heaven and earth. 
This goes on and on.   
 Then, strangely, there is a sudden someone to notice all this. It is as if one of the grains of sand had 
stuck its neck out and begun to look around. We are that grain of sand, coming to the conclusion of our 
separateness. This is the “birth of ignorance” in its first stage, a kind of chemical reaction. Duality has 
begun.   
 The second stage of ignorance-form is called the “ignorance born within.” Having noticed that one 
is separate, then there is the feeling that one has always been so. It is an awkwardness, the instinct 
toward self-consciousness… It is the attitude that one is a confused and separate individual, and that is 
all there is to it. One has identified oneself as separate from the basic landscape of space and openness… 
 In a sense, it might be said that the primordial intelligence is operating all the time, but it is being 
employed by the dualistic fixation, ignorance. In the beginning stages of the development of ego this 
intelligence operates as the intuitive sharpness of feeling.  Later it operates in the form of intellect. 
Actually it seems that there is no such thing as the ego at all; there is no such thing as “I am.” It is an 
accumulation of a lot of stuff. It is a “brilliant work of art,” a product of the intellect that says, “Let’s give 
it a name, let’s call it something, let’s call it ‘I am’,” which is very clever.  “I” is the product of the 
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constitution is not apperceived by consciousness as it happens; it too is autonomous and we 
have not established a genetic link between subject and object. Even if we argue for a radical 
idealism (which Husserl does in his later Ideas) with a self-sufficient subjective production 
“that does not refer to any objective natural history, it has to be turned into a ‘content of 
consciousness’ with all the plenitude of an ‘in itself’ closed up on itself”(xxix). But the point 
Nancy has pulled out of Hegel is that obsessing over the temporal primacy of either subjective 
of objective being presumes an ontological split between them. The earlier must be 
ontologically more authentic than the latter. But there is no such difference between types of 
being, ontologically. Derrida’s question of genesis in Husserl’s philosophy is epistemological, 
not ontological, but he conflates the two. For him, ontology is at the mercy of our access to 
being, therefore, he demands that Husserl give an epistemological account of the “arising of 
meanings,” from which all things derive their being.   
 Husserl was not unbothered by these dilemmas. He proceeds with extreme subtlety 
and is reluctant to grant primary status to either side of the dialectic. However, his aim was to 
describe the experience of consciousness, and this was performed under the microscope of the 
transcendental-phenomenological reduction. This method does not radically negate, but only 
suspends or [temporarily] neutralizes objective existence. The most salient aspect of his 
reduction is the relatively easy suspension of objective reality; but it also demands the more 
challenging suspension of the absolute status of subjective content. So what is the fate of the 
absolute subjective substrate in Husserl’s system?   
 Since Kant, or even since Descartes, correlationist thinkers hold the subjective self as 
the center; its experience is the point of departure for all inquiry. After that, we can ask what 
                                                                                                                                                       
intellect, the label that unifies into one whole the disorganized and scattered development of ego 
(Trungpa 2005 pp. 85-89). 
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either precedes or follows the self. Subjectivity seems so present, so undeniable and stable, yet 
we doubt its provenance. We would like to know what it is made of, but knowing that it may 
be produced and thus unstable disquiets us. Likewise, we long to fully appreciate its 
multifarious productions and expressions. These comprise the world in which we find 
ourselves; they are the content of our consciousness.  Yet knowing that they issue, as echoes, 
from a more inaccessible, cavernous self, divests meaning from our life-world. In his study, 
The Work of Georges Poulet, Paul de Man observes an equation with virtually the same structure 
as that found in the phenomenological problem. De Man analyzes Poulet on the problem of 
the self and its relationship to language: 
The quest for the source, which we have found constantly in his thought, can never be 
separated from the concern for the self that is the carrier of this quest. Yet this self 
does not possess the power to engender its own duration. This power belongs to what 
Poulet calls “the moment,” but “the moment” designates, in fact, the point in time at 
which the self accepts language as its sole mode of existence. Language, however, is 
not a source; it is the articulation of the self and language that acquires a degree of 
prospective power. Self and language are the two focal points around which the 
trajectory of the work originates, but neither can by itself find access to the status of 
source. Each is the anteriority of the other. If one confers upon language the power to 
originate, one runs the risk of hiding the self… But if the subject is, in its turn, given 
the status of origin, one makes it coincide with Being in a self-consuming identity in 
which language is destroyed. Poulet rejects this alternative just as categorically as he 
rejects the other, although much less explicitly. The concern for language can be felt in 
the tone of anguish that inhabits the whole of his work and expresses a constant 
solicitude for literary survival. The subject that speaks in the criticism of Georges 
Poulet is a vulnerable and fragile subject whose voice can never become established as 
a presence.”61 
The demand for a foundation is never satisfied as long as we insist on the absolute reality 
status of one or both of the self and its object. Derrida devotes hundreds of pages to exposing 
the irresolvable problem of foundationalism at every subtle twist and turn of the 
phenomenological method. He uses this as a starting point for a radical new method of 
philosophy, his deconstruction, which at the very least casts the same problem in refreshing 
                                                
61 Man, Paul de. Blindness and Insight. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983 p.100. 
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terms. At the heart of the problem is what Derrida calls “the impossibility of an originary that 
is absolutely simple” (xl). But Derrida’s focus on meanings, semiotics, and language already 
presume the primacy of the subject.  
 Levi Bryant notices the same assumption in Žižek’s Lacanian Hegelianism. Parts of 
Žižek’s ontology resemble Hyppolite and Nancy in its focus on the paradox between reality 
and appearance. Arguing that there is no ontological split between appearance and some 
underlying reality behind it, he approaches the flat ontology we have seen is possible in 
Hegel’s system:  
 
[Appearance implies that there is something behind it which appears through it; it 
conceals a truth and by the same gesture gives a foreboding thereof; it simultaneously 
hides and reveals the essence behind the curtain. But what is hidden behind the 
phenomenal appearance? Precisely the fact that there is nothing to hide. What is 
concealed is that the very act of concealing conceals nothing. 
62This description is not teleological, and it identifies appearance with reality: there is 
not more reality hiding behind appearances, however, appearances appear in a way 
that seems to hide something and does not satisfy some demand full the full disclosure 
of being. This, he argues, is simply the way that appearance works, and it is the source 
of our belief in hidden reality. The split is an illusion. But Žižek does not stop there; 
Bryant quotes him from another place:  
 
What we experience as “reality discloses itself against the background of the lack, of 
the absence of it, of the Thing, of the mythical object whose encounter would bring 
about the full satisfaction of the drive. This lack of the Thing constitutive of “reality” is 
therefore, in its fundamental dimension, not epistemological, but rather pertains to the 
paradoxical logic of desire—the paradox being that his Thing is retroactively produced 
by the very gesture of its loss. In other (Hegel’s) words, there is nothing—no positive 
substantial entity—behind the phenomenal curtain, only the gaze whose 
phantasmagorias assume different shapes of the Thing. 
63 The major point here for Bryant is Žižek’s focus on the symbolic, a domain that only 
has meaning for human subjects. Reality, in this system, takes place in, or is inscribed in 
subjectivity, which is the negativity that opposes the positivity of things that appear. 
Therefore, “For Žižek the object is a pole in a relation between subject and object. In 
other words, there is a type of being, the subject, and another type of being, the 
object”(DO 130). Therefore, despite the earlier suggestion of the identity of appearance 
and reality, there remains an ontological hierarchy that is essentially anthropocentric, 
as Bryant notes, “Beings are hegemonized under the signifier or language, just as they 
                                                
62 Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 1989. p193 
63 Žižek, Slavoj. Tarrying With the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham: Duke, 1993. p.37 
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are hegemonized under mind in Kant”(131). And we saw the same conclusion in 
Husserl and Derrida.  
 
So are we to abandon epistemology and semiotics as obsolete forms of inquiry? Of course not. 
Bryant remarks, “The point here is not that we should ignore the signifier, language, and 
signs, but that the signifier cannot function as the ground of being” (132). We have to find a 
better ground, or get by without one. This is Nancy’s main contribution, and one that helps us 
rehabilitate Hegel, who has too much of value to say to be vilified entirely. He helps us 
overcome the teleology and anthropocentrism that has clung to Hegel and his legacy, and by 
doing so we can begin to reverse some of the damage that has been done under those banners.  
 In the search for an alternative ground of being—one that is not language, symbols, 
signs, objectivity, or subjectivity—Nancy finds that, 
The Hegelian ground is neither a fundament nor foundation, neither groundwork nor 
substrate. It is the depth in which one is submerged, into which one sinks and goes to 
the bottom. More precisely, this ground founds only to the extent that it sinks in itself: 
for foundation should be a hollowing out… Still further: this hollowing neither attains 
nor brings to light a secure groundwork. It hollows out the point of passage, and the 
point itself is such a hollowing out: work of the negative, but right at the surface (15). 
 
He has an insight here, but he does not go beyond the correlationism of the phenomenological 
tradition from which he comes. Like Žižek, Nancy equates the negativity of this ontological 
groundlessness with Thought; that is, human subjectivity. But this is a mistake for which 
Nancy must be forgiven. He says enough in his The Restlessness of the Negative to help us 
achieve a purely ontological groundlessness that does not fall back into the trap of figuring out 
whether subjects or objects are primary.  
 If we take seriously the prehuman world speculated by Meillassoux and if we succeed in 
understanding subjectivity as just another kind of thing and not something superior to other 
things, then we don’t need to equate negativity with the subject. Things exist, come about, and 
manifest owing to the ontological negativity within them. All things have this quality, from 
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inert gases, to grains of sugar, to tiger cubs. To say that one object—namely human 
subjectivity—has endowed all these things with being is to posit an unjustifiable metaphysical 
hierarchy. But philosophy can bring us back to things themselves and allow for an 
appreciation of their spontaneous presence. Nancy writes,  
Philosophical decision is the decision not to settle for the manifest, and this in the name 
of manifestation itself. This decision is the decision not to entrust the manifest to 
something else: to something occult, hidden, or secret. It is the decision of a world 
without secret, or a world whose whole secret lies in its logos or its revelation (38). 
 
As we noted earlier, the theories of Darwinian speciation reveal that there is no grand design 
to the way things have happened. In a world of objects, subjectivity emerged as just another 
thing. But this new thing—subjectivity—opened up new relationships between things. As far 
as we know, objects in the pre-conscious world enjoyed very different relationships with each 
other than we enjoy with them. However, this does not justify the construction of a mythology 
that puts the newcomer-thing—human subjectivity—at the center of everything. Nor is there 
any reason to identify subjectivity with negativity tout court. Negativity has to be subjectivity’s 
condition or source. Subjectivity may have negativity as a major characteristic, but negativity 
already pervaded the ground of being, even before subjectivity manifested. Negativity as the 
ground means that there is no ground in the usual sense: no fundament or substrate. Temporal 
primacy falls away. Nancy observes, “The concretion of negativity begins with the other. The 
self that negates itself, instead of coming back to itself, throws itself into the other, and wills 
itself as other. This is why the other is not second, does not come after”(57).  
  
Since Epicurus and even well before him, we have speculated into the magic dance between 
atoms and the void—positivity and negativity—as the condition of appearances. As we 
became more adept at analyzing our subjectivity as something quite unique among things, we 
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inflated it, giving it so much spaciousness that it seemed synonymous with ontological 
negativity. Negativity, then, was no longer space, or the void—a categorical indeterminacy; 
paradoxically, it became a possession of the human subject: the subject first posited itself as 
negativity, then hypostetized itself and kept negativity as a property it possesses. There was 
thus a split in the fabric of the world: an ontological ground of subjectivity in opposition to its 
epiphenomena. This original split initiated a habit of arranging entities in ontological 
hierarchies: male entities are more than female entities; white entities more than brown 
entities. This habit’s momentum would not even let the subject repose in itself, happily 
knowing that its objects are just the waves and not the water; it took the form of theological 
machinations that projected its own being to a hinterland beyond access, setting itself up as 
something less absolute than an ever receding God. The theological stage, with its 
transcendent absolute, marks an extreme limit to the habit of hierarchization. Later on—
perhaps with Descartes’ phenomenological reduction—the transcendent absolute falls back 
into the subject (“I think, therefore I am [God]”)64. But he, and especially Kant, continued to 
demand that being can only be a gift of subjectivity—there is an inescapable correlationist loop. 
There is a transcendental subject that is the sole condition for the manifestation of objects. In 
Hegel, this transcendental subject is identified with negativity and it becomes a ontological 
category, rather than an epistemological organ. For him, the transcendent God becomes 
present through the historical event of the Incarnation and Crucifixion, and that God never 
leaves the realm of immanence again; he continually shows up as history; he is the Logos 
underlying each event. Death of God theology tries to push the transcendent even more 
deeply into immanence, believing that the literal event of the crucifixion spilled God out all 
over the world and was absorbed there. This event established the world’s divinity and 
                                                
64 The thesis of a forthcoming essay by Hanny Hindi. 
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ensured that every event, every objective manifestation, has significance by virtue of being 
imbued with what was once the transcendent God.  
 But all of these moves toward immanence don’t really accomplish it. These formulations 
are of a transcendence hiding. They continue to privilege certain entities over others, and those 
entities are invariably anthropocentric: human subjects, the Word at work in language and 
culture etc.65 These ontological privileges proliferate in varying degrees of subtlety, and there 
is no real break from the hierarchies that they all wanted to break from, which were 
represented most radically in the paradigm of the transcendent God. Mark Taylor points out 
the shortcomings of someone like Thomas Altizer’s attempt to theorize radical immanence:  
What Altizer has never been able to accept is that the Incarnation actually collapses 
high and low into each other in such a way that the divine is embodied not only in high 
culture and the fine arts but also in nature as well as low, or popular, culture. In other 
words, Altizer cannot follow where Hegel surely would have dared to go—he is 
unwilling and unable to extend theological and philosophical argument to nature, 
history, and culture as a whole.66 
 
This is because nature continues to be seen as fuel for the human subject, which is primary; 
history continues to be seen and teleological—carrying out anthropocentric destinies; and 
culture continues to be seen as the means by which these anthropocentric destinies express 
their lineage back to the transcendent absolute that created them.  
 Not only do these tries at immanence fail to achieve it because of their fundamental 
anthropocentrism, they are also Eurocentric and they create and maintain social, political, and 
academic prejudices. They invariably privilege the events of western history: the Crucifixion, 
the French Revolution, etc., claiming that any and all truth, any and all human development, 
could only have happened through these events. They claim that there can be no realization of 
immanence without arriving at it by thinking through western events like the crucifixion. 
                                                
65 The latter is from the theories of Death of God theologian, Thomas Altizer. 
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Habitual self-centeredness inspire someone like Altizer to hyperbole like, “Only Christianity 
knows that absolutely primordial which is absolutely “first,” an absolutely primordial which is 
absolutely other than the absolutely new, one which could never be manifest or actual apart 
from the advent of the absolutely new, and one only possible by way of a full and actual 
negation and reversal of the absolutely new.”67 It seems the only reply to such a statement 
would be, “If you say so…”. Such statements are tautological, saying essentially, “XYZ are 
developed thus in Christianity. Therefore, XYZ can only be known in this Christian way by 
Christianity.” When you formulate and then target some exalted intellectual realization and 
then say that it can only be reached via Christianity, you set up the conditions for Christianity 
to exclude, isolate, and oppress. Likewise, beyond their own tautological logic, I fail to see 
what is either accurate or helpful about the statements like the following from Altizer: “A full 
and actual atheism can only be found in the modern Western world”(5); “Only Christianity 
knows an absolutely dichotomous body”(150); “it is only Christianity that embodies ultimate 
historical and interior dichotomies”; “only Christianity and the Christian world know an 
actual body of abyss”(155); “it is only Christianity that calls forth the ultimate depths of sin, 
death, and Satan”(97); “Only Christianity knows an ultimate self-negation or self-emptying of 
the Godhead”(148). Each of these statements appears in the context of extremely profound 
metaphysical speculations, and Altizer constantly achieves insights into the synchronic 
structure of things. Like Hegel, however, he erroneously indexes the synchronic to diachronic 
history, and he assumes that any understanding of what “self-negation” or “self-emptying” 
mean is entirely dependent on Christianity’s power to express those concepts. The emptying 
of the Christian Godhead was just an example of emptying, it was not the only emptying that 
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ever occurred. Insofar as any modern western atheism is temporally subsequent to the 
promulgation of Christianity in the West, then tautologically, “full and actual atheism can only 
be found in the modern Western world.” But such a statement implies that the non-West has 
nothing to contribute to improved human understanding—2500 years of Buddhist atheism are 
not a resource for modern atheology. Such sweeping claims and dismissals are just not 
rigorous, nor are they ethical since political and social exclusion that follow from them.  
 Aspirations to immanence must be supported by a rooting out of anthropocentrism and 
metaphysical stratification. Attempts throughout Western intellectual history have failed to 
achieve an understanding of immanence most often because they continued to invest the 
human subject with the same character as the once transcendent God. When Nancy adjusts 
Hegel’s negativity away from being a property of the subject, and toward being an abstract 
ontological category that is the condition of appearance, he provides us with a helpful 
resource for breaking down our philosophical anthropocentrism. When this is done, the 
individual things that make up nature, history, culture etc. can be understood as ontologically 
dignified things that take part in complex networks that shift around in profound contingency 








Object-Oriented-Ontology and Neo-Epicureanism 
 
In order to really understand networks and how they produce things, it is imperative to 
remove human subjects from the role of conductor of the symphony, and to try to get a clearer 
picture about how things relate to each other. Doing this will clarify how things affect 
humans, once we enter into the network, and allow us to have a different vision of those 
networks and the other actors within them.  
 We saw how Nancy’s anti-foundationalism approaches this goal by reconciling Hegel’s 
metaphysics with contemporary scientific knowledge and does away with its theological link 
to teleology. He rescues Hegel from dismissal by those who cannot accept his idealistic 
dependence on the subject, but he also refuses to grant the objective world the full autonomy 
that materialists demand of it: as one of the great phenomenologists of that tradition, the 
subject remains at the heart of things, and perhaps the correlationist loop has just been 
rendered more subtle, and objects do not attain full autonomy. This puts him at odds with one 
of the most promising and interesting contemporary metaphysical theories, the object-
oriented-ontology championed by Graham Harman and adopted by Levi Bryant, Tim 
Morton, Ian Bogost, and others. Generally associated with posthumanism or “the speculative 
turn,”68 Object-Oriented Ontology is not trying to make the human irrelevant, or to denigrate 
humanity. Neither is it attempting to negate relation or networks altogether, even as it seeks to 
rehabilitate the ontological integrity of objective substance. It pushes deeper into the territory 
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of non-anthropocentric helping us attenuate the faith in teleological history and ontological 
hierarchies that leads to so many nasty consequences.  
 Graham Harman’s goal has been to rehabilitate metaphysics as systematic speculation 
into what is not visible. But he wants to do this without appealing to theology. For Harman, 
the linguistic turn that dominated twentieth century philosophy shifted all inquiry away from 
metaphysics—things, substances, depths of being—throwing its entire lot into epistemology. 
We saw the problem with this earlier in Bryant’s criticism of epistemological reductionism 
that makes the entire universe and the objects contained within it dependent on the human 
subject. But Harman is the real champion of this push to know objects, not just to reify them 
as scientific realists do, but speculate about the inner life of objects and the hidden layers of 
the world that are full and alive, and independent from human interference.  
 For Harman, theology and phenomenology, in most of their incarnations, are “blood 
brothers”69: theology relies on God standing by to create things and endow them with being, 
while phenomenology does the same thing with the human subject. There are objects, of 
course, but those objects our bound, inextricably, to a consciousness injecting them with 
meaning. Those objects do not exist in their own right, they have no hidden depths. Rather, 
for most phenomenologists, objects are like the western ghost town constructed by the 
characters of Mel Brooks’ Blazing Saddles: they are all facade; there is nothing inside. Or if 
there is something inside, as a theologian might concede, it is entirely dependent upon God’s 
power. For Harman, “whichever of these two camps one enters, phenomenology or theology, 
objects are reduced to the lackeys and menials of a unified lofty power”(14). Neither of them 
can appreciate the beauty of the ancestral world that is at the heart of Meillasoux’s elegant 
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criticism. In these systems, “The world’s pulsating landscape of palm trees, lizards, obsidian, 
salt, motorboats, and viruses is granted no hidden layer whatsoever”(13).  
 Hegel, in his teleological moments, grants a hidden layer to things in the idea of the 
Logos as a primordial code that contained the secret destiny of world and that would reach its 
zenith in the people of Europe and their cultural trappings. Kojève’s metaphysics eviscerates 
the objects of the universe and offers them as a feast to the people of the world, proving their 
supremacy in the ontological hierarchy. But Hyppolite and Nancy begin to wonder if Hegel’s 
Logic could not make us better neighbors to our fellow things. They ask whether we are 
subject to the same structure as them and obey the same laws. While they remain focused on 
the subjective and they equate the negativity so important in Hegel’s dialectic with 
subjectivity, by refusing to grant temporal primacy to the subject, they open the door to 
ontological democratization and subtle humbling of the human species.  
 Both Hyppolite and Nancy were profoundly influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, 
a subject-oriented system par excellence. As has already been noted, the centerpiece of 
phenomenology is the insight that consciousness is always aware of something, and so it posits 
the simultaneity of subject and object. However, like Kant and others, Husserl knew that it 
was not possible to have complete, unfettered access to things in themselves. We are limited to 
the parts of things that are given to our perception. These representations are phenomena, and 
they constitute the tapestry of our experience in all its multiplicity. Since we have no access to 
the fullness of objects and they always seem to hide much of themselves from us, we tend to 
doubt that they exist at all beyond the way that we see them. Yet we are not alone in a world 
with nothing but sense data keeping us company as phenomena. Those sense data already 
imply some objectified form out there that is either somehow playing a role in furnishing those 
sense data. But we can’t access them. As Harman puts is, “In short, we live in a strange 
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medium located somewhere between substances and qualities, unable to touch either of 
them”(24). Qualities are given to us and they suggest the presence of a substance, but the 
substance remains aloof, stubbornly, leaving us to build philosophies that do without it and 
deny its existence. If substance won’t show itself, we will make do with a universe of 
phenomena, though this is never fully satisfying and leaves us in the loop of intentionality, 
always wondering how we got to this strange chicken-and-egg conundrum in the first place.  
 Husserl’s answer to the problem of objective existence was to “bracket” the issue, to 
suspend it in his phenomenological epoché. This amounts to putting-out-of-play any concern 
with the ultimate status of objects and phenomena—flattening them ontologically, at least 
temporarily, at least to get into enough open space to be able to analyze the mesmerizing 
display of phenomena that inhabit our minds. And for Husserl’s purposes, this operation was 
effective. Husserl was a great champion of experience; for him the noblest object of 
philosophy is to understand the processes by which our experiences take shape. Because of 
this concern for experience as experience, Husserl bracketed, or put philosophically out of play, 
concern for things ontological status. All things are the same within experience. We are able 
to think about giant dinosaurs breathing fire and marauding through Tokyo, and we are able 
to write stories about these thoughts. Or even more close to home are the experiences we have 
almost nightly in dreams. The content of these experiences is not real, but we experience them 
nonetheless, so why obsess over their reality status? Against the natural-science influenced 
psychologism of his day, Husserl did not want to grant more reality to the empirical materials 
of the world than to experience itself, so full as it is with blatantly unreal sprites and unicorns. 
Our experience, and thus our universe, is phenomenal, and thus there are things that lay 
beyond our reach, but those things don’t matter very much. As Harman puts it, “For 
phenomenology, the drama of the world plays itself out within specific appearances, not behind 
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or beneath them”(21). Thus, he approaches the kind of democratic ontology that we find 
being worked out in Nancy and explicitly theorized in Bryant.  
Concerned as he was to put experience back in the center of philosophy, Husserl enriched 
western philosophy dearly, but he left us in the lurch about the ontology of objects and 
subjects, keeping us suspended in the phenomenological epoché. Philosophers in this tradition 
have been happy to remain in this ontological no-man’s land, positing the correlation of 
subject and object, not getting beyond the problem of which comes first, and eliciting critiques 
like Derrida’s The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy. For Harman, it is time to move on 
and we should no longer brook the “‘what difference does it make?’ approach to 
philosophy”(41). For him,  
The question of whether the world is real or not for phenomenology makes a huge 
difference, since it bears directly on the internal structure of phenomena themselves. 
The middle-ground position of claiming that “it makes no sense to ask” is not as neutral 
as it appears, for it entails a de facto reduction of objects to phenomena. Those who try 
to remain agnostics about the reality of any extraphenomenal realm still do not hesitate 
to strip such a realm of its philosophical role. The question of whether phenomenology 
deals with realities or only with human access determines whether philosophy can 
range freely over the whole world, or whether it will remain restricted to self-reflexive 
remarks about human language and cognition […]  
 A simple litmus test can be used to pin down the difference. Of any philosophy we 
encounter, it can be asked whether it has anything at all to tell us about the impact of 
inanimate objects upon one another, apart from any human awareness of this fact. If 
the answer is “yes,” then we have a philosophy of objects […] If the answer is “no,” 
then we have a philosophy of access, which for all practical purposes is idealism, even 
if no explicit denial is made of a world outside of human cognition. To remain “neutral” 
on this question is to condemn philosophy to operate only as a reflexive meta-critique 
of the conditions of knowledge. It is to trim the hair of Samson while he sleeps, 
imprisoning philosophy in the human realm while stripping it of the power to conduct 
nocturnal raids on trees, boulders, lizards, and stars (42). 
 
Harman’s answer to this widespread problem is to rehabilitate the philosophical notion of 
substances. He believes that substance-denialism has become a serious problem in modern 
philosophy, and is the primary reason for the trap of correlationism that he, Meillassoux, 
Bryant, Morton and others descry. By denying substances, we deny objective reality, and by 
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default give sole ontological validity to subjectivity. He does not, however, want to swing the 
pendulum to the other side and affirm substance as pure materiality or metaphysically simple 
objects. Substances are not even necessarily physical; they are metaphysical. The unreal 
phenomena whose existences are bracketed in Husserl’s system are also substances. Xuanzi’s 
butterfly is a substance as much as my landlord. They both contain depths that I cannot 
penetrate entirely, as I am limited to their phenomenal representations. In Harman’s words,  
They are not ultimate materials, but autonomous forms, forms somehow coiled up or 
folded in the crevices of the world and exerting their power on all that approaches 
them. This is my definition of substance, a term well worth salvaging: an object or 
substance is a real thing considered apart from any of its relations with other such 
things (19). 
 
So his object-oriented-ontology is not a naturalism that simply privileges the material at the 
expense of the ideal. He, “sees objects existing not just at some ultimate pampered layer, but 
all the way up and down the ladder of the cosmos, so that all realities gain the dignity of 
objects”(19). It is this flattening move, this ontological democratization, that puts Harman, 
despite vast differences in terminology and emphasis, in harmony with Nancy, and thus 
indirectly with Hegel. Harman’s writings resist this comparison at every turn, so it bears more 
explanation.  
 One philosophical mountain Harman has chosen to climb is perhaps the highest peak of 
Hegel’s thinking, and one that I have been sympathetically describing in this essay: the 
metaphysics of relationality. Whereas most of us deny the validity of autonomous substances, 
Harman denies the all-penetrating interrelations posited by Hegel and modern social theory, 
perspectivism, systems theory, and so forth. Again, it is not because substances are irreducible 
materials that are metaphysically simple; it is rather because substances always hold 
something back, not just from human perception, but also from each other. Even in the case of 
violent physical collision, things do not fully co-penetrate, they retain something of themselves 
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even through change; a substance never fully unfolds itself but keeps something bound up in 
itself that always flees from the touch of others. If this demure relationship only held between 
objects and subjects, then we would perhaps be satisfied by Kant or Husserl’s inaccessible 
objects; but even in the pre-conscious world, objects must have withheld from each other, 
interacting, sure, but never giving of themselves fully, always holding back some private store 
of power.  
 Harman does not necessarily try to decode the Logos at the heart of each substance. 
Each substance’s essence is its own business, though it vicariously affects its neighboring 
entities by partially deploying some of its potentiality. While we may not be able to plumb 
substances to their bottom, philosophically they remain fullnesses, and this explains how even 
though the phenomena of experience do not fully disclose themselves, “we do not just float 
through a void, pointing sadly at the ineffable”(20). If all things, regardless of their 
materiality, remain full and aloof, then science and metaphysics can grant them an ontological 
dignity, they do not just remain “luminous personae crowding a narrowly human space”(16).  
 Harman’s insistence on non-relational substances, it seems to me, is more of a heuristic 
than a hard stance. He has already made it clear that direct empirical perception is not the 
most reliable means to metaphysical truth. The correlationist circle is built on the premise that 
objects are second class things because they do not disclose themselves fully to the subject that 
relies on empirical data. Therefore, Harman has no qualms about the epistemological value of 
inference. We don’t see substances; very well, then let us not be afraid to infer them in order 
to make some sense of the world. But he has also made it clear that these inferred substances 
are not simple, irreducible materials, but rather metaphysical objects. This gives his theory 
great flexibility and allows him to escape the dark corner of dogmatic assertions about things 
being what they are, tout court, as Ayn Rand would have them. Harman has discovered, for 
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himself and his quickly growing readership, a productive philosophical byway that bucks 
against the now orthodox anti-essentialist camp of continental philosophy. For him, “a return 
to substance is no more inherently reactionary than Foucault’s retrieval of ‘power’ from 
Thrasymachus”(81). This is because  
There is nothing inherently ‘naive’ in saying that something lies behind appearance. 
There may well be a naiveté associated with certain theories as to the character of the 
real world… It might be altogether flawed to suggest that one specific layer of 
pampered entities explains all the rest”(79).  
 
Again and again Harman responds to his critics who accuse him of dogmatically positing 
essences to the very objects that can never be known in themselves. His essences and 
substances are real precisely because they can never be accessed; their inaccessibility does not 
detract from their ontology. To this point he explains,  
I am not speaking of some preexisting lump of atoms that remains the same despite all 
external changes: to be physical in this sense is already to be stationed in a world, to 
occupy a distinct space, and thereby to take up a definite stance toward other such 
spaces and the entities that occupy them. Spatial objects are to some extent always 
relational, whereas objects simply are not. To say that the world is filled with objects is 
to say that it is filled with countless tiny vacuums, like those bubbles that the 
Pythagoreans thought had been inhaled by the universe itself. What [my] guerrilla 
metaphysics seeks is the vacuous actuality of things. (82)  
 
Harman chooses to emphasize the fullness and positivity of reality. We may very well have to 
concede that appearances come from nothing, since we can never access, epistemologically, 
the origin of things; but that nothing is clearly productive, it harbors a fullness and a mystery. 
So to talk of the hidden as essence, or as substance, is not necessarily the philosophical 
transgression that it appears to be in light of modern anti-essentialist continental philosophy. 
Harman is concerned that when we think purely in terms of relationality, we enter into an 
ontological “house of mirrors”(82), in which a things’ potentiality is never founded in any kind 
of depth. Moreover, he is convinced that if a thing is a product of its relations, it would be 
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forced to remain static: since it would be nothing but a surface suspended between relations to 
other things, it would hold nothing in reserve, including its own ability to change.  
 I believe these concerns of Harman’s are exaggerated, and that a thing’s fullness need 
not be obviated by its relationality. Hyppolite and Nancy help assuage some of these 
concerns, as does a massive tradition of Buddhist mādhyamaka metaphysics. However, I am 
sympathetic to Harman’s arguments because, as mentioned before, they have a heuristic 
thrust that addresses the important flaw of anthropocentrism that often emerges in systems of 
relationality. To repeat, Harman’s relationless objects are not physical, saturated, atomic 
realities, but are philosophical objects. His objects do not gain their positivity by siphoning 
their character from the infinity of other objects that are “equally parasitical in their 
dependence on relationships for any identity”(83). Rather, “The thing apart from its relations 
is actually not an empty bare particular, but remains torn apart in its private vacuum between 
its irreducible unity and its colorful particularity”(83). This characterization is significant 
because of how impossible it is epistemologically. These objects are completely isolated from 
any kind of knowledge one could have about them; they also harbor the contradiction of being 
both unitary and florid. This position alone brings him much closer to Hegel than Harman 
wants to be, which is not a failure.  
 Relationality, for Harman, too often entails that the linchpin of all relations is the human 
mind. Harman’s objects are so full that they contain the One and the many, positivity and 
negativity in their own depths. Unlike the forms of Hegelianism that identify negativity with 
the human subject—as if it has a monopoly over the negative—Harman insists that the 
universe needs no such gift from the human mind.  
…We can never repeat enough that the difference between an object and its relations 
is a difference that permeates the entire cosmos, and not some sort of poignant psychic 
feature found only in human beings. It is not the tender particularities of the human 
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soul that first put the flaw in the cosmic jewel, cutting reality apart into substance and 
relation. Quite the opposite: there is no object at all, whether animal, floral, or mineral, 
capable of caressing the skin of another object so perfectly as to become identical with 
it or otherwise mirror it perfectly. When a gale hammers a seaside cliff, when stellar 
rays penetrate a newspaper, these objects are no less guilty than humans of reducing 
entities to mere shadows of their full selves. To repeat, the gap between object and 
relation is inherent in the nature of things, and not first generated by the peculiarities 
of the human mind. The fact that humans seem to have more cognitive power than 
shale or cantaloupe does not justify grounding this difference in a basic ontological 
dualism (83). 
 
It is just as important, according to Harman, to reject the assumptions of vitalists and 
panpsychists who claim that while the human mind may have been absent in the early phases 
of the universe, it remained latent, as if the objects that populated space were conspiring 
together to figure out the best way and the most fruitful time to allow the human mind to 
emerge like a butterfly from its larva. Darwin helped us see past this temptation with his great 
extirpation of teleology and ontological and biological hierarchies. Harman drives it home 
eloquently:  
What is lacking is the most sensible alternative, which is to say that human knowledge, 
just like glass, backbones, reptiles, music, and mushrooms, arises at a certain point in 
the history of the universe, but without necessarily forming some sort of root 
metaphysical dualism in the world (84). 
 
So the heuristic bent of Harman’s militant essentialism is meant to combat the irresponsible 
conflation of human subjectivity with negativity. Negativity is a fundamental feature of 
reality, regardless of what that reality consists of. There is no more or less negativity with or 
without subjects around. Harman’s philosophy is avowedly “object-oriented” because for him, 
objects are all that there are, and none of them is more of an object than any other. Objects 
contain a mysterious and even inexhaustible store of fullness as well as negativity. They are 
not founded upon any privileged ontological ground other than that inaccessible secret that 
somehow allows for their appearance. And while Harman sees himself as offering a sobering 
ballast to the wispy phantom entities of Hegelian idealism, his objects are as dream-like as 
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those of Nancy who looks at things as writhing in some self-hollowing depth (Nancy 15), a 
groundless ground in which negativity and positivity do not cancel each other out but 
restlessly produce all that there is and can be. For Harman,  
The reason we call these objects ‘substances’ is not because they are ultimate or 
indestructible, but simply because none of them can be identified with any (or even all) 
of their relations with other entities. None of them is a pristine kernel of substantial 
unity unspoiled by interior parts. We never reach some final layer of tiny components 
that explains everything else, but enter instead into an indefinite regress of parts and 
wholes. Every object is both a substance and a complex of relations (85).  
 
Not falling back on kernels and unities, Harman’s essentialism remains as open as Nancy’s 
essenceless metaphysics, and this heuristic contribution is to be admired. Harman is mostly 
shifting the terms of continental discourse, not for the sake of novelty, but because the old 
terms tether us to a subtle or not so subtle anthropocentrism in which all things are not given 
their due ontological dignity.  
 The most obvious objection to Harman’s system—and one that I have grappled with in 
my own reading of him—is a knee-jerk repugnance for any reifying of things that are clearly 
socially constructed. These would include the hoary philosophical topics of Right, Wrong, 
Beautiful, Good, Bad, and the even more problematic Woman, Marriage, Man, Normal etc. 
Harman is very aware of the tension that his system brings up vis à vis these topics, and he 
ready to deny that his philosophy leads to political dogmatism. It comes down to the same 
problem that Bryant explained about the difference between ontological and epistemological 
arguments; and Harman repeats that the problem is not that there are ontological essences;  
The problem lay only in the assumption that they could somehow be delivered to us in 
person in order to serve as normative criteria. There is no obvious political problem 
with saying that the world has an essence; there is a huge problem as soon as we say 
that Germany rather than Russia, or a male rather than the female (or vice versa), or 
the “Greeks” rather than “the Senegal Negro,” most fully embody this essence. In other 
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words, present day philosophy suffers from a deep and widespread confusion of two 
different kinds of essentialism.70 
 
Essences, as Harman and Bryant will have them, are not the theological or ethical eternal 
truths that modern continental philosophy has been diligent in dismantling. Because Harman 
and Bryant’s essences are epistemologically inaccessible, any claim to know them is a lie and 
pretense. An object, they insist, is anchored in something more than mere relation, since mere 
relation would spread it so thin as to have no gravity, no ability to affect anything. Yet where 
the chain of its being leads to is beyond our grasp. It descends into the abyss of the object and, 
somehow, indifferent to knowledge, grounds itself and finds repose. Harman describes the 
world as objects wrapped in objects wrapped in objects; each one sealed off mysteriously from 
the others while still interacting directly and indirectly. It is as if each object hollers into the 
mouth of the other’s cave: the echo resounds and things are heard, but they are unable to 
plumb all the way into the depths of the other thing. Cut off in this way, object-oriented-
ontology’s essences are far from stable foundations on which to build systems of ethical and 
political certainty, yet one of the most persistent critiques of Object-Oriented-Ontology 
(OOO) is that its essentialism can only lead to ethical absolutism. Given the general political 
leftism of the main proponents of OOO, it is important to consider their self-justifications of 
rejecting the post-modern paradigm of pure relationality. 
 Does OOO, in rejecting pure relationality, hypostatize abstract universals like Good, 
Bad, Beautiful, Man, Woman, Marriage and so forth by calling them objects and granting 
them a mysterious essence? People like Harman, Bryant, and Morton are, it would be safe to 
say, motivated precisely by the damaging effects that such hypostatizing has had on our world 
and experience of it. Why not grant that things are real? If we were asked to compile a list of 
                                                
70 Harman, Graham. Tool Being. Chicago: Open Court, 2004. p. 173 
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things that seem to have the most impact in the world, it would be filled with abstract 
universals and non-empirical objects. Perhaps God would even be at the top. The hand of 
God is everywhere, despite Reason’s dismissal of the concept entirely. The atheist 
intelligentsia can deconstruct the fiction of God into thin air, but he keeps popping up. So 
why not just concede some ontological dignity to the idea? An adversary is not nothing, it is 
an adversary and it makes us think things about it. Zeus caused things to happen, whether he 
has been relegated to a fictional myth figure or not. The same goes for the Judeo-Christian 
God. In this regard, OOO’s position is not so far from a nominalist position like Michel 
Onfray’s, one of the most virulent anti-theists in Europe. In an explanation of his atheism, 
Onfray explains, “God exists, for sure, but as a fiction, a character in a novel, a creature useful 
against the secular rejection of death, a crutch we need in order to deal with the negation that 
awaits us.”71 Onfray, who I believe is a OOO thinker avant la lettre, makes it clear that his 
                                                
71 Onfray, Michel. Manifeste Hedoniste. Paris: Stock, 2011. p. 24. Fr.: “Car Dieu existe, certes, main comme une 
fiction, un personage de roman, une créature utile au déni séculaire de la mort, une béquille nécessaire à la 
gestion de néant qui nous attend.”  
 Bertrand Russell objects to this dignification of patently false objects, but in doing so, he evinces a belief 
in an inverted ontological hierarchy in which the objective is privileged, not just temporally, but ontologically. 
For Russell, the objective watches over the subjective, so to speak, making sure that it does not pretend to equal 
ontological status. This would seem the surest way to counteract idealism, but OOO suggests that it still does not 
make sense to privilege the objective, since such privileging depends on an ontological split that is unwarranted. 
An elegant solution that has already been cited comes from Ian Bogost who suggests that “All things exist, yet 
they do not exist equally”(Bogost 11), meaning that there is no reason to say that fictional things do not exist on 
the same plane as objective, “real” things, however, however, they do not exist in the same way. Their ontological 
difference is one of quality rather than of degree: 
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy: (169-70):  
“For want of the apparatus of propositional functions, many logicians have been driven to the 
conclusion that there are unreal objects. It is argued that we can speak about “the golden 
mountain,” “the round square,” and so on; we can make true propositions of which these are the 
subjects; hence they must have some kind of logical being, since otherwise the propositions in 
which they occur would be meaningless. In such theories, it seems to me, there is a failure of 
that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies. Logic, I 
should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with 
the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. To 
say that unicorns have an existence in heraldry, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most 
pitiful and paltry evasion. What exists in heraldry is not an animal, made of flesh and blood, 
moving and breathing of its own initiative. What exists is a picture, or a description in words. 
Similarly, to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in his own world, namely, in the world 
of Shakespeare’s imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is 
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staunch materialism does not entail a barren universe devoid of the mystery that fascinates so 
many idealists and spiritualists: “I defend a materialist ontology and metaphysics: beyond the 
known physical, there is the unknown physical—and there you have the object of immanent 
metaphysics”(Onfray 2011: 13).72 The “Realism” part of “Speculative Realism” amounts to the 
same claims. Bryant and Harman are perhaps more explicit about how there will always be an 
unknown realm that is beyond the probe of knowledge, but Onfray recognizes this too when 
he celebrates the Epicurean infinitude of the material world. It is not material because it is 
fathomable by empirical knowledge now or in the future—we simply call it material because it 
exists. Astrophysics and quantum theory has imagined expanses that may never be 
fathomable even theoretically, and it gives human kind some perspective about its miniscule 
place in the cosmos.  
 None of this is to say that human problems are insignificant, a facile charge leveled 
against anyone who denies an anthropocentric cosmos. Onfray’s work is generally bent 
toward existentialist ethics, the reimagination of what humans are capable of doing and should 
do. But his ontology allows him to dispense with the old paradigms that he finds so noxious. 
He even echoes Morton’s ecological thesis “Ecology Without Nature,” saying “When those 
who defend the idea that nature is some kind of transcendental conceptual object, and not a 
                                                                                                                                                       
to say something deliberately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. 
There is only one world, the “real” world: Shakespeare’s imagination is part of it, and the 
thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading the 
play. But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc., in Shakespeare 
and his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet. When 
you have taken account of all the feelings roused by Napoleon in writers and readers of history, 
you have not touched the actual man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of 
him. If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing left of him; if no one had thought 
about Napoleon, he would have soon seen to it that some one did. The sense of reality is vital in 
logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending that Hamlet has another kind of reality is 
doing a disservice to thought. A robust sense of reality is very necessary in framing a correct 
analysis of propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round squares, and other such 
pseudo-objects. 
 106 
real material reality, end up forgetting nature or appropriating it, this goes hand in hand with 
contemporary nihilism”(Onfray 2011: 14). For there to be any effective ecology, the oiko has 
to be real, and to be real, it can’t be slave to the human subject; its reality doesn’t depend on 
our knowing it. Ontologically, God and Madame Bovary exist, just as rebar and quarks do. 
The former are unreal things, the latter we say are real, but not of them demand a special 
ontological place.   
 We may see how Śiva and Uriah Heap may be granted an ontological seat at the table 
because of their ability to act vicariously on things via their human conduits, but the same 
applies to other abstract universal fictions. Something like Gender is no more real than God, 
but its power is just as considerable.73 Modern philosophy impressively deconstructs such 
things, shattering their idea but leaving their form unscathed; we can intellectually know that 
Gender is a construction, but why does this not dispel the influence of such an object? What 
OOO does is show how epistemological triumphs are not always so powerful against 
ontological bulwarks that stubbornly remain no matter what knowledge claims are made 
about them. Those claims militarize what are originally neutral entities. We claim to know 
                                                                                                                                                       
72 “Je defends une ontologie et une métaphysique matŕialistes: après la physique connue, c’est la physique 
inconnue—voilà l’objet de la métaphysique immanente.” 
73 This is not to deny the appearance of certain biological differences between people. However, those biological 
differences are exaggerated when they are indexed to a hypostetized idea of Gender. Transgender theorist Julia 
Serrano has the following remarks to make:  
“…I believe that both social constructionists and gender essentialists are wrong (or at leasat they are both only 
partially right). The fatal flaw of the gender essentialist argument is the obvious fact that not all men are 
masculine and not all women are feminine. There are exceptional gender expressions…”(Serrano 97) And, “…I 
don not think that there is necessarily any harm in us recognizing that there are two major categories of sex, so 
long as we realize that these categories are neither discrete nor mutuall exclusive, and that we remain respectful 
of the fact that many people have exceptional sex characteristics and gender inclinations”(104).  
 In another excellent work on gender and sexual difference, Thomas Laqueur writes, “I have no interest in 
denying the reality of sexual dimorphism as an evolutionary process. But I want to show on the basis of historical 
evidence that almost everything one wants to say about sex—however sex is understood—already has in it a 
claim about gender. Sex, in both the one-sex and two-sex worlds, is situational; it is explicable only within the 
context of battles over gender and power”(Laqueur 11). And, “My goal is to show how a biology of hierarchy in 
which there is only one sex, a biology of incommensurability between two sexes, and the claim that there is no 
publicly relevant sexual difference at all, or no sex, have constrained the interpretation of bodies and the 
strategies of sexual politics for some two thousand years”(23). 
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what Gender is and then assign it to people with strict orders about how to treat it and what 
to do so as not to violate its sanctity. Then all of a sudden a kid grows up and finds that her 
experience does not fit the mold handed down to her. Somebody with bogus knowledge has 
impinged on the freedom of her body. She has to do this or that with it, she has to get married, 
she can’t ingest this or that, she has to procreate. There are infinite variations on this kind of 
tragedy. And this is what really matters. To say that OOO denigrates such problems because 
they are human and humans don’t matter that much is either gravely confused or 
disingenuous. The great victory of relational thinking (a very powerful one that should not be 
disparaged) is the unveiling of networks that produce things that we may have thought are sui 
generis. OOO does not, despite some of its language that would suggest otherwise, deny this. 
If anything, networks actually expand, since they are no longer tethered to humanity.  
 In the first chapter of this The Democracy of Objects, and in a series of earnest posts on his 
Larval Subjects blog, Levi Bryant addresses the political criticism of OOO with grace and 
force:  
Oil and fossil fuels are an organizing set of entities within our social assemblages.  A big 
part of changing our social world–not the only part–consists in responding to these 
nonhuman actors and how they organize relations among human actors…74 We find 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
74 http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/29/worries-about-ooo-and-politics/ 
There is too much rich material from the same post to quote at length above:  
“With my onticology, I have proposed a praxis called “terraism” as integral to political practice.  Terraism 
has three dimensions to it:  cartography, deconstruction, and construction.  Cartography is a mapping of 
social assemblages that discerns what actors or entities are present in the assemblage (signifiers, 
ideologies, people, groups, bubonic plague bacteria, toilets, rice, etc.), how they are linked together, and 
how these assemblages are organized or what power or gravity they generate in perpetuating certain 
ongoing patterns of relation.  Deconstruction is the practice of strategic intervention designed to target 
those various entities that exercise power or gravity in particular ways so as to produce social change.  
Such interventions can be of the semiotic-critical variety such as Zizek, Adorno, or Foucault practices that 
we’re all familiar with, but can also consist in more material interventions such as changing finance law to 
blunt the power of corporations.  Construction, finally, consists in building new assemblages through the 
introduction of new discourses (as OWS has done in the American situation), introducing plumbing and 
irrigation in impoverished parts of the world, building alternative ways of living in fossil fuel economies, 
and so on.  OOO does not so much reject representation, the discursive, and signification as see it as one 
element in an assemblage among others.” 
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ourselves surprised when we’ve adequately critiqued and debunked signifying systems 
and the social system doesn’t change.  Perhaps this would clue us into the possibility that 
perhaps there are other actors involved in these social assemblages, holding people in 
place in particular ways.  
 
Morton is concerned with the same thing when he theorizes “hyperobjects” like uranium and 
styrofoam, as well as abstract entities like climate, global warming, racial tension etc.75, which 
Bryant puts into context clearly:  
What Morton’s concept of hyperobjects opens is the possibility of thinking the fraught 
interactions of a variety of different hyperobjects such as economy, technospheres 
(Stiegler), culture, language, and so on, and how they enter into both conflictual 
relations with one another while also locally manifesting one another in a variety of 
ways. We get a rich ecological concept of (non)-relations among different objects at all 
levels of scale without being able to reduce any one object to another.76 
 
The dignification of the objective world is what Nietzsche was talking about when he called 
the body our faculty of “Great Reason” and that philosophy should stop its foolhardy 
explorations of the transcendental and focus on food, the earth, water, and air. Our 
neighboring entities are far more interesting than we usually give them credit for, unless we 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
75 In Morton’s own words: 
 “In a previous post I argued that hyperobjects are viscous—they adhere to you no matter how hard to 
try to pull away, rendering ironic distance obsolete. Now I'll argue that they are also nonlocal. That is, 
hyperobjects are massively distributed in time and space such that any particular (local) manifestation 
never reveals the totality of the hyperobject. 
When you feel raindrops falling on your head, you are experiencing climate, in some sense. In 
particular you are experiencing the climate change known as global warming. But you are never directly 
experiencing global warming as such. Nowhere in the long list of catastrophic weather events—which 
will increase as global warming takes off—will you find global warming. 
But global warming is as real as this sentence. Not only that, it's viscous. It never stops sticking to you, 
no matter where you move on planet Earth. 
How can we account for this? By arguing that global warming, like all hyperobjects, is 
nonlocal: it's massively distributed in time and space.What does this mean? It means that my experience 
of the weather in the hic et nunc is a false immediacy. It's never the case that those raindrops only fall on 
my head! They are always a manifestation of global warming! In an age of ecological emergency—in an 
age in which hyperobjects start to oppress us with their terrifying strangeness—we will have to get used 






are naturalists or mountaineers, and we are much more the product of other things than those 
things are the product of anything we have done.   
 Onfray, mostly known for his atheology and anti-platonic ethics, takes up Nietzsche’s 
challenge in many volumes of his prolific corpus, including The Philosophers’ Belly and his 
lyrical exploration oenology and metaphysics, The Forms of Time: a Theory of Sauternes.77 Here, 
Onfray meditates on the very “ancestral time” before humans, which is so important for 
Meillassoux, through the development of biological life, and finally to the production of the 
fine, fragile, and expensive sweet wines from the little Sauternais corner of Bordeaux, 
France.78 Generally, Onfray is content with the Epicurean world and thinks that we have only 
made things worse since then, starting with Plato and his successors. The Epicurean world is 
one of things and the products of things—epiphenomena that can be extremely complex, but 
                                                
77 From http://www.easy-french-food.com/sauterne-wine.html#.UAMaDo7mue4 :  
“What Makes Sauternes Different? 
Whereas a Sauterne wine is made from many different combinations of grapes, the grapes used to 
elaborate Sauternes are specifically the same used to make other Bordeaux white wines (although in 
different proportions): Sémillon, Sauvignon blanc, and Muscadelle.While they are still on the vine, these 
grapes are exposed to humid nights and damp mornings as mist rising from the nearby confluence of the 
Garonne and Ciron rivers spreads across the vineyards. And as we all know, where there's humidity, 
there is mold. Yes, Sauternes is made from moldy grapes! The mold that develops on these grapes is no 
ordinary mold, however. This is pourriture noble or noble rot and it is this that distinguishes Sauternes 
from other sweet white wines. Because small changes in weather conditions can have large effects on the 
development of noble rot, Sauternes can not be produced consistently every year, and you should be 
careful to buy a reputed vintage if you are going to enjoy a Sauternes. Even within the small region 
where Sauternes can be officially produced, there are pronounced differences in the soil. These 
differences also play a large part in determining the final quality of the wine. It is officially considered 
that the cream of the crop of Sauternes wine comes from Château d'Yquem. Enjoying a Château d'Yquem 
Premier Cru Supérieur could be considered a peak life experience and would certainly never be confused 
with drinking a Sauterne wine. A good Sauternes becomes denser and more flavorful as it ages. They 
are among the rare white wines that can and should be enjoyed at 20, 50 and even 100 years!” 
 
78 Onfray, Michel. Les Formes du temps: Théorie du Sauternes. Paris: Mollat, 2009.  
As an appendix, in the spirit of Charles Fourier’s great Hierarchies of Cuckoldry, Onfray offers a taxonomy of 
times: “genealogical time; immemorial time; geological time; congealed time; spatial time; primitive time; anarchic 
time; cyclical time; discernible time; seminal time; tragic time; circular time; natural time; cultural time; singular 
time; pantheistic time; aleatory time; meteorological time; climatalogical time; ontological time; negating time; 
destructive time; affirming time; federating time; augustinian time; transfigured time; slowed time; modified time; 
sculpted time; entropic time; agricultural time; chronometric time; slow time; hurried time; irenic time;  magic 
time; insipid time; technological time; georgic time; feudal time; alchemical time; chemical time; hedonistic time; 
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which do not require separate ontological strata. It is possible to string an elegant thread 
through all the different eras and types of existence. Early in The Forms of Time, Onfray 
describes the story of the pre-conscious world, the condensation of the oceans, the bubbling of 
lava, and the crystallization of stones. During that time, already, fundamental categories like 
relation, being, movement, and vitality were in play. They were not instantiated by the 
language of humans, or any other human operation. For Onfray, the presocratics grasped this 
with their metaphysics and were able to account for it with their stories about the world.  
 
The emergence of the earth is the inauguration of the real. Its appearance between 
disorder and love, between an enduring absence of meaning and the beginnings of an 
already present meaning, is the birth of relation. Out of the real and relation, out of the 
earth and its possibilities, surges Being. The presocratics developed a number of poetic 
variations on this theme. The tragedy of castration became a metaphor for separation 
and of a cutting that preserves the autonomy of identities. It allows for things to flow, 
and thus is responsible for movement. Hence vitality, energy, and flux make up the 
world. The real, relation, being, and movement are what constitute it. Could we ask for 
a more lovely metaphysics?79  
 
The object-oriented philosophers are, I believe, aiming at the same understanding as Onfray’s 
epicurean materialism. First it is important to appreciate the way things work independently 
from the presence of humans who introduce so much confusion into the world with their 
advent. Once we can imagine the prehuman world, with the help of natural science and 
whatever other disciplines we have access to, we can then think differently about the human 
place in networks that had already achieved incredible complexity before humans were ever 
around. Onfray describes the process of going back in time through our contrived disciplines 
to uncover the subtle transition between the unconscious, aleatory world to one that becomes 
conscious and starts to recognize cycles and patterns:  
                                                                                                                                                       
dionysic time; spermatic time; elementary time; human time; wrought time; magnified time; transcended time; 
sublimated time; local time; global time; pinpoint time; compressed time; quintessential time; multiple time (87). 
79 Onfray, 2009:20. 
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Genealogy, geology, mythology, geography, cartography, and etymology: there are 
many paths leading to Sauternais which carry us from primitive and immemorial times 
to those more recent. From the traces of stones to those of names—mineralogy and 
onomastics, from roiling oceans to the roots of words, eternity is rendered less 
imperious when cut into more modest periods. Boiled down to its essence, time 
becomes palpable, it becomes incarnate in the objects it haunts like memories. Inside 
this earth, so full of magical soils, there is another time in gestation, one of roots and 
seminal forces. Out of chaos emerges the first kind of time that we have access to. It is 
no longer anarchical, but cyclical.80   
 
Prior to that there was only the mad activity of climatological, meteorological, geological, and 
other types of time completely beyond the pale of any Apollonian epistemology that imposed 
any order to it. But this Apollonian knowledge is all that we have, it is structurally indelible 
from us as humans inscribed into this universe, and so it must be used to enhance our 
immanence, since only immanence can make us feel at home in the only place that we have. 
Here, Onfray starts to sound surprisingly like Harman with his dignification of objects:  
No need for anthropomorphism or ecologistic projection, no more discourses inspired 
by earthly and earthy logics in which the soil, just like blood and race, is associated 
with some metaphysics or mysticism. Rather, there are just elements, and 
combinations, that provide new material and help us think differently. This is 
important because we need a poetic materialism in order to express the forces and give 
shape to the forms that orbit around objects, things, matter. In this way of thinking, 
there is nothing but concern for the immanent that recalls in many ways the practices 
of pre-socratic philosophers in places like Ephesus, Milet, Velia, Klazomenai, 
Agrigento, and other sunny terrains (48). 
 
Thus, objects, the fundamental building blocks of the universe, are to be understood; but is 
philosophical cerebration the most efficient way of doing this? A true Epicurean, Onfray 
proposes that objects and the mysteries they hold are probably best understood through direct 
consumption, direct interaction, a transgressing of boundaries between us and them. Hence, 
his study of wine and where it came from. He hails from a country where few things have 
more cultural and economic influence than wine, yet wine culture and wine economy are not 
sui generis fields. They emerge from a network that started with the formation of the most 
                                                
80 Onfray 2009: 23. 
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fundamental objects, object that began their journey billions of years ago and carry those 
immense histories inside of them:  
Drinking a wine is to fill yourself with time that has been sculpted, wrought, worked 
upon, and which is capable of nourishing a soul that is subject to entropy. There where 
time, which passes and manifests, becomes consubstantial with a body, we accomplish 
a transfer of energy as real as it is symbolic, in which the drinker partakes of an 
eternity that preceded the liquid, in a way. An imbibed Sauternes is less a content [of a 
bottle] than a container [whose contents] we incorporate into us (80). 
  
Do these descriptions of things entail strict and dogmatic foundationalism and essentialism 
that are irreconcilable with Nancy and damning for Hegelianism? I believe they more a 
matter of style and rhetorical emphasis, which I will explore in the next chapter. The bottom 
line is that these figurations are compelling alternative to our habitual appeals to theological 
transcendence, ontological dualism, anthropocentric essentialism and so forth. These theories 
do not pigeonhole all things into hierarchical metaphysical orders, so that these orders do not 
spill out into concrete social and political hierarchies. They allow that history bungled along in 
an interesting but aleatory cacophony, and they do not demand that all history, for it to have 










Language and Metaphor 
 
The preceding chapters have been largely concerned with the ill affects teleology has on the 
world and the people within it, as well as the faulty bases for beliefs in teleology. These beliefs 
inscribe themselves in exclusionary theories that lead to exclusionary canons, which lead to 
exclusionary attitudes and prejudices. It is not true that Europeans or theists are the only 
people in the world who believe in teleology; rather, Europeans, with particular intellectual 
resources in combination with aleatory circumstance such as geography, soil, food, and 
germs,81 arrived at certain positions. They then enhanced their theories to justify those 
positions. But it is even likely that advancements in knowledge marched along in spite of the 
dead weight of theo-teleological beliefs.82 The versions of history built up around these beliefs 
                                                
81 I have already mentioned Nietzsche’s concern with these topics, as well as Onfray’s attempt to understand 
them better. For a popular and clear exposition of history as aleatory, see Jared M. Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and 
Steel. 
 
82 For example, see Ray Brassier’s point on this:  
“As for nihilism and religion: well, religion’s rational credibility can be rebuked without evoking modern 
science or nihilism: Democritus and Epicurus did so over two thousand years ago, using arguments that 
are still valid today, even if theists prefer to ignore them. But of course, the irrationality of religious 
belief has never impeded its flourishing; indeed, it is precisely what immunizes it against rational 
refutation, since religion is designed to satisfy psychological needs, not rational requirements. Marx was 
right: religion will never be eradicated until the need for it evaporates. Obviously, this evaporation will 
have to be accomplished practically as well as cognitively.  
         I have not read Meillassoux’s L’inexistence divine so do not know what sorts of arguments he 
adduces to legitimate the hypothesis of an inexistent ‘God-to-come’. I am sure they will be exceptionally 
ingenious. But I remain skeptical, since I see no need for any such hypothesis. Indeed, I view this 
continuing philosophical fascination with monotheism as deeply pernicious and think a moratorium 
ought to be declared to prevent any further ‘God talk’ by philosophers. I do not think it mere 
coincidence that the critique of scientific rationality in much 20th century philosophy goes hand in hand 
with a revival of theological themes. Religion obviously satisfies deep-seated human needs, but it has 
been a cognitive catastrophe that has continually impeded epistemic progress—contrary to the 
pernicious revisionism that claims monotheism was always on the side of science and truth. Human 
knowledge has progressed in spite of religion, never because of it. Philosophers should simply have no 
truck with it.” 
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do not respect the individual peoples and events that history is made of. They describe the 
people and events of the world in metaphorical language that bears the weight of chauvinistic 
attitudes and habits. These descriptive metaphors, which are not essential but fungible, are 
then interpolated into the diachronic history of the world and are taken for expressions of its 
essence. By looking at the ways that such metaphors are constructed and change over time, 
we can disabuse ourselves of believing they are linked to transcendent referents, and thus 
open ourselves to alternative, hopefully more expansive and inclusive, understandings of 
history.        
 Each thinker I have emphasized, from Hegel to Kojève, to Harman and Onfray, has 
cultivated and employed a unique voice in order to communicate their message. Not only do 
these writers represent different languages, they choose qualitatively different terminologies, 
focusing on certain images and not others, and using metaphors to express insights that are 
difficult to express directly. When we compare Hegel’s most famous metaphors to the more 
recent thinkers, questions arise about the implications of Hegel’s emphasis on violence and 
struggle. Were his metaphors of master, slave, desire, and alienation the only way to express 
his insight? Do those metaphors share something essential with the content of the things they 
describe? When he speaks of violent historical events, figures like Napoleon, abstract terms 
like the Oriental, African, or the Trinity, are these terms essential and fixed to some definite 
referent, or are they also symbolic and therefore interchangeable with other words that would 
carry different significances? 
 Hegel, of course, is not alone in couching his discoveries in the discourse of struggle. It 
is well known that Darwin was deeply influenced by the social theory of Thomas Malthus, 
                                                                                                                                                       
-KRONOS. Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00–927 Warszawa. 
http://www.kronos.org.pl/index.php?23151,896 
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and many of the metaphors that Darwin used to explain natural selection were borrowed from 
the struggle-ridden worldview of Malthus and realist social scientists. To summarize, in his An 
Essay on the Principle of Population, Malthus analyzed the issue of overcrowding in London, 
concluding that populations are self-regulating, and that the mechanism by which they 
regulate themselves is economics (or more simply, food). That is, when a population becomes 
more comfortable economically, as London was at the dawn of the industrial revolution, 
people have more children. At some point, the new generations end up consuming the 
resources that were there to sustain them, and those who fail to secure enough resources 
starve or get sick and die off. Thus, populations remain relatively stable, despite the economic 
and cultural changes they go through. This made perfect sense to Darwin, who had observed 
the mysterious homeostasis of animal populations for many decades. Darwin was able to 
extrapolate this elegant explanation, finding it an adequate framework for explaining how 
populations of all species maintain their numbers over time. However, Darwin added the 
important amendment to Malthus’ theory, explaining that stability was not really an end in 
itself. Stability is only significant insofar as the individuals of a stable population carry 
heritable traits, so when those traits are passed from generation to generation according to the 
individual organism’s success at staying alive, over time there is “change in adaptive structure in a 
population.”83 
 Part of what made Malthus’ analysis compelling was the cold hard look it gave to pure 
survival as the underlying issue of economic and cultural activities. His London was roughly 
the same as that of Dickens’ Hard Times and Bleak House—not a pretty picture. Cholera, 
starvation, and general filth were serious problems. The countryside, where conditions were 
Spartan, was sparsely populated, while London, teeming with resources, was overcrowded. 
                                                
83 Carroll, Joseph. Introduction to On the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin. Ontario: Broadview, 2003. p 49. 
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The competition for resources was just waiting to be theorized, and Malthus answered the 
call. His theory made even more sense in light of the social and economic conditions that he 
emerged from, and that were possible only in England at that time: a leisure class bourgeoisie 
that could choose whether or not to have children based on the resources they were able to 
guarantee for them. Children had come to resemble pets in England—objects of financial 
expenditure—whereas in most of the world, as in the third world today, they were still seen as 
a reliable means for a family to secure more resources in the long run. Given these 
circumstances in England at the time, Malthus’ theory of population did well to explain many 
facets to London’s population problem, and could reasonably be extended and applied to some 
other major urban centers with similar conditions. When we observe the life of the poor (who 
are the majority of the world’s population) existence is indeed a struggle full of injustice, 
cruelty, and violence. Hence, when Darwin read Malthus’ metaphor of human existence as a 
struggle, he immediately saw how the same holds for the animal kingdom (he was deeply 
moved by his observation of the wasp that lays its eggs inside of a host and then eats its way 
out of the host). The metaphor even held for plant populations in which the organisms that get 
more light and water survive, and those that get less die. Since his audience was the lettered 
English bourgeoisie, all of whom had witnessed the animal like struggles of the poor of 
London or some other urban center, the “struggle” metaphor resonated deeply with the 
common sense argument he was presenting through the ample empirical evidence contained in 
his great works like the Origin, The Descent of Man, and his less synthetic but exhaustive study 
of barnacles, A Monograph of the Cirripedia. When one organism perishes for lack of resources, 
while its neighbor thrives when those resources are obtained, it makes sense for any human to 
compare this to competition, to the struggle that each of us has known to whatever small 
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degree. The expression does not account for everything, it merely helps us think about how 
the systems he is describing work.  
 Darwin was keenly self-aware about his use of Malthusian “struggle” in his theory of 
evolution. D.P. Todes, in a rich study of Darwin’s “struggle” metaphor, Darwin Without 
Malthus, quotes him at length: 
I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense, including 
dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only 
the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. Two canine animals in a time 
of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other which shall get food and live. 
But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, 
though more properly it should be said to be dependent on the moisture. A plant which 
annually produces a thousand seeds, of which on an average only one comes to 
maturity, may be more truly said to struggle with the plants of the same and other 
kinds which already clothe the ground. The missletoe is dependent on the apple and a 
few other trees, but can only in a far-fetched sense be said to struggle with these trees, 
for if too many of these parasites grow on the same tree, it will languish and die. But 
several seedling missletoes, growing close together on the same branch, may more truly 
be said to struggle with each other. As the missletoe is disseminated by birds, its 
existence depends on birds; and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other 
fruit-bearing plants, in order to tempt birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds 
rather than those of other plants. In these several senses, which pass into each other, I 
use for convenience sake the general term of struggle for existence.84 
 
As central to the struggle for existence was the notion of “natural selection.” Quite literally, 
this meant the inheritance of traits dependent on the processes of nature, as opposed to the 
decision of man or deity. In the Origin Darwin confronts early criticism of this expression:  
Others have objected that the term selection implies conscious choice in the animals 
which become modified; and it has even been urged that, as plants have no volition, 
natural selection is not applicable to them! In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, 
natural selection is a false term; but who ever objected to chemists speaking of the 
elective affinities of the various elements?—and yet an acid cannot strictly be said to 
elect the base with which it in preference combines. It has been said that I speak of 
natural selection as an active power or Deity; but who objects to an author speaking of 
the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets? Every one knows 
what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost 
necessary for brevity. So again it is difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but 
I mean by Nature, only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by 
                                                
84 Todes, Daniel Philip. Darwin Without Malthus. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989. p. 8. 
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laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us. With a little familiarity such 
superficial objections will be forgotten.85 
 
Yet both of these metaphors have been persistent stumbling blocks: they either prevent 
certain readers from embracing the theory because of possible ethical and political 
consequences of using violent or pseudo-teleological metaphors, or these metaphors appeal 
too much to certain readers who are eager to buttress their own violent or teleological world-
views. He is rightly respected as an elegant stylist, and part of his success rested on his ability 
to clearly express his scientific discoveries with a wide audience. Not only did Darwin’s 
discoveries throw some light upon the causes of Malthusian urban squalor, they also 
contributed profoundly to the millennia-old discourse around the problem of evil and 
injustice. Theology had still not been able to give satisfying answers to why there always 
seems to be struggle despite an omnibenevolent Deity, but Darwin, however reluctant he was 
to step onto theological ground, offered the insight that struggle was a deeply structural part 
of biological life in general—something that could be understood and perhaps mollified, but 
not entirely avoided. Despite his emphasis on struggle and “selection,” these were not the only 
metaphors he employed. Looking at the plant kingdom, he spoke of life as an “entangled 
bank”86 of interdependence, and he compared the diversity of biological forms to a “great 
tree.”87 He even used a geometrical, carpenter’s simile in which “Nature may be compared to a 
yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and driven inwards 
by incessant blows, sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force.”88 
And, famously, he uses the expression “contrivances”89 when speaking about the specialized 
                                                
85 Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species. The Harvard Classics. Charles W. Eliot ed. New York: P.F. Collier & 
Son, 1909–14. vol 11. Ch. IV para. 2. (This quotation missing from the Broadview edition.) 
86 Darwin 2003 p. 397 (Origin ch. 14, final paragraph). 
87 ibid. 176 
88 ibid. 136 
89 ibid. 211 
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functions of the different parts of the eyeball, without for a minute believing that they were 
literally “contrived” by an intelligent designer. Despite his use of these important metaphors, 
Darwin is always associated with struggle and “survival of the fittest.” When his views are 
reduced to these metaphors in their most literal senses, the result is egregious 
misunderstanding:  
This biased account of Darwin's thinking has had two unfortunate consequences. 
First, it has given to the idea of struggle the form of polarized struggle between two 
opposed forces (as in human warfare, or as in a contest between Breeder and Nature). 
In Darwin's own thinking, "struggle" clearly means something else: the complex 
interplay of many factors, leading to the differential survival of organisms, depending 
on their varying adaptation to all the conditions of life. 
 Second, this biased account of Darwin's thinking puts all the emphasis on forces of 
selection and destruction in nature, those aspects of the entire process in which 
stronger organisms flourish and weaker ones die, depicting a world of nothing but 
winners and losers. But this selective use of Darwin's ideas destroys the dialectical 
unity of his thought. The creative and explosively productive metaphors of 
contrivance, tangled bank, and branching tree were equally essential features of 
Darwin's image of nature.90 
 
Even a contemporary leftist biologist like Richard Dawkins employs the terminology of an 
“evolutionary arms race” and describes all biological forms as being interconnected in a vast 
“solar economy.”91 These metaphors are chosen to help the audience visualize the complex 
systems being explained. Of course it is unlikely that any non-human biological forms have 
any awareness of an “arms race,” however, since Dawkins’ audience consists of post-Cold 
War Anglophones, he uses a metaphor of competition—invoking the threat of extinction—
that resonates with those who have lived through that particular geopolitical era. Dawkins’ 
metaphors absorb and reflect the cultural conditions surrounding him and his audience, just 
as those of Malthus and Darwin reflected the reality of Victorian English bourgeoisie. Thus, 
while such culturally specific metaphors may help specific audiences assimilate the material 
                                                
90 Howard Gruber quoted in Todes 1989 p. 19 
91 Dawkins 2009 ch. 12 
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being described, they sometimes have an alienating affect on those who do not share the same 
cultural presuppositions. Such was the case with the reception of evolutionary theory in post-
Revolutionary Soviet Russia.  
 Steeped as they were in Marxist anti-competitive values, Soviet intellectuals were at first 
generally repulsed by Darwin’s ideas, particularly those couched in the discourse of struggle, 
competition, and survival of the fittest. The entire communist ethos was built on the concept 
of harmony and mutual aid, and they were convinced that these things were more powerful 
and more creative than mere selfish competition. Therefore, to posit struggle and competition 
as the generative forces of evolution was to construct a craven worldview in which all hellish 
crimes are justified.  
 Unlike England with its overpopulated urban centers and limited usable land and 
resources, Russia was nothing but vast swathes of pristine forests, steppes, mountains and 
plains containing unlimited resources. While it had its own aristocracy, there was nothing like 
England’s leisured bourgeoisie whose procreative habits depended upon the resources 
available to sustain their offspring. It’s resources could sustain populations hundreds of times 
its size, so competition was not necessarily the prevailing issue in Russia, but lack of mutual 
aid and harmony, both of which were goals of the communist regime. What did Marx call for, 
if not the elimination of superfluous suffering caused by competition and exploitation?  
 Coming from such a point of view, many Russian intellectuals criticized Darwin’s 
theories, not because of any faulty scientific methodology, but because of the noxious 
Malthusian metaphors they contained. Todes explains how, for the Russians,  
The problem, then, lay, not in Darwin's theory itself, but in the false analogy between 
struggle in the natural and social worlds. In nature struggle was a necessary, 
"fundamental fact" and the essential cause of organic development. In society it was the 
artificial product of exploitative economic relations and the source of human misery. 
Only in "the language of a poet" did the struggle for capital, the battle of landowners 
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and factory owners among themselves and against workers, have anything in common 
with "the struggle of some mollusk with an ammonite (38).  
 
This criticism is sound, except that it should be leveled against Darwin’s more Malthusian 
interpreters than against Darwin himself. While Darwin certainly saw competition and 
struggle as powerful forces for evolutionary change, he never explicitly claimed that such 
struggle was necessarily beneficial—it simply occurred and should be accounted for. Russia’s 
preeminent 19th century botanist, Nikolaevich Beketov, chose to transpose Darwin’s theories, 
which he generally praised, into a more felicitous metaphor of harmony. Harmony, he felt, 
served equally well as a heuristic metaphor for understanding the science of evolution, but it 
did not carry the deleterious political and ethical consequences that went along with the 
discourse of struggle. Todes explains:  
He praised Darwin and Wallace for demonstrating the evolutionary role of the 
struggle for existence, but warned naturalists not to substitute this metaphor for a 
more rigorous, mechanical appraisal of organic relations. Beketov insisted, as he had 
earlier with respect to his own metaphor of harmony, that the struggle for existence 
must ultimately be understood as "simply the interaction of general physical forces at 
greater or lesser complexity." Only by demystifying the struggle for existence—by 
breaking it down into its component parts and understanding it in terms of physical 
laws—could science develop the ideas "at the foundation of the great theories of 
Lamarck and Darwin.”(55). 
 
However, if Beketov and other Soviet scientists based their criticisms on the ideological 
baggage that went along with the struggle metaphor, it is not difficult to see how their own 
metaphorical choices were not untainted by metaphysical assumptions. In one essay, Beketov 
writes, “The Creator did not establish immutable laws in order that chaotic phenomena would 
predominate over harmonious ones.”92 Thus, for Beketov, science was still a kind of theodicy. 
It was just a matter of recognizing the order and harmony of God’s creation; this knowledge 
would lead us to knowledge of God himself. And those Soviet scientists who had relinquished 
                                                
92 Todes p. 61 
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theism were not necessarily freer from ideological projection. Most of them were already 
looking for evidence in the animal and plant world that would point toward the universal 
truths embodied in Ideas like Harmony and Mutual Aid. Encouraged by an observation of 
bees working together for the common good, or a cat adopting stray kittens, they often 
jumped to the conclusion that such instances pointed teleologically, toward some ultimate 
harmony that was the unachieved birthright of all biological entities. Darwin, as I have 
mentioned, argued no such thing. While Malthus may have claimed that struggle and 
unfortunate demographic purges were necessary in order to achieve sustainable homeostasis, 
Darwin never argued that the calamities of existence that we encounter everywhere are good 
or bad. Of course they are bad insofar as we are sentient being who must endure them, but 
they point to  nothing on the horizon, there is no eschatological purpose to the events of the 
world, nor do they reflect a universal metaphysical order. Metaphysical disorder is precisely 
what generates movement, vitality, change, and life.  
 Another prominent Soviet botanist, Sergei Korzhinski, continued the Russian criticism 
of the Malthus-Darwin struggle metaphor, proposing an alternative theory called 
heterogenesis. This theory argued that it was not struggle that produced evolutionary change, 
but lack of struggle. In fact, struggle is what inhibits creative change, which is a natural 
capacity of all things.93 Given enough conducive circumstances, an organism, in its own life or 
through successive generations, will naturally adapt to its surroundings and spin off new and 
various forms of itself. Often these new forms immediately perish, but when conditions allow, 
they survive and count for an addition to the biological “tree of life.”94 Thus, “In order to 
                                                
93 An interesting comparison can be made here to Graham Harman’s vacuum-sealed, volcanic objects that 
forever sit upon a vast store of power to change. When an object does change, it is not entirely attributable to 
exogenous circumstances, but to its own capacity to be differently. The exogenous forces act on it vicariously. 
94 Todes p. 79 
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understand the origin of higher forms from lower ones it is necessary to allow for the 
existence in organisms of a special tendency to progress, either connected to or identical with 
a tendency to variation, and which leads organisms to improve, insofar as external conditions 
permit.” However, like Beketov, Korzhinski adheres to a teleological metaphysics. His 
organisms are objects that continually emanate their own progress, yet this progress is usually 
chipped away by the non-conducive circumstances that surround it and cause its outgrowths 
to immediately wilt and evaporate. Thing naturally tend toward their own perfection, and if 
only struggle and competition could be eliminated, they would achieve it. For Korzhinksi,  
The superiority of the theory of heterogenesis was "especially striking" when "we 
transfer our conclusions to the world of human relations." Everybody knew that in 
human society "hunger and need do not lead to progress" and that "adaptation does not 
at all signify improvement." Individuals and entire peoples remained ignorant and 
backward if preoccupied with the need to acquire their daily bread. Many great 
intellects had been physically weak and sickly, and would surely have perished had 
their lives been too trying. Nor were great cultural figures, who constituted "the pride 
of humanity," always well adapted to their environment—sometimes they remained 
entirely unrecognized by their contemporaries. Conversely, adaptation to one's 
environment often attested to a weakness, rather than strength, of character (Todes 
80). 
 
At the level of plants and animals, Korzhinski’s theory relies heavily on an inference about the 
mysterious change-capacity that dwells within each organism. So while it may not satisfy all 
standards of rigorous empirical scientific method, its conclusions do indeed ring true when 
applied to human kind. While Anglo-Saxon thinkers like Mill and Smith believed that 
thriving minds and vibrant, humanistic culture depended upon faculty-sharpening 
competition, they would admit that no high-order mental activity would be possible in 
conditions of serious depravity. These thinkers, who were strong influences on Malthus and 
Darwin, argue that human beings need a certain base-level of comfort in order to live up to 
their potential as human beings, and within this realm of relative stability, they can then 
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engage in non-mortal competition with each other. It is not true that Smith’s capitalism 
advocates cold disregard for those who fail to keep pace, as contemporary neo-liberals would 
have it. The same author of the Wealth of Nations founded his entire system on his equally 
important, but almost universally ignored Theory of Moral Sentiments, which establishes 
empathy as the single most important feature of human nature. Far from praising unfettered 
competition or condoning exploitation as inevitable, Smith argues that every sane human has 
a moral imperative to restrain themselves from harming the interests of others. This 
imperative takes precedence over the virtue of competition and the individual liberties it feeds 
on.95 The same truths hold for Mill who advocates for the maximum possible amount of 
individual freedom, as long as the enjoyment of that freedom does not impinge on the freedom 
of others.96 In these systems, ethics becomes an ongoing calculus that demands one’s full 
attention at all times. It is not acceptable to make an excuse out of “following one’s nature” 
since one’s nature is reflexive and capable of self-criticism, empathy, and restraint. For Smith 
and Mill, there are no adequate metaphors that express the complexity of human behavior, 
and their writings are reflect such distrust. Smith, of course, employs his famous “invisible 
hand” metaphor to explain markets’ tendency to regulate themselves, but his Moral Sentiments 
is generally a straight-forward description of human psychology. Mill too, avoids metaphor at 
all costs, writing more like a lawyer than a philosopher from the country of Shakespeare and 
                                                
95 Quotations like the following one abound: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.” - Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Amherst: Prometheus, 2000. p. 3 
 
96 “The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these 
concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people, if 
thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its 
dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of 
others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of 
 125 
Hobbes. In his A System of Logic, Mill explains the ambiguity-creating quality of metaphors, 
which is why he did his best to leave them out of his own writing:  
And one of the commonest forms of fallacious reasoning arising from ambiguity, is that 
of arguing from a metaphorical expression as if it were literal; that is, as if a word, 
when applied metaphorically, were the same name as when taken in its original sense: 
which will be seen more particularly in its place.97  
 
Had Mill written after Darwin and Malthus, he may have taken exception to their use of 
metaphor in the place of clear denotation. As we have seen, the metaphors of struggle and 
natural selection were misinterpreted in just the way Mill warned against. Their metaphors 
were unable to transcend their cultural milieu which was still tied tightly to the teleological 
thought of Christian theology, and so Darwin’s metaphors were imputed with a teleology they 
did not have—the same teleology present in Hegel’s history of the world: a belief in inexorable 
progress toward perfection. By presenting the structural truths of the natural world as 
universal metaphors, Darwin set himself up for criticisms that did a better job of appreciating 
the complexities of human psychology. Thinking like Smith and Mill, the nineteenth century 
Russian scientist Ilya Mechnikov reflected on Darwin’s Descent of Man:  
Two tribes conflict, not because the means for survival are inadequate for their large 
numbers, but as a result of mutual hatred and the desire to enslave others; generally, 
from laziness and the desire to exploit another. Consider an example. On an island 
resides a certain number of people with plentiful resources for their existence. Still, 
there is a lazy person among them who will exploit others based on his simple desire to 
do nothing, in other words, to satisfy his desire for idleness. Being shrewder, he 
becomes richer and stronger, without working, than his industrious, but less shrewd 
neighbors. Here the source of inequality, and consequently of struggle, lies not in 
heightened reproduction but in human inclinations. Therefore, we see that even in a 
country where there are many sources of nourishment (even Russia) there appears a 
struggle conditioned by inequality (Todes 91).  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.” — Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and Other Essays. 
Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1998. p. 104 
97 Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic. Project Gutenberg [Ebook #27942]. Release Date: January 31, 2009  p. 45 
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This passage alludes not only to Malthus and Darwin’s metaphors, but also the famous 
Hegelian metaphor of master and slave.  
 The master-slave metaphor is so central to Hegel Phenomenology that Kojève isolated it as 
the essence of Hegel’s thought. Just as animal life was based on one beast’s ability to 
dominate another to ensure it own survival, human life is a perpetual struggle for recognition 
and power. This is true on the scale of an individual lifespan, as well as human history as a 
whole. What gives human history this character is the metaphysical truth that supports it. 
Always thinking in fractals, Hegel posits that events that play out objectively are following the 
same movement of individual subjectivity, which also reflects a more universal movement of a 
more universal Spirit, that permeates both the individual subjective realm and the objective 
realm of history. In the abstract discourse of consciousness, an individual subject undergoes a 
struggle in which it finds itself in opposition to an object and is bewildered. It perceives a gulf 
between itself and the object, something is different between the two. Given this unsettling 
feeling, it assumes that the object is real, and somehow, it is false, its essence is not there 
within itself, but perhaps out there in the vault of the object. However, a reflection occurs in 
which the subject realizes that the object is an object by virtue of its opposition to the subject. 
The object owes its identity to the subject; it indeed holds part of the subject’s essence within 
it, but that essence becomes accessible again to the subject, so it is no longer alienated.  
 This abstract and subtle phenomenological process describes the way in which 
consciousness makes sense of itself and the world, and becomes self-consciousness. It 
describes the developments of a sense of relation and interdependence between things, rather 
than one in which consciousness sadly trundles along, unable to enjoy its own essence and 
always longing after it. That is what Hegel calls the unhappy consciousness, and it, as we saw 
earlier, is the essence of Hegelianism for Hyppolite. 
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 At this level of subtle, individual phenomenology, which is the focus of Hyppolite and 
Nancy, this process uses gentle terms like reflection, recognition, comprehend, web, mingling, 
mediation, movement etc. But transposed to the register of outer human history, it adopts the 
more violent metaphor of master-slave and its attendant verbs and adjectives. Human beings, 
motivated by the “desire” for recognition, confront one another; the one that is willing to risk 
its own “annihilation” “dominates” the “weaker” who becomes the “slave” while he becomes 
the “master;” the slave feels that he is dependent on the master, who can destroy him, and thus 
he is alienated from his own essence; however, the master is unfulfilled by his relationship to 
the slave, since the slave’s inferiority make his recognition meaningless; moreover, the master 
lives off of the slave’s labor; they both start to realize this, and with the recognition of their 
interdependence, the tables are turned and the slave becomes reunited with his essence, while 
the master must go through what the slave just went through.  
 This metaphor mirrors exactly the movement of the phenomenological subject, and it 
seems to explain a lot about the undeniably violent character of human activity. However, 
does the master-slave metaphor say exactly what it means? If we concede that it is indeed a 
metaphor, then its meaning is not entirely straightforward. It is not to be taken literally, and if 
it is taken literally, it can be dangerous, as we saw when Darwin’s metaphor of struggle was 
taken literally by nazi social Darwinists. We may not object to the gentle way that the subject-
object dialectic is described in Hegel’s Logic and early in the Phenomenology, but if we start to 
believe that the master-slave dialectic is an exact mapping out of the same process in concrete 
life, then the language of that dialectic may have serious affects on our orientation to the 
world. Hyppolite, in his exhaustive commentary on the Phenomenology, writes about the 
master-slave dialectic, “Human consciousness can take shape only through this anguish 
throughout the whole of its being. At that point, specific attachments, the dispersion of life in 
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more or less stable forms, disappear, and in that fear man becomes cognizant of the totality of 
his being”98 [bolds added]. This suggests that the master-slave metaphor is therefore the only 
possible way to express the development of human consciousness, but what if you object to 
the political, ethical, or even logical implications of such wholesale acceptance of a violent 
metaphor?  
 As we saw with the Soviet assimilation of Darwinian evolution, couldn’t we simply 
substitute more innocuous metaphors for the that of the master-slave? What about love? 
Doesn’t it encompass the longing that goes on between two things? Recognition and 
fulfillment? Hyppolite draws out why love is inadequate as a metaphor that could replace 
master-slave:  
Love is the miracle through which two become one without, however, completely 
suppressing the duality. Love goes beyond the categories of objectivity and makes the 
essence of life actually real by preserving difference within union. But in the 
Phenomenology, Hegel takes a different tack. Love does not dwell sufficiently on the 
tragic nature of separation; it lacks “the seriousness, the torment, the patience, and the 
labor of the negative (PE, I, 18; PG, 20; PM, 81).99  
 
Hyppolite says elsewhere in his commentary that the master-slave dialectic is renowned “as 
much for the graphical beauty of its development as for the influence it has on the political 
and social philosophy of Hegel’s successors, especially Marx” (172). The symmetry of the 
master-slave dialectic makes it quite easy to remember, much more so than the abstract and 
confusing development of consciousness on its journey to self-consciousness. Using the course 
metaphor as a pneumonic device, we can easily remember the parallel movement that goes on 
in Hegel’s more subtle phenomenology. Like Malthus and Darwin’s metaphor of struggle, it 
accounts for the mysterious violence of the world, the obvious contradictions, injustices, and 
                                                
98 Hyppolite 1974: 175 
99 ibid. 164 
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constant manifestation of destructive negativity. However, it does not explain everything, all 
that happens is not directly indexed to the terms of the metaphor. However, just as social 
Darwinists believed that the metaphor was the literal truth, Hegel and many of his successors 
believed that the master-slave dialectic was essential, and the more familiar it became, the 
easier it was to work with, and the more they viewed it as the indispensable expression of the 
truth. 
 For Hegel, the things signified by the master-slave metaphor—violent events—were 
directly linked to far more fundamental truths that were the unique domain of philosophy. 
Hyppolite explains that  
Hegel takes the historical events he is discussing, which he witnessed—the 
revolutionary thought of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment’s struggle against 
faith, the French Revolution, and the domination of Napoleon—as metaphysical code, 
and he seeks to draw from these events a philosophy of spirit (GS 377).   
 
Thus, as we discussed before, Hegel’s philosophy of history is a theodicy, everything has a 
reason behind it; a reason that is decipherable and that gives us access to absolute knowledge. 
Hence, history is like a novel or German Bildungsroman, in which the events of the story direct 
us to the intent of the authors of the event, in this case the Logos underlying everything that 
occurs. Therefore, Napoleon, Caesar, Christ, and the other heroes of Hegel’s story of human 
history are not symbols—i.e., signs that embody a meaning that might be expressed in another 
way—but literal embodiments of spirit directed by a metaphysical code that can be known 
just as it is. In the introduction to his translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of History, Leo Rauch 
remarks on the suitability of the Bildungsroman metaphor for Hegel’s philosophy, with its 
vague and expansive terminology: “world history is a process of development which he likens 
to that of the individuals’s mind growing up—and that metaphor could not work unless there 
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were that ambiguity in the universal and individual sense of ‘Geist’" (PH xii). Geist, or Spirit, is 
at the heart of Hegel’s system because of the myriad of valences it carries. It does not denote 
something altogether clear, but only a rich and complex movement that can be discovered at 
the level of individual phenomenology, and even less clearly in the events of concrete history.  
 Following the more phenomenological bent of Hyppolite and Nancy, I believe it is 
easier, and indeed necessary, to first comprehend Spirit at the individual level, which then 
invites us to speculate on the metaphysical possibilities of the events going on around us. We 
first understand that our subjectivity is not autonomous or uniform, but that it relies on an 
orientation toward something quite different from itself: it is structurally intentional—the 
great insight of Brentano and Husserl. Paying attention to this split between subject and its 
objects, we are a bit confused and wonder which one is more real, which one is generating 
other. Are we an illusory product of the other things, or are they illusions made by this 
subjectivity? We keep going to find that neither is the case. That the two forever entail a 
codependence. So does this mean that the positive, concrete fullness of the objects relies on 
the subjective, which is negative in character? This would back us into the idealist trap of 
correlationism which has been highlighted as a problem through this essay. If the subject is 
truly the vector of negativity, as Hegel constantly contends, then it makes little sense to speak 
of it as some autonomous entity that is full, concrete, and positive. If that’s the case, then the 
subject becomes something like a metaphor, or a symbol that signifies negativity, something 
purely metaphysical that can only be pointed to symbolically. Objects, the concrete, positive 
entities, likewise signify the metaphysics of fullness. The ebb and flow and interaction of these 
two vague metaphysical things are what cause, or just allow, manifestation, appearance, 
history.  
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 Neither the subject or the object are monarchs of the processes that go on between 
them. Following OOO’s insight, they are equally things, neither bestows Being to the other. If 
we follow Hegel down the path of granting ontological priority to the subject, then indeed 
some objective manifestations, some historical events, embody the absolute truth of that 
generating subject more than others do. But without that ontological priority, no 
manifestation is a more successful embodiment of an invisible truth than any other. They are 
all equally true as manifestation. They happen, and it is not a question of to what degree they 
express a teleology. This was the Darwin’s insight.  
 The events of history are metaphorical in that they are expressions of the metaphysical 
conditions that allowed them to be, metaphysically. That is their signification. Of course, in 
the realm of human activity, signification knows no bounds and it becomes the fabric of 
aesthetic thinking that informs the tenor of human existence. In the unavoidable human realm 
of aesthetics, individual manifestations reflect one another as in Indra’s Net, where each knot of 
an infinite net contains a mirror-like jewel, so that each knot contains and image of all the 
other knots of the infinite net. However, the individual manifestations cannot transcend the 
net, they do not point to something outside of it that is ontologically superior.  
 But Hegel’s historical events claim to signify just that. They are not metaphors that are 
interchangeable, but precise images generated by a precise code that lies beyond. The 
characters of his historical novel are not mere characters, but direct embodiments of a 
destined Spirit. He writes in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History,  
If we take another look at the final destiny of these world-historical individuals, who 
had the calling to manage the affairs of the World-Spirit, we find that their destiny was 
by no means happy. They attained no calm enjoyment, their entire life was toil and 
trouble; their entire nature was nothing by their master-passion. Once their goal is 
achieved they fall away like empty shells from the kernel. They die young, like 
Alexander; they are murdered, like Caesar; they are exiled, like Napoleon to St. 
Helena. There is a horrible consolation in the fact that these historical men did not 
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achieve what is called happiness—a happiness found only in private life, and under 
very different external circumstances—and this is a comfort that can be drawn from 
history by those who need it. But those who need that consolation are also the envious, 
who resent greatness and eminence, who seek to belittle greatness and to find fault 
with it. Thus, in modern times it has been demonstrated all too often that princes are 
not at all happy on their thrones—so that we are not to begrudge them their position, 
and are to be glad that it is they who are there, not we. The free man, however, is not 
envious, but gladly recognizes what is great and exalted, and rejoices in it (PH 34).  
 
Hegel’s world-historical men with their onerous destinies are not just mythical characters like 
Dionysius and Damocles.100 This passage does not just point to the common human 
psychological issues of envy, duty; it says that the destinies of Alexander, Caesar, and 
Napoleon were coded and that they are indexed directly to an absolute truth which they 
express. They are indispensable in this sense and nothing else—no other characters or 
stories—could have expressed what they do. For him they are not metaphors.  
 But I suggest that that is all that they are. The people and events of human history are 
not indexed to a transcendent truth, just as the evolution of the field mouse is not the 
expression of a destiny. Not only do Darwinian insights suggest that Hegel is wrong in his 
conception of history, so does literary criticism.   
 When Hegel talks about world-historical people and events, he is using them as 
metaphors without even realizing it. He was deeply entangled in the milieu of German 
Romanticism that marked his time and place. Part of that aesthetic movement was the 
proliferation of metaphorical and symbolic signification. As Gadamer writes, “The basis of 
aesthetics during the nineteenth century […] was the freedom of the symbolizing power of the 
mind101” and Hegel was no exception to his era’s fascination with symbolization; he just did 
not always admit (if he ever admitted it) that what he was doing was symbolizing. De Man, in 
                                                
100 The myth of the Sword of Damocles in which King Dionysius allows his envious courtier, Damocles, to take 
his throne. However, Damocles immediately notices a massive sword above the throne, suspended by a single 
thread. Realizing the throne comes with such anxiety, he is unable to cope and renounces the position. 
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his essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality”102 explains the connection between nineteenth 
century German aesthetics and metaphysics. If, as discussed above, we hold to an ontological 
superiority of the subject, that subject starts to assert itself onto the objects it perceives: 
Since the assertion of a radical priority of the subject over objective nature is not easily 
compatible with the poetic praxis of the romantic poets, who all gave a great deal of 
importance to the presence of nature, a certain degree of confusion ensues. One can 
find numerous quotations and examples that plead for the predominance, in romantic 
poetry, of an analogical imagination that is founded on the priority of natural 
substances over the consciousness of the self. Coleridge can speak, in nearly Fichtean 
terms, of the infinite self in opposition to the “necessarily finite”character of natural 
objects, and insist on the need for the self to give life to the dead forms of nature.103 
 
With this metaphysical presupposition, romantic poets worked on blurring the lines between 
the objective and subjective realms, since it was assumed that the subject had the capacity to 
fully consume or comprehend the objective. De Man adds,  
The fluent transition in romantic diction, from descriptive to inward, meditative 
passages, bears out the notion that this relationship is indeed of fundamental 
importance. The same applies to a large extent eighteenth-century landscape poets 
who constantly mix descriptions of nature with abstract moralizings…”104 
 
This is precisely what Hegel does in his writing. His Phenomenology of Spirit forms a bridge 
between the entirely inward, meditative Logic and his various historical writings, which claim 
to deal with the concrete world. But there is unabashed moralizing throughout all of his 
historical writings.  
 Some of the most salient metaphors that Hegel uses are the caricatures of the Oriental 
and the African. They are metaphors because what Hegel calls the Oriental and the African 
do not exist in the way that he says they do. They are not real objects but fantasies that allow 
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104 ibid. p. 193 
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him to construct rich metaphorical significations that betray his worst myopias and biases and 






Hegel’s Africans and Orientals 
 
In 2011, Teshale Tibebu published a devastating and thorough criticism of Hegel’s words on 
African and Asian history, culture, and religion: Hegel and the Third World: The Making of 
Eurocentrism in World History.105 While I have criticized Hegel from multiple angles and I have 
drawn heavily on insights that appeared after Hegel’s own life (Darwin, OOO etc.), Tibebu 
attacks Hegel head-on, declaring, “I happen to believe that one can critique Hegel’s 
eurocentrism and his depiction of Third World humanity on the basis of the moral standard 
he himself set”(xxvii). He analyzes the incoherence and ignorance of Hegel’s writings on 
Africans and Orientals, showing, in example after example, how essential his racism is to his 
vaunted philosophical system. Hegel’s subtlety and opacity save him from accusations of 
being a crass biological racist, but, Tibebu argues, they bring him to new heights as a geocultural 
racist. I believe this criticism is important, but I will focus on the metaphysical issues that 
allowed Hegel to codify and propagate the geocultural racism that Tibebu identifies. For the 
Africans and Orientals he writes about have never existed except as chimera’s of Hegel’s 
German-Protestant imagination. It is too late for Hegel himself to realize it, but all of the 
people and events of his historical writings should be recognized as metaphors, mere 
placeholders, buckets of meaning.  
For Tibebu, the following passage embodies Hegel’s philosophy of history:  
In Africa proper, man has not yet progressed beyond merely sensuous existence, and has 
found it absolutely impossible to develop any further. Physically, he exhibits great muscular 
strength, which enables him to perform arduous labours; and his temperament is 
characterized by good-naturedness, which is coupled, however, with completely 
unfeeling cruelty. Asia is the land of antithesis, division, and expulsion, just as Africa is the 
                                                
105 Tibebu, Teshale. Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History. Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2011 
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land of concentration. One pole of the antithesis is that of ethical life, the universal 
rational essence which remains solid and substantial; the other is the exact spiritual 
opposite, that of egotism, infinite desires, and boundless expansion of freedom into the 
particular, of control of the immediate and elevation of the particular to the universal, and of the 
descent of the spirit into itself. (xiv. Emphasis Tibebu’s).  
 
This passage clearly shows a movement that shows up all over Hegel’s writings on history: 
history moves from East to West, undeniably, and for a reason. After the beginnings of history 
in Asia, the Greco-Roman world ushers in the dawn of Reason, which becomes perfected in 
European modernity. But what are these East and West, really? Regarding the West, there 
has been much debate over what Hegel saw as the essential characteristics of the community 
that signify the end of history. His own politics were unspecific, just vaguely conservative. All 
that is really clear is that Christianity is important, but even that great religion can be 
surpassed by the potentialities of truly great art. The West, for Hegel, becomes a semiotic 
repository for all things relating to spiritual maturity, well-being, vitality, and intelligence. For 
example, characterizing the Greek World (whatever that means), Hegel writes, “This 
background—gradually emerging out of self-differentiating Spirit into individual spirituality, 
and rebirth in the full daylight of knowing—is moderated and transfigured into beauty and 
the ethical life of freedom and happiness”(PH 104). Here, Hegel appeals to the metaphor of 
light (“daylight of knowing”), something that’s monopolized by the West, and which is one of 
Hegel’s favorite modes of expression.  
 Under the heading “The Division of History” from his Introduction to the Philosophy of 
History, Hegel encompasses all of world history in his metaphor of light: 
The Sun, the Light, rises in the East. Light, however, is simple self-relatedness: and the 
light that is universal in itself is also a self-enclosed subject, in the sun.  
 The scene has often been pictured in which a blind person suddenly gains sight, 
sees the dawn, the growing Light, and then the Sun as it blazes up. At first, in his 
complete amazement, he forgets himself utterly, in his pure clarity. But when the sun 
has fully risen, his amazement is lessened; he looks at the objects around him, and from 
them he goes on to see his own inwardness, and the relation of outer to inner. He 
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proceeds from inactive contemplation to activity: by evening he has constructed some 
sort of building, by the use of his own inner sun—and when he contemplates it in the 
evening, he values it higher than that first external sun. For he now stands in relation 
to his own creative spirit and hence in a relation of freedom [because that spirit is 
related to itself]. If we keep this image before us, we can see the course of the world 
history in it, the great daily work of the Spirit. (92).  
 
This passage is an evocative description of the kind of inner phenomenological process that is 
at the heart of Hegel’s Logic and that is transposed into the master-slave dialectic in the 
Phenomenology. It provides a textured roadmap for the sensitive reader who can follow the 
phenomenological path being described. Remembering fresh morning sunrises, the reader will 
be touched by the image of the dawn and the feelings that attend it. Having learned and 
matured in the course of her life, the reader can related her own cultivated knowledge to an 
“inner sun,” and this metaphor adds something subtle to her perceptions. She is no passive 
observer, but is interacting with the world.  
 On these terms, Hegel’s metaphors are valuable and skillful, like those of a poet or a 
mystic. Compare them, for example, to a description of meditative perception written by the 
fourteenth century Tibetan philosopher and mystic, Longchen Rabjam: 
Before, you perceived outer manifestations—sense objects—as existing in their own 
right.  But now that you have realization, the very essence that you have certainty of is 
such that your holding to things as having true existence is overturned.  So you think, 
“I perceive all these reified sense objects as though dream images, or the reflection of 
the moon in water, or forms in mirages—they are unobstructed, vivid yet ephemeral.”  
Whatever manifests arises as awareness’s own manifestation, randomly and without 
any particular reference point, leaving you wondering whether any of it exists or not.  
 You might wonder whether the conduct and character of ordinary beings are 
different from what they were before.  As things seem to manifest with no reference 
point, you might think, “Does everyone realize this?”  With all reference point fading 
away in emptiness, you experience, feel, think, and are aware as never before, so that 
you experience awareness as an infinite evenness. You might wonder how you have 
ended up in such a state in which thoughts never arise, for your consciousness is 
completely open and your ordinary experiences are naturally pristine, inherently pure.  
Occasionally you may burst out laughing at the way your behavior and all that you see 
and hear are continually without any frame of reference. You may become aware of 
thoughts like “Am I crazy?  Is everyone else crazy?  Is this a dream or the intermediate 
state after death?”  The thought may occur to you: This awareness, bursting forth in all 
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its nakedness, in which all reference points fade away, is present in everyone.  What, 
then, is the problem in realizing it? It’s right here!”  With your unconditional 
compassion arising unchecked, you also speak of these things to others, sing vajra 
songs, and act without inhibition, all of which show that your awareness has no 
fixation.  All sensory appearances manifest unobstructedly in the moment.106    
 
Here, Longchenpa is just describing a taste, the ineffable textures of an inner mental 
experience. The metaphorical terms being used (dreams, mirages, and reflections) signify 
phenomena that are not strictly verbal. They are phenomenological phenomena, merely 
pointed at with metaphors of this and that. From the same tradition, the metaphor of light (of 
the sun, of a butter-lamp etc.) abound, and are used just as Hegel does in the passage above. 
Light and the sun are apt metaphors for self-knowledge, confidence, and clarity; but as 
metaphors, they must be understood as such. The sun can denote a giant ball of gas—its 
natural-science meaning—or it may connote something else. By doing the latter, it loses its 
direct, denotative link to the concrete world. However, for Hegel, metaphors retain, 
miraculously, their denotative power, even while serving double-duty as signs beyond 
themselves.  
 He extends his metaphor of light from his Philosophy of History:  
World history goes from East to West: as Asia is the beginning of world history, so 
Europe is simply its end. In world history there is an absolute East, par excellence 
(whereas the geographical term “east” is in itself entirely relative); for although the 
earth is a sphere, history makes no circle around that sphere. On the contrary, it has a 
definite East which is Asia. It is here that the external physical sun comes up, so sink 
in the West: and for that same reason it is in the West that the inner Sun of self-
consciousness rises, shedding a higher brilliance. (92).    
 
Here is a bizarre conception of time, place, and language. There is a “definite East which is 
Asia,” but this is not necessarily a geographical term, it is a term of “world history.” While 
opaque, it connotes something much more significant than mere geographical dirt materialism. 
                                                
106 Longchen Rabjam. A Treasure Trove of Scriptural Transmission: A Commentary on The    Precious 
Treasury of the Basic Space of Phenomena. Junction City: Padma Publishing,   2001 
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Real geographical locations, their flora, fauna, climates, food, waters, and so forth, are of little 
importance to Hegel. Asia is not a place, but a placeholder. It is merely the symbol of spiritual 
immaturity. Asia is what he says it is, it is merely a metaphor. He is explicit about this:  
It is not our task to get to know that ground as an external locale, but only as the 
natural type of the locality which corresponds to the type of character of the people 
that is the child of such ground […] Nature ought not to be rated either too high or too 
low in all this. The mild Ionian sky surely contributed much to the charm of Homeric 
poetry; yet that sky alone could produce no homers after the one, and if it could such 
poets would not always be coming forth, for under Turkish domination no such bards 
arose (PH 83).  
 
This is the antithesis of Nietzsche’s imperative, picked up by Onfray in his Forms of Time. 
Nietzsche exhorts in Ecce Homo, “these small things—nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the 
whole casuistry of selfishness—are inconceivably more important than everything that one 
has taken to be important so far. Precisely here one must begin to relearn.”107  For Hegel, these 
things are trivial; he has found a way to know essences that transcend concrete manifestation. 
Despite the profound relationality of his metaphysics, it is not important to understand the 
mild Ionian sky, nor the olives of Anatolia or the Aegean waters. Homer was produced 
through a magical surge of Spirit, wholly autonomous from the material world. The details of 
the material world are mere secondary accompanying circumstances. This is because Hegel is 
firmly on the side of idealist correlationism; things do not exist in themselves, but only for 
subjects. Therefore, time is wasted trying to know those things, except insofar as they serve as 
speculums for our own consciousnesses. Better is to know the mysteries of Spirit, which is the 
real force behind the appearance of anything meaningful in the world. Hyppolite explains this 
well in the section “The Observation of Nature” in his Genesis and Structure. He writes, “That 
things can be said, that their external existence can be expressed is a description, is already a 
                                                
107 Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Geneology of Morals and Ecce Homo. Walter Kaufman trans. New York: Vintage, 
1989 
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sign that in-itself they are concepts, that the human logos is at once the logos of nature and the 
logos of spirit”(GS 237). Thus, Nature and its things are not fully devoid of reason or Spirit, 
despite being contraposed to it. Spirit can realize itself through man’s reflection on Nature 
and its things; those things alone cannot reflect on themselves, and thus cannot be conduits of 
Spirit. Because of things’ apaprent impotence, Hegel finds things trivial. Hyppolite explains: 
“Seeking to give nature a conceptual transparency, he abandoned it more and more to itself 
and saw in it the fall of the idea”(245). There is no real need to know objects as objects, 
situated in geographical spaces and made of real organic chemicals. It suffices to know things 
as sterile mirrors for subjective reason. Objects express Reason, and so it is Reason that 
should be plumbed to its depths, not objects.  
 Despite this denigration of the sensual world, Hegel is deeply invested in what Tibebu 
calls “sensual rationalism,” “consciousness frozen at the level of sense-certainty”(Tibebu 344). 
In Hegel’s social and historical philosophy, Spirit achieves its most retarded forms in the non-
white races of the world, particularly the African. The African is a deformation of Spirit. 
Hegel writes, authoritatively, “It must be said in general that, in the interior of Africa, the 
consciousness of the inhabitant has not yet reached an awareness of any substantial and 
objective existence.108” Of course, Hegel says this without the benefit of having carried out, or 
even having access to legitimate ethnographic studies of Africa. Yet he evidently knows the 
African in his essence. Not just the “African” writ large, he can even distinguish between 
various kinds of African—in this case the African from the “interior of Africa.” A fine example 
of the logic of difference in identity?  
 Tibebu’s book is largely a litany of Hegel’s absurdities on race and history. And Hegel’s 
writings on these topics would scarcely be worth a derisive laugh if they were not so 
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fundamental to the Eurocentrism and racism that plague both the academy and the socio-
political world. Therefore, we have to address them and figure out a way to get beyond them. 
A person whose “has not yet reached an awareness of any substantial and objective existence” 
is not a real person but a metaphor, a semiotic dumping ground for racist presuppositions.  
 He does exactly the same thing with Asia and its people. Hegel’s treatment of Asian 
thought (as if there is such a thing and it pervades all of Asia) arrives at some stunning 
conclusions. For example, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy he avers,  
So the Oriental domain is on the whole to be excluded from the history of philosophy; 
later we shall offer just a few comments about Indian and Chinese thought. On earlier 
occasions I have passed over this topic, for we have only recently been in position to 
form judgment about it.  
 
We might ask what it was that allowed him to so confidently dismiss the intellectual piddlings 
of the majority of the world’s population: it was, of course, the British scholar Henry Thomas 
Colebrooke’s On the Philosophy of the Hindus. Until then, Hegel confesses, too little was known 
of Indian or any other Asian systems of thought to include them in the discussion of the 
history of philosophy. After such a comprehensive study, all of Asia’s traditions can be 
definitively dismissed.  
 These dismissals were not mere oversights. Pervasive European ignorance of Asian 
writings and intellectual traditions were not to be addressed through learning, which might 
allow Asian populations to be incorporated into world history. Rather, Asians were to become 
straw men set up to demonstrate the irrefutable superiority of white European civilization 
rooted in overwhelming superiority of white Europeans’ ability to think. Hegel pronounces in 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy:  
                                                                                                                                                       
108 Hegel quoted in Tibebu 177. 
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What comes to our attention first in history is the Oriental World. No 
philosophy in the proper sense, however, can be found there. The character of 
this world is, in short, such that while spirit does arise in the Orient, 
nevertheless in this relationship the subject, or individuality (my I on its own 
account), is not a person but is simply submerged, is determined only as 
negative, as submerged in the objective domain as such. In the Oriental 
Character the substantial relationship prevails; substance is represented as 
supersensible, as thought, or even in a more sensuous way..... 
This is not even presented as a hypothetical phenomenology of an Asian person. It is not a 
thought experiment akin to Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like To Be A Bat”109 that would help 
the reader understand “What Is It Like To Be An Oriental.” It presents itself as the 
description of fact. One only comes away with the impression that to be an Oriental is to be 
very different from a European Christian, and it is certainly worse to be an Oriental. 
   1) Is what Hegel says about Asian thought accurate internally? 2) Is it accurate 
historically?  The answer to both is no. If his depictions are historically non-existent and are 
not verifiable by anything on earth, they are metaphors, placeholders, mere signs.  
 In an essay on Hegel and Buddhism, Tim Morton analyzes a very curious example of 
Buddhist (actually Hindu) iconography that was one of Hegel’s favorites.110 In his Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel takes as exemplary of the Buddha “The image of Buddha in the 
thinking posture, with feet and arms intertwined so that a toe extends into the mouth—this 
[is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself.”111 This image is what the Buddha and 
his religion are all about. Unimportant if such an image has never, to anyone’s knowledge, 
appeared in any Buddhist iconography (In fact, it can almost certainly only be an image of the 
baby Krishna sucking his toe). It doesn’t matter how Buddhists or their texts explain 
                                                
109 Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50. 
110 Morton, Timothy. “Hegel on Buddhism” from Romantic Circles Praxis Series.February 2007. 
http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.html 
111 Hegel, G.F.W. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Peter C. Hodgson. Tr. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, 
and J. M. Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of 
California Press, 1988. p. 252 
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themselves, they simply are what Hegel say they are: they represent self absorption, infancy, 
and some vague, disturbing sensuality or proto-Freudian oral-fixation. Showing his skill as a 
literary critic, Morton riffs on Hegel’s image:  
The toe sucker is practicing literal, physical introversion. The body turns round on 
itself and disposes of itself down one of its own holes. To be "retired within itself," 
Being loses its spiritual or ideal aspect and actually becomes this very image, as in 
Hegel's telling syntax: "The image of Buddha . . . this [is] the withdrawal into self." 
Hegel repetitively adds "this absorption in oneself," as if he himself cannot get away 
from the fascinating, sucking maw. There is a little eddy of enjoyment in Hegel's own 
text, a sucking backwash that is not simply dialectics at a standstill, but rather an 
entirely different order of being. This Buddhist being is only recognizable in Hegel's 
universe as an inconsistent distortion, at once too insubstantial and too solid. 
Buddhism stands both for an absolute nothingness, a blank zero that itself becomes 
heavy and dense, unable to shift itself into dialectical gear, and for a substantiality that 
is not even graced with an idea of nothingness. Contemplation, meditation, is 
tantamount to reducing the body to a horrifying inertia, a body without organs in the 
Deleuzian-Guattarian terminology (Deleuze and Guattari 149-66). The nearest 
approximation is a black hole, a physicality so intense that nothing escapes from it. On 
the other hand, the image is made of organs rather than a single, independent body. If 
he is terrified of the static body without organs of the meditating ascetic, in which the 
inside of the body threatens to swallow all trace of working limbs, perhaps Hegel's 
description also evokes an even greater panic concerning the possibility of organs 
without bodies. As one starts to examine the image, nothingness proliferates into a 
veritable sea of holes. The zero of the open mouth, stuffed full of the body of which it 
forms a part, while the body curls around in a giant, fleshy zero, like a doughnut: this 
is the inconsistent, compelling image, the sinthome of Hegel's ideological fixation.[8] It 
is ironic, then, that for Buddhist meditators, physical posture is indeed not only a 
support for meditation, but also embodies it, quite literally, as in the notions of yoga 
and mudra (gesture), where certain postures enact forms of being awake. These are 
indeed "thinking postures," to use Hegel's phrase, the textual ambiguity brilliantly 
(accidentally?) betraying his anxiety about the idea that aposture could think. There 
must be an infinite distance between posing a philosophical proposition, conceptually 
positing, and this posturing thought, this thinking that postures and postures that 
perform thinking. As any Buddhist meditator could have told Hegel, meditation is a 
highly physical process. 
 
In case it is not clear enough yet, not only are Hegel’s Africans and Asians pure fictions, 
metaphorical fantasies, so are every other people, person, and event that he talks about. 
Central to his philosophy of history are the metaphors of the Greek and Roman worlds, each 
containing subsidiary metaphors. Within the Greek, there are the Pre-Socratics, Socratics, 
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Sophists, Cynics etc., each representing some kind of insight and failure. The Romans gave us 
Stoicism and new forms of imperial government. And of course there are the Jews—
embodiments of unhappy consciousness and self-alienation—and the Muslims, and the 
Oriental, who is responsible for “wild hordes breaking forth from the highlands” and for 
whom “that which in our world belongs to the sphere of subjective freedom proceeds there 
from the universal totality”(PH 94). And so on… Each of these People corresponds not to 
anything concrete, localizable, or sensual, they are simply placeholders for a collection of 
spiritual and intellectual attributes. To one he affixes self-absorption; to another he affixes 
self-abstraction etc. For him, each of these People evince, in their historical becoming, a 
teleological necessity that is revealed after their disappearance or sublation into some other 
People. Merely affixing such general predicates to a vanished people is good enough. Their 
physical being was gone, but their spiritual history remains, and that is what we have access 
to, and that is what matters—our twisting and embellishing are not violent.  
 In his contemplations, Hegel had gone through the subtle and difficult work of 
dissecting his mind and mapping a phenomenological movement. He then universalized this 
movement, projecting it onto the concrete world, turning the events and the people of the 
world into metaphors that represent aspects of the complex and flowing subject. It is too bad 
he didn’t realize this or admit to it, since its results in the academic, social, and political realms 
have been disastrous.  
 Susan Sontag, in her 1977 essay Illness as Metaphor, writes passionately about the 
suffering that is generated by conflating metaphor with reality. Her essay is about falling ill 
with cancer, which is bad enough; but what’s worse, people have invented metaphors about 
cancer which exacerbate the pain of those who have it. She writes, “I want to describe, not 
what it is really like to emigrate to the kingdom of the ill and live there, but the punitive or 
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sentimental fantasies concocted about that situation: not real geography, but stereotypes of 
national character.”112 Combing through several centuries of western literature, Sontag finds 
examples of writings about cancer, where the cancer itself is described as a kind of malevolent 
force, and the person afflicted by it a victim. What’s more, the victim is implicated in the 
illness’s onset. Even after the etiology of cancer became well-understood by science, there 
remained a mythology surrounding cancer in which psychological repression—failure to live 
up to your full potential— turns your body against itself, deforms its tissues, and embodies 
itself as tumors. While these have no basis in science, they remain powerful psychological 
burdens for cancer patients who not only have to contend with the physical pain and mental 
distress of the disease itself, they also become confused and terrified by the possibility that 
everything that is happening to them is their fault. Likewise, in her 1988 follow up, AIDS and 
Its Metaphors, she analyzes the favored metaphor used to describe AIDS, that of a military 
invasion, a body under siege by pernicious beings and militarized against them. Regarding 
both of these, Sontag continues,  
My subject is not physical illness itself but the uses of illness as a figure or metaphor. 
My point is that illness is not a metaphor, and that the most truthful way of regarding 
illness—and the healthiest way of being ill—is one most purified of, most resistant to, 
metaphorical thinking (3). 
 
Just as illness is not a metaphor but a discrete event that happens in time and place to a real 
person, neither is History a metaphor. Being African is not a metaphor; nor is being Asian; 
nor is whatever bloody revolution has occurred in your home country; nor is the climate you 
live in; nor is whatever lowly status you might be stuck in. All of these things listed are 
themselves abstract objects implicated in complex systems of relations with other abstract, 
particular, and hyper-objects. They should not be taken to be the half-shine of some invisible 
                                                
112 Sontag, Susan. Illness as Metaphor and Aids and Its Metaphors. New York: Picador, 1988 p. 3. 
 146 
Spirit struggling to manifest itself. They do not express an ultimate teleology anymore than 
the development of an extra fin on the bum of sunfish. Their lack of teleology should not, as 
the accusation often goes, make things and events any less fascinating or mysterious. 
Evolutionary biology continues to flourish without the hand of God, and OOO has started to 
show us fertile philosophical inroads into appreciating objects both in themselves and in their 
relations. But Hegel and historical teleologists find this hard to swallow, especially when 
speaking about relative positions of power and weakness in the world. If you are strong, let 
me tell you why you are strong, philosophically. If you are weak, take solace in the Will that 
makes you a necessary sacrifice. Regarding metaphorical understandings of disadvantage, 
Sontag observes, “Nothing is more punitive that to give a disease a meaning—that meaning 
being invariably a moralistic one. Any important disease whose causality is murky, and for 
which treatment is ineffectual, tends to be awash in significance”(58).113 
 Hegel’s compulsive conflation of metaphor and reality throughout his historical writings 
are at least, and probably more, pernicious than Darwin’s problematic use of struggle, or the 
metaphors of illness discussed by Sontag. They have been rich stores of fuel for Eurocentric 
                                                
113 A similar problem can be found in the struggle for transgender rights. For example, from a press release by 
the Internation Campaign to Stop Trans Pathologization:  
STP 2012 demands the removal of the diagnostic categories ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ and ‘Transvestic 
Fetishism’ / ‘Fetishistic Transvestism’ from the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders) published by the American Psychiatric Association, and from the ICD (International 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems), edited by the WHO, World Health 
Organization. Furthermore, this campaign calls for state-funded coverage of trans health care, as well as 
the substitution of the current evaluation model for accessing trans-specific treatments, for an approach 
based on autonomy and informed decision making. With the aim of facilitating state-funded coverage, 
STP 2012 proposes the introduction of a non-pathologizing reference of trans health care in the ICD-11, 
as a health care process not based on illness or mental disorder. Furthermore, the International 
Campaign STP 2012 demands the removal of medical requirements from existing gender identity laws, 
as well as the approval of new gender recognition laws based on a depathologization and human rights 
perspective.  
- http://www.stp2012.info/old/en/news 
 Not surprisingly, the pathologization of the transgender experience leads to normative structures that 
oppress transgender people since their experience is not respected as a dignified iteration of humankind, but is 
rather laden with condescending signification. See also, Ben-Asher, Noa. "The Necessity of Sex Change: A 
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racism in academia, politics, and society. His metaphorical use of people and events borrows 
from the most opaque theological beliefs in teleology, and augment those with a profound and 
subtle microcosmic phenomenological discourse, in which the process described actually 
makes sense. His master-slave metaphor, and the general distortion of his African and Asian, 
Jew and everyone else condition us to think of people as abstract totalities to which awful 
things occur because they must. Wait patiently for the end to come, then you will understand 
why it had to go down the way that it did. Graham Harman, in an interesting aside chapter of 
his Guerrilla Metaphysics analyzes Ortega y Grasset’s theory of metaphors. He makes the 
following observation:  
The chess metaphor does not only pick out chesslike features from the military scene 
before us. Instead, it actively shapes our perception of the battle, perhaps playing up the 
brilliant tactical positioning of the two armies while suppressing the shock and trauma 
of those wounded horribly in action—a gruesome feature of warfare for which 
chessboards provide little analogy. The same thing happens when we say “man is a 
wolf.”For as long as this metaphor rings in our ears, we tend to forget all instances of 
human musical skill or mathematical ability, the invention of airplanes, and all other 
human things that have no name in wolf-speak”(GM 120).  
 
While the master-slave metaphor has a powerful symmetry and seems to gracefully explain 
away much of the world’s complexity, that complexity still remains on the other side of the 
veil. People are, to speak like Harman, irreducible objects and cannot evaporate in an idealist 
rapture because they have been affixed with metaphorical significance that is greater than 
them. The point is not to stop trading in metaphors but to use them more skillfully and to 
know where to draw the line between metaphor and lived experience. Sontag, speaking for 
people who have experienced illness declares, “The body is not a battlefield. The ill are neither 
unavoidable casualties nor the enemy […] About that metaphor, the military one, I would say, 
if I may paraphrase Lucretius: Give it back to the war-makers”(183). When we see how entire 
                                                                                                                                                       
Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties."January 1, 2006. Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, Vol. 29, 
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epochs and populations of billions of people have been washed over by metaphorical 
narratives that dismiss and obscure them (the true night in which all cows are black!), 
Eurocentric history makes much less sense. The objects that are the basis of metaphor must be 
respected as ontologically dignified things: these include all of the people written out of 
history, as well as all that they ever produced. No history of the world is comprehensive, 
reliable, or healthy when based on willful denial and taking what is figurative as literal.   
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       





Hegel’s history of the world and of philosophy can be seen as a kind of doxography. Like all 
doxographies, it justifies the author’s own positions by means of criticizing all other positions 
that came before it or presently compete with it. As such, it is just a form of criticism, about 
which there is nothing inherently pernicious. However, doxographies differ immensely with 
regard to their historical and conceptual accuracy, as well as their political agendas. The more 
conscientious an author is of the historical claims he makes—the more he argues based on his 
own observations, reliable ethnographies, and so forth, and the less works to contort rabid, 
biased fantasy into the semblance of something real—the better the doxography. Hegel’s, 
however, is an example of taking all of these dangers to the extreme, and the people who are 
buried by his doxography have had to pay for it.  
 As an absolute idealist, Hegel holds the Subject, or rather, the even more abstract and 
indeterminate Idea to be the one sole Truth.114 It is this Truth as Idea that unfolds as the 
world and as history. The things of history are mere containers for this, its ultimate content. 
Thus, history is a theodicy, as we have discussed before, and the appearances of history are 
unimportant except as expressions of the absolute. The appearances have no ontological 
significance of their own. This results in the strange conclusion that the appearances of 
history, whilst being unessential as appearances of an essence that stands behind them, are yet 
fixed; they could not have appeared differently because, as expressions of a Logos, they are 
bound to its bidding.  
                                                
114 “The Idea, and it alone is truth.” Hegel. Lectures on the History of Philosophy.trans. E S Haldane, 1892-6. section 
A.1.a. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpintroa.htm#A1 
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 The Idea, for Hegel, has the nature of seeking development, or striving to unfold. Thus, 
it unfolds through the phantasmagoria of historical events, but what we must do is decode 
those events to understand their essence. He writes, “ That the Idea should have to make itself 
what it is, seems like a contradiction; it may be said that it is what it is,” therefore, what 
appears is essential, but appearances have no ontological status of their own, they are just the 
vehicle of essence, shrouds. In genuine philosophy, which he constantly argues is a science 
(Wissenschaft), these shrouds should be lifted so that we can get to the Idea itself, which is 
truth. He explains the guiding principles of his history of philosophy in the following way:  
Only a history of Philosophy thus regarded as a system of development in Idea, is 
entitled to the name of Science: a collection of facts constitutes no science. Only thus 
as a succession of phenomena established through reason, and having as content just 
what is reason and revealing it, does this history show that it is rational: it shows that 
the events recorded are in reason. How should the whole of what has taken place in 
reason not itself be rational? That faith must surely be the more reasonable in which 
chance is not made ruler over human affairs, and it is the business of Philosophy to 
recognize that however much its own manifestations may be history likewise, it is yet 
determined through the Idea alone. 
 
However, such faith in the teleology of things is on thin ice in the post Darwin world; so too 
should be the view that no science can be built on a bed of facts, as attested to by object-
oriented-ontology and the neo-presocratism of Michel Onfray. Even microbiologist Carl 
Woese sees object-orientation as the most promising path for future biology. Speaking of the 
pre-conscious world (Meillassoux’s ancestral world), Woese speculates,  
 Although we can infer essentially nothing about the hypothetical primitive entities 
under discussion, it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider their possible relationships 
to one another. Were they communal relationships only in an abstract sense, a virtual 
community defined only by genre transfers, or did they form actual physically 
structured groupings, perhaps resembling modern bacterial consortia but even more 
diverse in makeup and mode of interaction? Some time ago I said what I now call the 
pre-Darwinian era “may be more a world of semiautonomous subcellular entities that 
somehow group to give ‘loose’(ill-defined) cellular forms.” The panoply of interactions 
that such an image evokes… is strongly suggestive of physical communal organization, 
one not only of “cells” but of a spectrum of biological entities, many of them not self-
replicating in their own right (and not all on paths to become “modern” cells) (14).   
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For Hegel, it is a mistake to invest too much in object themselves, or in people as they exist on 
the ground. It suffices to generalize about them. There are, of course, sections of Hegel’s 
writings that are rigorous and penetrating criticisms of philosophical eras and movements. 
Part II section three of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, for example, are exemplary 
analyses of neo-Aristotelian philosophy from Pomponatius through Cicero, Bruno, Vanini, 
and so forth. They are paraphrastic, but clearly show in-depth study of these philosophers’ 
works, and even include brief but informative biographies of each major figure. The same can 
be said of his presentations of scholastic philosophy. However, the further back in time we go, 
or the further abroad we travel geographically, the less rigorous Hegel becomes and the more 
he projects and bastardizes. His treatment of the pre-Socratics like Diogenes Laërtius115, 
Democritus, and Epicurus are famously shallow. Marx, for one, dedicated his doctoral 
dissertation to rehabilitating the latter two thinkers who he believed Hegel had treated 
unjustly because they did not conform to the idealism that he believed was the only way to 
Truth.116 Despite writing brief biographies of the major figures of philosophy and providing a 
little bit of historical context, Hegel does not believe that any of these outer conditions really 
matter in the scientific history of philosophy he is doing. He writes,  
 
                                                
115 The book of Diogenes Laërtius (De vilis, &c., Philoss. lib. x., ed. Meibom. e. notis Menagii, Amstel. 1692) is 
an important compilation, and yet it brings forward copious evidence without much discrimination. A 
philosophic spirit cannot be ascribed to it ; it rambles about amongst bad anecdotes extraneous to the matter in 
hand. For the lives of Philosophers, and here and there for their tenets, it is useful.” Ch. 1, Period I, division I of 
LHP. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpearlygreek-intro.htm 
116 Marx wrote, “To be sure, Hegel has on the whole correctly defined the general aspects of the above-mentioned 
systems. But in the admirably great and bold plan of his history of philosophy, from which alone the history of 
philosophy can in general be dated, it was impossible, on the one hand, to go into detail, and on the other hand, 
the giant thinker was hindered by his view of what he called speculative thought par excellence from recognising in 
these systems their great importance for the history of Greek philosophy and for the Greek mind in general. 
These systems are the key to the true history of Greek philosophy. A more profound indication of their 
connection with Greek life can be found in the essay of my friend Köppen, Friedrich der Grosse und seine 
Widersacher.” Forward to The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Marx-Engels 
Collected Works Volume 1. Progress Publishers. 1902 
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In the progress of Greek philosophy men were formerly accustomed to follow the 
order that showed, according to ordinary ideas, an external connection, and which is 
found in one philosopher having had another as his teacher — this connection is one 
which might show him to be partly derived from Thales and partly from Pythagoras. 
But such a connection is in part defective in itself, and in part it is merely external. The 
one set of philosophic sects, or of philosophers classed together, which is considered as 
belonging to a system — that which proceeds from Thales — pursues its course in time 
and mind far separate from the other. But, in truth, no such series ever does exist in 
this isolation, nor would it do so even though the individuals were consecutive and had 
been externally connected as teacher and taught, which never is the case; mind follows 
quite another order. These successive series are interwoven in spirit just as much as in 
their particular content. 
 
What matters is whether or not a style of philosophy is properly idealist. If it is too concerned 
with objects, it is misguided and not oriented toward the truth. In the passage above, Hegel 
suggests that things like geography and chronology are secondary, since Spirit operates on a 
different plane and merely expresses itself in these secondary appearances. Therefore, in the 
West, a philosophical position can be considered a kind of worldview, one that can be adopted 
at any time or place by any person. Thus, Hegel’s doxography of Western philosophy tells us 
that we all have a bit of Democritus in us, all of us can fall into the same mistakes as Epicurus, 
so we should familiarize ourselves with their blunders in order not to perpetuate them. The 
individuals of Western philosophy are metaphorical, each movement signifies a different 
phase in the flowering of Spirit. However, geography is significant when we talk about non-
Western thought:  
The geographical distinction makes its appearance in the manifestation of Thought, in 
the fact that, with the Orientals a sensuous, material side is dominant, and in the west, 
Thought, on the contrary, prevails, because it is constituted into the principle in the 
form of thought. Those philosophers who turned to the east knew the absolute in a real 
determination of nature, while towards Italy there is the ideal determination of the 
absolute. These explanations will be sufficient for us here; but Empedocles, whom we 
find in Sicily, is somewhat of a natural philosopher, while Gorgias, the Sicilian sophist, 
remains faithful to the ideal side. 
 
Thus, geographical details are unimportant, except metaphorically, since the “East” represents 
a dividing line on the other side of which lies pure opacity. At least when presenting the 
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doxography of the West, Hegel is informed by substantial historical documentation and the 
facts that he culls from them give his history of philosophy the air of authority. We might not 
even ask ourselves why he continually blurs the lines between philosophy as earthly and 
embodied by people in terrestrial places, and philosophy as floating Idea, and as the things of 
the world as metaphors pointing to it. But his presentation of Asian and African thought 
makes it very clear that everything Hegel says about a people or a movement, or an event are 
only metaphors and that they should not be confused with anything on earth.  
 When we get to the Orient, Hegel does not even bother with details to give a semblance 
of authority. He writes,  
The first Philosophy in order is the so-called Oriental, which, however, does not enter 
into the substance or range of our subject as represented here. Its position is 
preliminary, and we only deal with it at all in order to account for not treating of it at 
greater length, and to show in what relation it stands to Thought and to true 
Philosophy.  
 
After such an introduction, Hegel whole doxographical method changes. Gone are the 
biographical details of those who represent different styles of thought. He reassures the reader 
of his doxography that non-Europe need only be known as a giant abstraction, a dumping 
ground for everything foolish: “It is true of the Chinese as well as of the Indians that they have 
a great reputation for culture; but this, as well as the amount of Indian literature which exists, 
has largely diminished through a further knowledge of it.”117 He therefore, does the work of 
debunking Oriental claims of knowledge, citing the household names of Confucius, Buddha, 
and Lao Tzu, and he paraphrases Henry Thomas Colebrooke’s On the Religion and Philosophy of 
the Hindus regarding the Sāmkhya philosophy of Kānada and the Nyāya philosophy of Gotama. 
There is no discussion of any of the dozens of other schools of Hindu and Buddhist thought in 
Asia, including the many idealist schools that may have complicated his ultimate conclusion 
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that, “The Idea has not become objective in the Indian Philosophy; hence the external and 
objective has not been comprehended in accordance with the Idea. This is the deficiency in 
Orientalism”(146). 
 Is there any other way to do the history of philosophy? How else can we look critically 
at all the possible stances we could take in philosophy? If we have a position, then aren’t all 
others simply mistakes leading up to the right one? Do any other models, perhaps from Asia, 
suggest an alternative way of doing doxography?  
 Fortunately, the Asian tradition I am most familiar with, that of Indo-Tibetan 
Buddhism, has a rich doxographical literature going back for more than a thousand years. In 
the early centuries of the millennium, there were immense stakes in defending your own 
position against competing views. Public debates were frequent, and if your opponent soundly 
beat you, the institution with which you were affiliated may be contractually obligated to 
forfeit its resources to the victor. There were always political ramifications. Joseph Walser, in 
his study of the most illustrious Buddhist philosopher of all time, Nāgārjuna, writes, “By 
refuting these opponents, Nāgārjuna secures an alliance with his spectator audience and 
thereby secures a place for Mahāyāna within their monastery.”118 Later on with the rise in 
importance of publication, these debates were often waged on paper, enabling philosophers to 
engage with each other from thousands of miles away. In Tibet, the most talented and 
charismatic writers were able establish veritable philosophical empires around monasteries 
housing hundreds of thousands of monks nuns, and affiliated lay people.  
 The standard format of their doxographical texts was similar to a history of philosophy 
as we know them in the west. Since western colonialism never penetrated Tibet, and since its 
                                                                                                                                                       
117 Hegel. Lectures on the History of Philosophy.Lincoln: Nebraska, 1995. p. 119 
118 Walser, Joseph. Nagārjuna in Context.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 
 155 
cultural exchanges with China were extremely limited, Tibetan writers knew even less about 
the outside world than Hegel did. Fortunately they limited their doxographies to the 
philosophies of India and their country. Like Hegel, they took a straw man approach, usually 
starting with the most well-known non-Buddhist traditions of India. Their arguments would 
be paraphrased and caricatured, refuted, and the author would move on to the “lower” schools 
of Buddhist thought. This method, nearly indistinguishable from Hegel’s continues until the 
author presents his own position as the one that corrects all errors and arrives at the absolute 
truth.  
 As with Hegel, each of the schools that these doxographies (Tibetan: grub mtha’)  deals 
with are transparently oversimplified. The authors of them are also not always immune to the 
kind of absolute claims that Hegel makes against competing philosophies. For example, the 
great scholar and philosopher of nineteenth century Tibet, Mipham, writes,  
The beliefs of the five tarka systems and of the Vedanta are knitted together in a web 
of darkness. But no one in the world, not even a god, is able to overturn the ultimate 
nature of things. No words, no theories can conceal this nature, any more than dry 
tinder wrapped around a piece of incandescent metal. The ultimate nature itself 
destroys all false tenets.119  
 
This representative passage suggests that Tibetan doxography cannot be distinguished from 
Hegel’s in terms of authorial conviction, or even qualitatively, since Mipham’s statement 
seems about on par with Hegel’s idealism. Nor can we necessarily claim that Mipham’s 
doxography is less militant than Hegel. In fact, it might be even more so:  
With regard to other traditions, if they do no harm to the Buddhadharma, they should 
simply be left alone. As it is said in the Chandrapradipa-sutra:  
Have no hatred for the non-believers 
That you find established in this world. 
Instead regard them with compassion.  
Let this be the first sign of your forbearance.  
                                                
119 Mipham. Commentary to The Adornment of the Middle Way by Shantarakshita. Boston: Shambhala, 2005. p. 232. 
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On the other hand, one should not delight in them, for then one would be an idiot 
preferring brackish water to the amrita of the gods. Especially for those who sincerely 
uphold the tradition of the great abbot Shantarakshita, the teachings of the Buddha 
Shakyamuni, it would be quite out of place to show enthusiasm for them. For 
Shantarakshita was the the one who proscribed the teachings of the Bonpos,120 and 
they consequently looked upon him as their enemy.121 
 
As this quote shows, Tibetan doxographies have an unambiguous political element. In his 
doctoral dissertation on Tibetan doxography, Albion Butters writes,  
Because value structures in Tibet were also inextricably linked with religious concerns, 
the role of grub mtha’ [doxography] in that country’s larger socio-political power 
dynamic must not be disregarded. Being classified together with other heterodox view 
at times led to serious repercussions in the socio-political sphere.122 
 
He continues with the following analysis:  
One might argue that, by default, all doxographies achieve their ends by means of a 
violent or “tyrannical appropriation of the systems that they treat… As Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith notes, “every comprehensive Weltenschaung, insofar as it achieves the 
coherence at which is aims, therein reduces every alternative one: misunderstanding, 
distorting, its neighbors’ world-view.”…  
 According to a popular rubric of social anthropology, power is derived from the 
reinterpretation of different types of values—be they cultural, social, or economic. As 
Bourdieu put it, “What is at stake in the struggles about the meaning of the social 
world is power over the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of the 
representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization: 
the evocative power of an utterance which puts things in a different light.”  
 To a great extent, doxographies are metanarratives. Grounded in a critical analysis 
of belief systems, doxographies are supposed to be unbiased and accurate. Like 
metanarratives, they also both work with determinate facts at an unequivocal limit of 
meaning where it is assumed that objective readers will come to the same conclusion as 
the author… (89).  
 
 Is there any way around this consequence of classification and criticism, which is the model 
of both doxography and the history of philosophy? If we wish to avoid such political and 
political implications, how can we use criticism in a more productive, and less destructive 
                                                
120 The indigenous religion of Tibet, which Buddhism displaced. 
121 Mipham p. 233 
122 Butters, Albion. Doctoral dissertation: The Doxographical Genuis of Kun mkhyen kLong chen rab ‘byams pa. 
Columbia University 2006. UMI Dissertation Services. This quotation continues to give an example of a Tibetan 
philosopher, Bo dong Pan chen, whose view were linked to a philosophy that had been proscribed (gzhan stong) 
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way? Butters adds that although there are both political motivations and consequences of the 
doxographical text he is analyzing, Tibetan doxography generally,  
balances the hegemonic apparatus with an awareness that the ‘inferior’ views have 
their own role to play in the spiritual development of people on the path… By 
presenting in sufficient detail the greater scope of Buddhist philosophical thought, grub 
mtha’ texts provide practitioners with an opportunity to reference their current 
position against an entire series of views. It is at this level of reading doxography that 
personal evolution is possible (90).  
 
It is this last suggestion—that doxography can be read in a way that is personally 
transformative—that I believe is important. Even if a doxography is blatantly political and 
biased toward an eventual winner, which they are by their very structure, there is a difference 
between being purely dismissive of “inferior” views, and in genuinely engaging with them. 
Hegel’s history of philosophy (and general history of the world) does not encourage the 
reader to have a go at each of the world-views being adumbrated. His list of philosophies is 
not an invitation to actively climb a spiritual ladder toward the most true and most profound, 
one arrives at the highest level by purely extrinsic circumstances: if you are born at the right 
time in the right place, you happen to be a handmaiden to the Truth unfolding itself through 
you. If you are white and born into a Christian community, you’ve already arrived. Even 
better if you are German. Skepticism, stoicism, Judaism and so forth needn’t be traveled 
through on the level of individual phenomenology; timeless Spirit has already done that for 
you earlier in history. From one’s present, serendipitous position at the peak of history, it 
suffices to look at earlier and other modes of thinking with an interpretive glance rather to 
engage in them first hand. When presenting other philosophies, seldom does Hegel give 
anything resembling a summary of their own arguments. He may have gone through them 
                                                                                                                                                       
by the most powerful Buddhist lineage in Tibet (the Geluk). As a result, that philosopher’s followers were 
disbanded and their resources appropriated (p. 89). 
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himself, but he does not invite his audience to do the same. Instead, he provides us with an 
abstract interpretation of their views:  
Now if Cynicism made reality for consciousness the fact of being immediately natural 
(where immediate naturalness was the simplicity of the individual, so that he is 
independent and, in the manifold movement of desire, of enjoyment, of holding many 
things to be reality, and of working for the same, really keeps up the external simple 
life) the Stoic elevation of this simplicity into thought consists in the assertion, not that 
immediate naturalness and spontaneity is the content and the form of the true Being of 
consciousness, but that the rationality of nature is grasped through thought, so that 
everything is true or good in the simplicity of thought.   
 
But philosophies are more than artifacts to be spoken of as if their time has passed. They can 
be taken up at any point, their logics followed, and their insights seen clearly in the mind’s 
eye. The stoic, cynic, and epicurean perspectives can be traversed and assimilated to lead to 
new philosophical perspectives. Thus, the terms that name philosophical movements are 
metaphorical references for possible phenomenological experiences, which should not be 
confused with real people in real places.  
 In an essay about Tibetan doxography, Jeffrey Hopkins claims that the genre has a very 
specific and efficient didactic role for Tibetans. Like the history of philosophy in the West, 
they introduce the student to the diversity of opinions in the world and get them to evaluate 
them critically. Of course, influenced by their teachers and institutions, Tibetan students start 
with the presupposition that there is a highest truth, but they accept that they are not ready to 
be exposed to it yet. The “lower systems” are considered rungs on a ladder. Only after truly 
appreciating the perspective of a particular system, inhabiting it for a time, can you move up 
the ladder to a more subtle and profound view. After each perspective is grasped, a skillful 
teacher introduces the student to a flaw in it, and then guides them to find out how another 
perspective corrects such a flaw. Hopkins explains,  
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Systems of tenets, therefore, are primarily studied not to refute other systems but to 
develop an internal force that can counteract one’s own innate adherence to 
misapprehensions. These innate forms of ignorance are part and parcel of ordinary life. 
They are not just learned from other systems, nor do they just arise from faulty 
analysis. Thus the stated aim of studying the different schools of philosophy is to gain 
insight into the fact that many of the perspectives basic to ordinary life are devoid of a 
valid foundation. This leads the adept to then replace these with well-founded 
perspectives.123   
 
For these purposes, simplification and condensation are permitted. For example, many sub-
schools of thinking are often reduced to a single theme they all have in common. Also, some 
schools are linked to ideas or movements they themselves would probably object to. Hopkins 
adds, “This pretended amalgamation of many schools into one is a technique used to avoid 
unnecessary complexity that might hinder the main purpose of this genre of exegesis…”(175). 
In his memoir of his career as a scholar in a Tibetan monastic university, Georges Dreyfus 
analyzes the purpose of debating various philosophical positions, which he practiced for 
thousands of hours. To many outsiders, Tibetan debates looks like dry and formal exercise in 
rote learning and repetition. But Dreyfus describes how the practice of debate is designed to 
keep the student's mind constantly active, never reposing into an intransigent position of 
certainty. Remembering his teacher, Dreyfus writes,  
Gen Nyi-ma would use debate as a way to undermine students' attempts to stop the 
investigation and fasten on any one answer, especially the traditional one. In this way, 
he was illustrating the full potential of the practice as a mode of inquiry, not just a 
useful pedagogical tool… Debate develops the ability to explore ideas and take a 
stance while keeping in mind the fragility and uncertainty of those ideas… Only long 
intellectual training can lead us to realize that the questions raised by debate are worth 
thinking about not because they bring final clarity but because they oblige us to grow 
by relinquishing our tendency to cling to ideas.124  
  
                                                
123 Hopkins, Jeffrey. “The Tibetan Genre of Doxography.” from Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre. Ithaca: Snow 
Lion, 1996. p.171 
124 Dreyfus, Georges. The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: the education of a Tibetan monk. Berkeley: University of 
California, 2003. p.288 
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What to make of the many examples of explicit political motivation, prejudice, and downright 
nastiness in Tibetan doxographical and polemical texts125? I suggest they are examples of the 
prerogatives of highly influential authors with a lot at stake in their writings. Until very 
recently, it was extremely difficult all over the world to gain access to publishing. You had to 
be very well connected and you had to have a substantial population interested enough in 
your work to make it worth all the trouble of putting it to press. In Tibet this even involved 
the painstaking and expensive process of carving of wood blocks. Therefore, in general, only 
those who had already built their intellectual careers through teaching and institution building 
found their way into print. This explains a lot about many of the politically aggressive 
statements that you find in Tibetan texts. The authors had their reputations at stake, and 
those reputations were the foundation of control over vast resources and hundreds of 
thousands of followers. The softer, seemingly ecumenical attitude that Hopkins describes is 
not another invention of a utopian western convert to Tibetan Buddhism, but a common 
teaching in the Tibetan Buddhism’s extremely important oral tradition. These oral teachings 
generally overlook the political element of the canonical texts, often whitewashing them as 
“skillful means,” and it is very common for a lecturer to emphasize how dangerous and 
misguided it is to externalize the opponent of a polemic, or to disrespect the so-called “lower” 
traditions of a doxography. What the terms of a doxography represent are your own 
tendencies to hold mistaken views as correct. When we criticize non-contemporaries or those 
who are not around to defend themselves, we should be rooting out our own potential to make 
the mistakes that we are calling out.  
                                                
125 For example, the brilliant philosopher of the Sakya lineage, Gorampa, regularly addresses the earlier great 
Gelug philosopher, Tsongkhapa, with highly abusive epithets. 
 161 
 For Hegel, European populations have already, by proxy of previous generations, gone 
through the spiritual progressions represented by various philosophical movements. Whatever 
was represented by terms like cynics, skeptics, stoics etc., has been incorporated into more 
recent evolutionary movements, snowballing together with Christianity and the French 
Revolution to lead up to the acme of human development that is represented by his own time 
and place. Those Greco-Romans are not really around anymore. In this sense Hegel himself 
takes cynics, skeptics, and stoics to be metaphorical; they represent innate philosophical 
tendencies, but ones that were collectively overcome through history; they don’t need to be 
grappled with all the time. Who loses out, however, are those who are still around: the Jews, 
Africans, Asians, and other Others. Those terms don’t denote distant movements or innate 
universal tendencies; they denote real people in real places, and thus, they suffer the political 
and social consequences of Hegel’s doxography and influence. Hegel does not engage any of 
the arguments put forth by these Others themselves. Rather, he treats them as fictional 
people, making up what they say and placing them at the bottom of the teleological 
evolutionary mountain. He does not acknowledge that he is only talking in metaphors and 
that the people he is talking about do not really exist. Unfortunately for them these metaphors 





If Eurocentrism stands on the foundation I have tried to expose, in what other ways does it 
express itself? Clearly, race has plenty to do with it, but race is only one element in the 
complicated aggregate of what we call Culture.126 Religion is another major element, and we 
have seen how it is at least partly responsible for the teleological orientation of Eurocentrism. 
Thus, clearly Eurocentricity opposes itself to the conceptual content of heterogeneous 
religious (atheistic, polytheistic etc.) and philosophical systems, but it is also important to 
remember that those foreign modes of thinking most likely convey themselves in foreign styles 
of presentation. These also become targets in the competition to guard canons and write 
history.  
 Andrew Nicholson, an Indologist working at SUNY, presented a paper in April 2012 
at the Columbia Seminar for Comparative Philosophy that analyzes literary style as a major 
factor in the marginalization of non-European philosophical texts in the contemporary 
academy. He argues that the form and content of philosophy are more bound to each other 
than people often admit. The consequence of this relationship is that when philosophers 
(especially of the “professional” ilk) are confronted with texts that conform to unrecognized or 
unaccepted literary conventions, the content of the philosophy itself is often denied.  
 In the West, philosophy conforms to two literary genres: the monograph and the 
journal article. Of course there are notable exceptions, such as the Nietzschean aphorism or 
                                                
126 A notoriously difficult word to define, but we can use Geertz’s famous definition as an example. For Geertz, 
culture is ““an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
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Sartre and Camus’ philosophical fiction, but this general fact is difficult to refute. In fact, the 
range of philosophical styles, if anything, has become even more pinched since the time of 
Nietzsche, with very few forays into truly experimental and original stylistic philosophy. For 
example, Alfonso Lingis may be credited with stylistic freedom, but his influence has 
remained minimal and he is often dismissed because of the his style, deemed unserious by 
“serious academics.”127 Nicholson opens his essay with the hypothesis that “had philosophical 
conventions developed differently, Donald Davidson might have presented his ideas in 
dialogue form, or Quine might have written rhymed couplets.”128 I take this statement as 
support for my own formulation of history as contingent. Philosophical styles like the 
monograph and the journal article did not come to dominate western philosophy because they 
had some ontological code impelling them; their rise is complicated and their stories are 
deeply connected with the history of the romantic novel, the economics of publishing, the 
politics of peer-review and tenure committees etc.129 We are already seeing, at least in this 
                                                                                                                                                       
knowledge about and their attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973d:89).     1973d    Religion As a Cultural System. 
In The Interpretation of Cultures. Pp. 87-125. New York: Basic Books. 
127 For example: Jackson, Peter A. “Spurning Alphonso Lingis’ Thai ‘Lust’: The Perils of a Philosopher at 
Large.” Intersections: Gender, History and culture in the Asian Context. Issue 2, May 1999. 
128 Nicholson, Andrew J. (forthcoming 2013).  Dialogue and Genre in Indian Philosophy: 
Gītā, Polemic, and Doxography.  In Dialogue and Early South Asian Religions: Reading the Sources (first 
book in the series “Dialogues in South Asian Traditions: Religion, Philosophy, Literature, and 
History,” series editors Brian Black and Laurie L. Patton).  Hampshire: Ashgate Press. Thanks to 
Andrew Nicholson for providing a rough draft of the essay. 
129 Harman has written many opinions of the issue of open-access publishing:  
“Bottom line: there are an increasing number of independent scholars out there who, unlike many of us, 
do not have university positions and university library staffs able to get us copies of just about any 
article on interlibrary loan. The idea that they should pay a $35 fee to read one of my articles is 
ridiculous.And why did I ever agree to publish in a journal that has such conditions? Simple: I was 
working within a tenure/promotion system where those sorts of journals have more credibility with 
faculty and administrative committees who were judging my work. But now, for me… who cares what 
they think? The academic freedom that comes with tenure (and now full professorship) is not supposed 
to be merely hypothetical. Nor does it only mean that I can criticize capitalism if I want. It also means 
that I can publish wherever I want, based on speed of publication, and based on audience 
characteristsics, rather than on what might impress a group of older university colleagues because of the 
conditions operative in their own day rather than in mine?” 
- http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2012/06/28/a-readers-views-about-the-idea-of-self-publishing-
everything-other-than-books/. And:  
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essay, the estimation short and medium blog posts as legitimate philosophical forms—perhaps 
a new kind of pseudo-aphorism—and the inexorable growth of electronic media in all 
academic and literary fields is very likely to be accompanied by a proliferation of new styles 
that take advantage of new media. Thus, to think of western philosophy’s literary style (or 
lack thereof) as some teleological realization is foolishness.  
Yet this assumption is a big part of why non-European philosophy continues to be 
marginalized. Nicholson writes “This, I believe, is one of the biggest obstacles to having Asian 
philosophy recognized as philosophy per se—the texts of philosophers in India and China just 
do not look like the sorts of texts that students of philosophy…are trained to read”(1). In 
contrast to someone like philosopher-of-mind Antony Flew’s insistence that philosophy is 
defined by strict adherence to explicit argument, Nicholson cites a passage from Parmenides 
poem On Nature, which offers virtually nothing in the way of explicit argument. Rather, the 
text “takes the form of a supernatural being addressing mortals and exhorting them to think in 
a certain way”(2). This approach, Nicholson shows, is typical of many Indian texts such as the 
Bhagavad Gītā, and it lasted much longer as a literary style in India than it did in the West. In 
fact, in Sanskrit literature, the gītā is a distinct genre that follows self-conscious conventions, 
such as the use of a supernatural interlocutor.  
Next, Nicholson summarizes another distinct genre of Indian philosophical text, which he 
classifies as “polemic, and which generally follow a structure developed by the Mīmaṃsā 
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school that was based on a systematic hermeneutics of the Vedas.130 These texts resemble 
Socratic dialogues insofar as they take dialogue form, however, they abide by different 
philosophical rules. For example, philosophical cliffhangers are not permitted. When Plato 
and his friends fail to agree on a definition of Justice, they embrace the ambiguity and move 
on. However, in the polemical texts of the Mīmaṃsā and the Nyāya, failure to advance a 
superior argument after criticizing other arguments wold result in a merely “‘destructive 
argument’ (vitaṇdā), the lowest of the three types of debates in their typology”(12).131    
The third type of text from Indian literature that Nicholson believes has been ignored is 
doxography. As discussed in the last chapter, Nicholson points out that Indian 
doxographies—the earliest being a Tamil text from the sixth century—are not so different 
from Hegel’s history of philosophy in that they present a series of philosophical systems, each 
correcting the one before it, and ending up with the truest and most sublime philosophy of the 
author. It would be interesting to see further studies in Indian doxography as a genre—which 
flourished since the sixth century—compared to what we call the “history of philosophy” in 
the West, the original conception of which we credit Hegel.  
 After these discussions of genre, Nicholson asks whether they can be considered 
properly philosophical. Just like the texts of the ancient Cynics, they can only be called 
                                                
130 The texts take the form of a dialogue between a teacher and student, and the structure is usually divided into 
five sections: 1) topic (viṣaya). 2) doubt (saṃdeha). 3) prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa). 4) response (uttarapakṣa). 5) 
final decision (nirnaya). 
131 Not addressed in Nicholson’s paper is the famous antipode to this standard developed by the Buddhist 
philosopher Nāgārjuna in his radical system of “absurd consequences” (skt: prasaṅgika). Nāgārjuna argues for the 
universality of emptiness; that is, all things, without exception, do not possess an autonomous, sui generus core 
or demonstrable essence. Given the universality of his claim, it also applies to his own thesis. Contemporary 
Nāgārjunist, Jan Westerhoff sums it up:  
“Nāgārjuna claims that he does not have any thesis himself. This does not amount to the paradoxical 
claim of someone asserting that he is not asserting anything. What Nāgārjuna wants to say is that he 
does not hold any substantially existent thesis, that is, any thesis which is to be supplied with a realist 
semantics that spells out meaning and truth in terms of correspondence with a mind-independent reality. 
The Mādhyamika will have to interpret his statements in terms of a purely convention-based semantics 
in order to avoid reintroducing substantially existent objects by the back door.”  
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philosophical if our definition of philosophy includes more than Flew’s demand for explicit 
argumentation. Nicholson refers to Pierre Hadot’s influential distinction between proper 
philosophy and the work of the Cynics, which is a distinction between theory (philosophy) 
and practice (“only a way of life”).132 It is interesting to note that the “way of life” argument is 
also often made in modern times for Buddhism, which people hesitate to call a religion—
because of how different it is from the Abrahamic traditions, its general atheism—and can’t 
call a philosophy proper because it still maintains a number of supernatural elements, such as 
belief in reincarnation. Hadot doesn’t count Cynicism as a philosophy not for its supernatural 
beliefs, but because it  
was exclusively a choice of life: it was the choice of freedom… Such choice obviously 
implied a certain conception of life; but this conception, which was probably defined in 
conversations between the master and disciple or in public speeches, was never 
directly justified in theoretical philosophical treatises (109).  
 
In the later Western world, this approach of the Cynics was absorbed into religious mysticism, 
or later on, was able to express itself as artistic antinomianism; but this style of semi-
philosophical living—where life is informed by intellectual concepts, but those concepts are 
means to a more important end—is carried on to this day in most of the non-Western world: 
the Indian sādhu and Tibetan wandering yōgin, for example. If the Cynics are not 
philosophers, Nicholson asks the important question, “What if the problem is that we mean 
something different by philosophy than the ancient Greeks did?”(19). Clearly, he notes, non-
Cynic ancient Greeks considered them to be philosophers, according to their own 
doxographies. Also, medieval Indian doxographies like the influential Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 
(Compendium of Philosophical Systems) happily list India’s Cynic-like antinomians, the Pāśupatas, 
among the “four [great] wisdoms” of the world (19). The issue then, is not that these pre-
                                                                                                                                                       
- Westerhoff, Jan. The Dispeller of Disputes. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. p 12. 
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modern texts are unphilosophical. Rather, it is the professors in our modern philosophy 
departments who are often not doing philosophy in the traditional sense of the word.” That 
sense, of course, is philo-sophia, love of wisdom. To drive this point home, Nicholson cites 
analytic philosopher Colin McGinn’s 2012 New York Times article133 that proposes we abandon 
the word philosophy, precisely because it implies a concern for figuring out some “way of life” 
that is better than others. Instead, he proposes “ontics,” which would put things like 
philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, on par with natural sciences, while softer 
disciplines like ethics and aesthetics could remain in the humanities and keep the name 
philosophy if they like.  
 McGinn’s view shows a striking compartmentalization of the branches of philosophy, as 
if metaphysics and ethics have no effect on each other. It seems to me that every great 
metaphysician worked hard on their metaphysics because they believed it would affect the 
way that people act. If your metaphysics holds to an eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient 
God/Creator, that worldview will undoubtedly inform the actions you make in life. If your 
metaphysics is stubbornly immanent, if you are limited to the here and now, this will also 
change the way you live. If your metaphysics describes the universe as the expression of a 
primordial code, you may adopt a teleological view of history and the political and intellectual 
biases that go along with that. If the world is a display of contingent, spontaneous restlessness, 
then you may be headed in some other direction, perhaps deeper into your body, perhaps into 
new relationships to the stuff of the world. However, McGinn thinks that such 
transformations shouldn’t concern contemporary philosophers, or at least that they are 
premature until we get to definitive “knowledge of abstract theoretical matters” as if this 
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133 McGinn, Colin. “Philosophy by Another Name.” New York Times, Opinionator section. March 4, 2012 
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entire quest is carried in a disembodied realm, and as if the abstract will have no relation to its 
concrete correlate.  
 Nicholson’s concludes with the following remark:  
If McGinn is correct—and he certainly seems to be on to something—then we can say 
with some relief that texts like the Bhagavad Gīta and Parmenides’ On Nature are 
probably not philosophical after all. Perhaps by exploring new modes of expression 
and cultivating a philosophical orientation toward our daily lives, someday we may join 
Parmenides and Diogenes in being able to call ourselves philosophers too (20).  
  
This is precisely what Nietzsche did. Finding the state of philosophy severely lacking, 
Nietzsche abandoned the vapid structures and conventions of the dominant Western canon, 
instead developing his own vital, acerbic, and poetic style whose originality put him on the 
margins, but whose brilliance ensured its irruption into the canon. Nietzsche himself had no 
problem calling himself a Cynic, seeing it as a noble way of thinking far superior to the craven 
dogmatism at the heart of nearly every other world-historical creed134. Ian Cutler argues 
convincingly in his book Cynicism from Diogenes to Dilbert,135 that Nietzsche can be considered a 
Cynic par excellence for many reasons, including his stylistic incorporation of autobiographical 
sketches and political incorrectness, as well as his overriding concern with philosophy as a 
life-transforming, almost ascetic practice. It was Nietzsche’s aim to revive the cynical-
pāśupatin concern with living, immanently, and to provide an alternative to the empty vaults of 
the dominant idealist canon.  
 Against the Hegelian vision of a teleological history of philosophy and the world, 
Nietzsche saw the world as merely happening, and philosophies that try to organize it into 
events constituting a metaphysical historical hierarchy were to him patent dogmatisms. Unlike 
Flew, Nietzsche saw the glorification of explicit dialectics as a perversion of rigorous and 
                                                
134 In section three of “Why I Write Such Good Books” in Ecce Homo, he writes that his books “achieve the 
highest thing achievable on earth, cynicism.” - Nietzsche 1989: 264. 
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imaginative philosophical thinking. Socrates and Plato marked a sinkhole in the history of 
philosophy, not an inauguration of the category. In the Socratic impulse to universalize virtue 
and morality via argument, philosophy became cerebration, it looked to the skies and became 
the pastime of wan hermits (Christian monks, Kant etc.). Thoughts of virtue and the proper 
way to live split away from any thought of where one lives, where philosophy and life play out. 
He writes, “In praxi, this means that moral judgments are torn from their conditionality, in 
which they have grown and alone possess any meaning, from their Greek-political ground and 
soil, to be naturalized under the pretense of sublimation.”136 When philosophy changed and 
skepticism was deemed an immature stance afraid of commitment, this was not an advance. 
Rather, it signifies a calcification of thought into dogma. Seeking to prove the truth, every 
argument starts with digging in the heels. The post-skeptic philosopher has an epistemological 
claim or fantasy that he feels duty bound, or perhaps simply wants to convince us of137, and he 
assures himself that his skill in argumentation need only live up to the veracity of his 
epistemological breakthrough. With the dialectical method, philosophy became something like  
target shooting: the goal is in sight and the task is clear. Either you settle the matter and 
convince a good many people, or you fail as a thinker. Thesis, sentence, paragraph, 
conclusion: these are the perfect forms to accomplish such an aim, as Western philosophy for 
the past two millennia has proved.  
 However, what of the person (can we even say “philosopher” here?) who feels within 
them a “Profound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one total view of the world? 
Fascination of the opposing point of view” refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the 
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enigmatic.”138 What if one has no single-minded epistemological revelation to prove? What if 
one wants simply to reintegrate theory and practice and would like for reading and writing to 
be one means among many for doing that? To fold our philosophy into our life practice, it is 
essential to have access to alternative forms of expression, something that may have an 
unexpected aesthetic impact. We have to question why we have been offered so few forms of 
expression and why the ones we have access to now are said to be the best. This starts with 
interrogating the established history of philosophy with all of its teleological presuppositions. 
Nietzsche, backs up his innovative style with a theoretical justification against the kind of 
teleology that would have him bow before canonical forms of writing:  
Against determinism and teleology.— From the fact that something ensues regularly and 
ensues calculably, it does not follow that it ensues necessarily. That a quantum of force 
determines and conducts itself in every particular case in one way and manner does 
not make if into and “unfree will.” “Mechanical necessity” is not a fact: it is we who 
first interpret it into events. We have interpreted the formulatable character of events 
as the consequence of a necessity that rules over events. But from the fact that I do a 
certain thing, it by no means follows that I am compelled to do it. Compulsion in things 
certainly cannot be demonstrated: the rule proves only that one and the same event is 
not another event as well. Only because we have introduced subjects, “doers,” into 
things does it appear that all events are the consequences of compulsion exerted upon 
subjects—exerted by whom? again by a “doer.” Cause and effect—a dangerous 
concept so long as one thinks of something that causes and something upon which an 
effect is produced.  
 a. Necessity is not a fact but an interpretation.139  
 
As I have argued throughout this essay, the first place to apply this critique of teleology is in 
the area of history. Once the thread that connects every event in a teleological rosary has been 
cut, the canons that shape out vision of history will open and alternative forms can flourish. 
 One way of cracking open the canons is to engage in a destabilizing “counter-history of 
philosophy.” This has been the project of Michel Onfray, who, in addition to his dozens of 
monographs rehabilitating the integrity of well-known but marginalized Epicurus, 
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Democritus, Diogenes, and Nietzsche, has written seven volumes of his “counter-history of 
philosophy,” and many more are likely forthcoming. His method is relatively straightforward: 
let us simply excavate as many voices as possible from the tombs that the dominant 
historiographers put them in. It is not that we should, in retaliation, try to silence Platonism, 
Christianity, and German Idealism—those traditions are, of course, extremely important—
however, we must recognize that they are not the voice of reason and that they achieved their 
dominant position through complicated games of power, and not always through 
philosophical merit. Simply by acknowledging the existence of a sea of alternative voices 
running parallel to the dominant historiography, and by listening to those voices sincerely, we 
open ourselves up to different ways of seeing things, giving ourselves more resources to 
employ in living and shaping the world. Between the broadcasts of the Platonic megaphone, 
let us listen for the murmurs of Empedocles, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Abderitan atomism, 
Pyrrho, Antisthenes, and Aristippus. In the rests of the Pauline liturgy, let us hear the prayers 
of Carpocrates, Epiphanes, Simon Magus, Valentinus, Bentivegna de Gubbio, Heilwige 
Bloemardinne, Lorenzo Valla, and Pierre Gassendi. Through the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance, let’s not buy into the trope that all that mattered was nee-Aristotelianism, 
Aquinas, and Descartes. Let’s look at Pierre Charron and Montaigne and the roots of 
secularism, free thinking libertines like La Mothe Le Vayer, Saint-Evremond,and Cyrano de 
Bergerac, and the materialists Jean Meslier, La Mettrie, Helvetius, and d’Holbach.140 Such is 
the focus of the curriculum at Onfray’s Popular University of Caen in Normandy, a free 
university he founded in 2006 in Normandy.  
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 We do not study these writers as a mere philological exercise, or to just preserve them as 
entries in history’s catalog. We study them because their visions of the world were profoundly 
different from those who happened to be in power during their era, and it is for this reason 
that they found themselves to a large extent written out of history. Their writings have 
something to offer us, a valuable resource for gaining momentum when mainstream resources 
ring flat. They teach us that the loudest voice is not the only voice, and that we should keep 
our ears tuned for the constant hum of an alternative world, perhaps one right around us, one 
more immanent than the one favored by the establishment. Not only does opening ourselves 
to alternative voices furnish us with valuable resources for thinking and living, it has the 
added political benefits of lifting hushed voices out of isolation and the suffering caused by it. 
For Onfray, with his own personal history and certain areas of expertise, it is important to 
legitimize and rehabilitate hedonism, atheism, and materialism from the centuries of 
reductionism heaped on them at the hands of Plato-Christian-Idealism. But the methodologies 
of Queer Theory and Feminism are based on the same principle; and these two fields have 
been some of the richest, most productive, and most impactful intellectual realms of modern 
times. They are essentially counter-histories that voice what the dominant historiography does 
not want to be heard.  
 All of these counter-histories function by displaying alternative styles and methodologies 
to the ones contained in the dominant canon, once thought exhaustive. An equally effective 
way of doing this, which should be carried out in parallel, is to open the canons to non-
Western sources of ideas. This is important not as an exercise in documenting the world’s 
diversity—though that is an added benefit—but as a way of accessing different styles of 
thinking and expression. A philosophical style, vague as the term is, is a posture toward 
things, a way of approaching them, seeing them, and feeling them. One style can be like 
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handling an object with gloves, another with fine, soft hands, another with the calloused mitts 
of a mason. They are borne by long and deep swells of history that stand behind every author, 
yet they are personal. Talking about Merleau-Ponty’s writing style, which was fully integrated 
with his philosophical method, Harman writes, “Even philosophy, he holds, is less a set of 
arguments than an animating impulse by which a thinker sees the world in a unique 
fashion.”141 As we saw in the previous section on doxography, one can either take the posture 
of a fighter or a dancer toward the world. One can stand firm in hoary forms of expression, 
batting away all comers, or one can adopt new postures and moves, if even briefly, thereby 
embodying a character one may never have met, or may have rejected out of hand. Both these 
moves have personal and political repercussions. The former makes us unsupple, unadaptable, 
unseeing, and certain; everything that has been has led up to us for a reason. By opening the 
canon, through the proliferation of styles and the visions they convey, we see things a new 
way, we see things with others, and accord them and ourselves the dignity of individuals.  
                                                




This essay has been somewhat schizophrenic about Hegel—a document about a love-hate 
relationship. I began by talking about comparative philosophy and the impasse represented by 
Hegel when it comes to taking non-European thinking seriously. Tibebu takes exception to 
those who whitewash Hegel’s historical and social writings, as if they should be pardoned 
because his Logic and Philosophy were so brilliant and profound.142 Such Hegelians tend to 
argue that there are two Hegels, one ontological and the other social/political. Much of what I 
have written may suggest such an approach, since I do agree that his ontological and historical 
writings are as different as night and day, but that he employs his vague and malleable 
metaphysics to the service of his thoroughly misguided political and historical philosophy. His 
historical philosophy needs to be discredited, but the way to do that is not through book 
burning or ad hominem criticism. Many have, and still do claim that Heidegger should be 
purged from the canons of philosophy143 because of his nazism—that his metaphysics must 
have been an engine that led him to his execrable political ideas. However, the vast majority of 
philosophers, even if to their chagrin, believe that the brilliance and radicalness of his writings 
make him a more than worthy figure to think about and against, if not always with. 
Heideggerians now pick up the challenge not of rehabilitating their teacher from his 
unforgivable aspects, but of using his considerable insights as new material for new ways of 
thinking.  
                                                
142 For example, he has little sympathy for Philip Kain’s Hegel and the Other: A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
New York: SUNY, 2005. 
143 For example: Romano, Carlin. “Heil Heidegger!” Chronicle of Higher Education. Oct. 18 2009. 
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 Hegel presents just this same problem. His offenses did not seem egregious until more 
recently, and people like Tibebu have done the noble work of pointing out the severity of his 
damage and the need to go beyond the paradigm he constructed. However, just as with 
Heidegger, it is foolish to reduce any thinker, especially Hegel, to one theme, claiming it to be 
their essence that all other themes point to. At times, Tibebu is guilty of this reductionism, as 
when he roundly criticizes Philip Kain,144 who he reads as saying “that even though Hegel is a 
racist, his work is not all racism. We should throw out the bad, the racism, and keep the good 
in Hegel. There is more good to be had in Hegel than bad”(340). While I think it is 
disingenuous to maintain sympathy with Hegel’s historical philosophy, I do not generally have 
a problem with the take-some-and-leave-some approach to Hegel, or any philosophy. This is 
what we do when we study the history of philosophy, this is what criticism is about, and as I 
alluded to in the early parts of this essay, it should be at the heart of any comparative 
methodology. Accepting and discarding, putting things together, evaluating, blowing them up 
again, and on and on—this is philosophical method. That said, I believe unequivocally that his 
historical philosophy should be entirely rubbished. Tibebu exposes Hegel’s deep racism and 
the racist legacy that he left behind, to which so many Eurocentrists adhere to with no self-
awareness, and this exposé is absolutely necessary for waking people up to the roots of 
Eurocentrism and the way that it affects canon-formation, social norms, and politics. A 
similarly pointed exposé should attack the noxious affects of Hegel’s theism. But theism and 
racism, I believe, have a more fundamental cause, which is teleology. And so it it Hegel’s 
essential teleology I have tried to expose and criticize. However, I am not interested in or 
willing to reduce all of Hegel’s philosophy to this, my least favorite of its aspects. Getting rid 
of his racism, theism, and teleology, what is left is empty space, negativity and whirling 
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restlessness. These are the metaphysical conditions in which things can come about without a 
teleological maker and without reliance on human perception. Rejecting teleology and the 
ontological hierarchies that invariably attend it, appreciating objects and people as individuals 
and as actors in networks, only then will we be on the road to open canons and open minds. 
Carl Woese, describing the outdatedness of microbiology’s evolutionary tree, writes that we 
must do a better job of understanding the variety of organisms and “Only then can living 
systems finally be conceptualized in discreet, ideosyncratic species terms.”145  
 Tibebu is naïve when he says “As someone who professed to follow the teachings of 
Jesus regarding love, peace, and reconciliation, Hegel had all that he needed to place himself 
outside the camp of racism and bigotry of his era”(xxvii). It would be fascinating to see a list 
of people in the history of Christianity who lived up to this seemingly easy standard. It is the 
talk of a Christian cravenly insisting on the nobility of his bias, which is inherently teleological 
and thus metaphysically wrong and socially dangerous. If we are to get beyond the 
Eurocentrist paradigm, we must start with teleology, and Hegel is only one prominent 
representative of long and powerful lineage.  
 To bring this back to my starting point of speculating on academic Eurocentrism and a 
comparative methodology that can get out of it… The answer to the monstrous history that 
Hegel constructs, and the institutions that crystallized around it is not to simply replace it with 
a contrasting system. People with an affinity a more dominant philosophy need not renounce 
those systems and become madhyamikas or Epicureans. However, they ought to take enough 
steps to bring their tightly help presuppositions under real criticism. Sometimes an effective 
way to do this is to inoculate our prejudices with destabilizing principles from other cultures. 
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But they must be taken seriously and not set up to be knocked down because they lack the 
necessary pedigree. The point is to engender new possibilities of seeing old problems.  
 Comparative philosophy began as a historical project, where Orientalists sought to 
document more of the diversity of the world's ideas. Eventually (and my remarks here are 
limited to the area of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism)—especially since the 1970's increasing access 
to communities of people who actually live and practice different styles of philosophy and 
religion—erstwhile philologists and ethnographers began to convert with zeal to the new 
systems of thought they encountered. This lead to a flourishing of philology and exegeses of 
those traditions on their own terms146. These scholars generally resisted the temptation to 
force Indo-Tibetan philosophy into a European conceptual framework, and because of their 
translations and exegeses, it is now really possible to study those philosophical traditions in 
English, just as one can study Heidegger and Hegel without knowing proper German (though 
of course it would be preferable to read in the original!). However, for reasons talked about 
ad nauseum in this essay, these philosophical traditions have been left stranded in isolation, 
held together mostly by a coterie of enthusiasts, with no access to the legitimizing power to 
institutionalized philosophy departments. Such a state of affairs has lead to an air of 
competitiveness and resentment on the side of the excluded philosophical traditions. This 
manifests in more desperate engagements with western philosophy in which enthusiasts seek 
to prevail over a canonical position, done under the guise of a "dialogue" or the innocuous 
term "comparative philosophy." There is a big difference between comparative, collaborative, 
                                                
146 For example, in the area of Tibetan Buddhism there have been impressive waves of translations of important 
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or interdisciplinary work that attempts to produce something new, and that which simply 
means to poach the resources of other fields in order to shore up its own sense of supremacy.  
 Philosopher Owen Flanagan analyzes this problem in his book The Bodhisattva's Brain. 
In it, he talks about his involvement with a group of philosophers, scientists, and religious 
practitioners who are all ostensibly interested in the mystery of consciousness, and in 
exploring the question of happiness and the paths that may lead to it. Part of these 
explorations included neuro-biological analyses of the brains of meditation practitioners to see 
if they had any discernable unique qualities.147 While the experiments were very interesting 
and opened a new channel for aquiring empirical data, the subsequent press and some of the 
conclusions that were jumped to bemused Flanagan:  
There were widespread discussions, and many published expressions, which continue, 
of the idea that neuroscience was actually in the process of empirically vindicating the 
calims of one lived philosophical tradition, namely Buddhism, to yield happiness and 
flourishing, or something in the vicinity, at a higher rate of return than other 
contenders. The hyperbole was (and continues to be) jaw-dropping.148    
 
Clearly Flanagan, as a participant in these discussions and experiments, was not convinced by 
the finality of the results. No matter how badly Buddhist practitioners wanted it to be true, 
believed it to be true, they would have to be patient like everyone else—indefinitely patient—
for any vindication of their creed. The victory cries  that were published and the self-
congratulating that spread among Buddhist communities (like the claim in the preface here 
that meditation can fix depression) are simple cases of triumphalism; they are unimaginative 
and unproductive; they keep people mired in narrow mindedness; and they make people 
judgmental.  
                                                
147 Performed by Richard Davidson at the University of Wisconsin’s Laboratory for Affective Neuroscience with 
results published in articles such as “Buddha’s Brain: Neuroplasticity and Meditation.” IEEE Signal Process 
Mag. 2008 January 1; 25(1): 176–174. 
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 While I written a great deal about the flaws of Eurocentrism, I have also observed a 
great deal of the reverse triumphalism that so displeases Flanagan. A great many of the papers 
presented in the field of comparative philosophy end with the ground-breaking conclusion 
that since altruism has remained such a difficult problem in Western philosophies, and that it 
is a presupposed ideal in a tradition like mahāyāna Buddhism, it follows that if everyone 
engaged in Buddhist meditation practice, they would gain insight and access to to true 
altruism. Such a claim may have merits, but when presented in such a ham-handed way, 
coming from a place of personal commitment, the argument vitiates itself philosophically. For 
such an argument to be accepted, it demands something of a conversion experience. In order 
to verify the claims of the argument, a person would have to undergo a dramatic life-style 
change and practice a program of learning and meditation for many years. Someone who is 
predisposed to or subconsciously receptive to such a radical shift may indeed benefit from 
what the argument suggests, however, as a philosophical argument to be shared with people 
who may have strong contradicting views, it is simply alienating. The person making such an 
argument suggests that they have epistemological access to some a priori truth that the other 
person does not have. It suggests that the all philosophical insights have already been 
exhausted by the wisdom traditions of the past, and that the task at hand is simply to choose 
the best among them. It supposes that all people can be reduced to a finite set of categories, all 
of whom can and should adopt a certain stance toward their selves, others, and objects.  
 While I am a proponent of meditation practice as a way to explore oneself, I have great 
reservations promoting it as a universal epistemological framework. In my experience, 
meditation and its glorification are usually at the center of the “triumphalist” approach to 
comparative philosophy. One example I have seen repeatedly is the insistence that a universal 
ethics can be constructed and promulgated on the basis of Buddhist meditation techniques: if 
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only we “pay attention” closely enough to the mind, we can objectively inuit what is “good” 
and “bad” and thereby demystify the problem of ethical choice. The right choice will become 
clear to us. Moreover, if we just “pay attention” closely enough, we can unlock the indwelling 
capacity we already have to overcome whatever adventitious addictions we might have, or any 
depression that haunts us. Some evidence, no doubt, has been accumulated over the years to 
suggest that mindfulness meditation has a number of salubrious affects on the individual, from 
decreasing stress to promoting self-control, and it would take a dour one indeed to claim that 
the cultivation of more subtle self-awareness would not be desirable. However, there is danger 
in universalizing something like meditative awareness and insist that it alone is a reliable 
foundation for a unified theory of ethics.  
 The proponent of Buddhistic meditative ethics—an ethics based on supremely subtle 
“attention”—becomes unaware of the oppressiveness of their arguments. First of all, they 
claim to have epistemological access to a private object, but one that can become public if only 
everyone else tries as hard as they have. This is a theological stance. Second, advocates of 
altruism and compassion often callously hold the rest of the world to their standard. “You are 
depressed? I have shown you the tools to get over it, so if you don’t, then it’s your fault.” “You 
have an addiction? Use my incisive technique to excise it from your self.” Of course Attention 
and awareness and self-discovery are important components of personal maturation and 
overcoming all sorts of suffering, but when people are held to a standard by means of a self-
righteous and judgmental imperative, if they fail to live up to the expectation, it can 
exacerbate the suffering they already feel. This is what Žižek is getting at when he rather 
bluntly rejects “new age” teachings, along with their more traditional allies in Buddhism and 
other Asian religions. He summarizes the ethos of the self-righteous self-knower:  
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You must do your duty of achieving full self–realization and self–fulfillment because 
you can. This is the reason why we feel, at least I do, a kind of terrorist pressure 
beneath the compliant tolerance of New Age preachers. They seem to preach peace 
and letting go and so on but there is an implicit terrorist dimension in it.149     
 
Self-discovery, self-realization, and self-fulfillment are thus not methodologies, they are results 
of some very complex work, most likely not an algorithm but something very personalized and 
unique to each individual. But they are too often treated as starting points: “First intuit your 
self and all the subtle things that make it up (never mind the depth of your experience of this 
intuition, what it actually consists of, and so forth) then universalize it and adumbrate the 
path for others.” 
 In a particularly contemplative piece titled “Giving an Account of Oneself,” Judith 
Butler questions both the reliability of self-knowledge as well as the implications of an ethics 
built on such self-knowledge. She notices that “The ‘I’ cannot tell the story of its own 
emergence, and the conditions of its own possibility, without in some sense bearing witness to 
a state of affairs to which one could not have been present.150” As with Meillassoux’s ancestral 
world or Harman’s vacuum sealed “objects wrapped in objects” that never fully divulge 
themselves, self-knowledge requires that we become artists trying to give form to a self; we 
have to get at it speculatively;151 it is not given to us whole in intuition. Even our own bodies 
have a history we are not privy to: the soft bundle we were as an infant may as well as been 
someone else, and the growth and decay of our tissues and cells is something we can only 
paint a mental picture of through inference and imagination. Perhaps its very hiding 
character, its absenteeism, is the Self’s greatest secret. Any claim to fathom the self from all 
sides, to intuit it cubistically, must be looked at with suspicion. The person who claims 
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complete self knowledge must be able to describe its genesis and history, in all its detail. If 
they are unable to do so, if their story has blind spots or contradictions, then they have no 
right to hold others to the standard they pretend to. In the context of the Hegelian dialectic of 
recognition, this means that the Self does not achieve some ultimate satisfaction in being 
recognized by another self-consciousness, for that would lead to a kind of deflation—the 
impelling desire behind the whole movement would evaporate or drain away. Rather, the Self 
and the Other constantly withhold something from each other; a mystery remains and the 
ember of desire still glows. This is no reason, however, to condemn the Hegelian dialectic 
since,  
There is lots of light in the Hegelian room, and the mirrors have the happy coincidence 
of usually being windows as well. In this sense, we might consider a certain post-
Hegelian reading of the scene of recognition in which precisely my own opacity to 
myself occasions my capacity to confer a certain kind of recognition on others. It 
would be perhaps an ethics based on our shared, and invariable, partial blindness 
about ourselves. The recognition that one is, at every turn, not quite the same as what 
one thinks that one is, might imply, in turn, a certain patience for others that suspends 
the demand that they be selfsame at every moment. Suspending the demand for self-
identity or, more particularly, for complete coherence, seems to me to counter a certain 
ethical violence that demands that we manifest and maintain self-identity at all times 
and require that others do the same.152     
 
A methodology or ethics that starts with a claim to complete self-knowledge has already set up 
an ontologically hierarchical structure: it is their fully-plumbed self that bestows meaning on 
things. Others are magnetized by the density of their Self and thereby emerge into a world of 
meaningful relations.  
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 Hence the long discussions herein about the need to get beyond hierarchical ontologies, 
belief in the sublimity of one’s destiny and that of one’s tribe, and so forth. Such critiques are 
the starting place of envisioning different ethics. Butler continues in this direction:  
And though I am certainly not arguing that we ought never to make judgments—they 
are necessary for political and personal life alike: I make them, and I will—I think that 
it would be important, in rethinking the terms of culture and of ethics, to remember 
that not all ethical relations are reducible to acts of judgment. The capacity to make 
and justify moral judgments does not exhaust the sphere of ethics, of either obligation 
or ethical relationality. Indeed, prior to judging the Other, we must be in some relation 
to him or her, and this relation will ground and inform the ethical judgments we finally 
do make. We will, in some way, have to ask the question, “Who are you?” If we forget 
that we are related to those we condemn, even those we must condemn, then we lose 
the chance to be ethically educated or “addressed” by a consideration of who they are 
and what their personhood says about the range of human possibility that exists, and 
even to prepare ourselves  for or against such possibilities.153  
 
In order to arrive at a non-oppressive human ethics of relation, ironically, it is necessary to go 
through the post-human movement described in earlier chapters. It is a possible way to 
understand something about the relations that preexist us, and which therefore undermine our 
own supremacy as Creator-Subjects. The most persistent, obnoxious, and lazy mode of 
criticism against OOO and Speculative Realism philosophers is that their post-human 
theories will lead to a denigration of the human, into some Matrix-esque dystopian hell, as if 
they are part of a conspiracy to collaborate with a nascent android takeover. Harman, Bryant, 
and Morton continually address these criticisms, with little success at quelling them, and 
Onfray continues to write prolifically in favor of his epicurean materialism—itself closely 
related to post-humanism—as the foundation for a truly humanist ethics that does not appeal 
to the heavens or acknowledge an ontologically privileged actor. The post-human turn is a 
way of criticizing the anthropocentrism that makes us put ourselves at the top of a 
metaphysical hierarchy, and which results in personal and political chauvinism. Any 
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productive “comparative methodology” needs to keep these issues in mind, being careful not 
to fall into reverse triumphalism and dogmatic competitiveness.   
 This is why Flanagan still sees value in the kind of interdisciplinary, comparative, "inter-
faith" projects that have proven to, at times, exasperate him. Despite his skepticism, he is still 
confident that comparative work is essential to  
disabuse us of several… blind spots: ethnic chauvinism, the view that non-Western 
traditions are esoteric in a bad way, for reasons beyond their unfamiliarity; the idea 
that Religion (with a big "R") is inevitable for psychological reasons; and that it is 
required, true or false, to shore up meaning and morals.154 
 
For him, a self-described platonic-hedonist who does not believe in absolute truths, 
comparative philosophy is useful for its cosmopolitanism. Take an ignorant, narrow-minded 
bigot out of a backwater and introduce them to the finest minds of a cosmopolis, and before 
long their habits and attitudes will change and open. The same goes for philosophy. Open the 
canon, look over your self-imposed fence, and you will start to see and hear new and 
wonderful things. Again, these are not important because they are different, but they offer us 
new material with which to forge new ways of living.  
 Comparative philosophy, as a project of opening, excavating, and proliferating, is not so 
different, methodologically, from feminism and queer theory. They have similar traps and 
successes. Feminist philosopher Sandra Harding has argued that feminism, like comparative 
philosophy, when it is too sure of itself methodologically, becomes dogmatic and unhelpful. 
Just as some comparativists call for all ethics to be subjected to some universal meditative 
epistemology, there are feminists who desperately forward a particular methodology as 
essential to an ultimate goal. Some argue that what feminists should be doing is 
“consciousness raising,” others insist on historical materialism, others “feminine 
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phenomenology.” All of these, Harding admits, have great merits, but she sees no reason to 
declare winners and runners up.155 Feminism’s accomplishments are not counted in individual 
major breakthroughs, but cumulatively, over a wide range of categories and fields. Among its 
broad successes, she lists just a few, so as not to suggest any limit to further inquiry and 
discovery. They include: “The ‘discovery’ of gender and its consequences”; “women’s 
experience as a scientific resource”, i.e., the idea that truth claims must hold up 
epistemologically for women, not just for men; and a “robust gender-sensitive reflexivity 
practice.”156 While there are surely other contributions, her point is that it is foolish to focus 
too much on figuring out what the feminist method ought to be. Meditation on the method 
question in feminism leads us to the recognition that feminism is fundamentally a moral and 
political movement for the emancipation of women: 
It may be unsatisfying for many feminists to come to the conclusion that I have been 
urging: the search for a distinctive feminist method of inquiry is not a fruitful one. As a 
consolation, I suggest we recognize that if there were some simple recipe we could 
follow and prescribe in order to produce powerful research and research agendas, no 
one would have to go through the difficult and sometimes painful—if always 
exciting—processes of learning how to see and create ourselves and the world in 
radically new forms demanded by our feminist theories and practices.157 
 
Likewise, comparative philosophy, even when performed as the most drudging philology, has 
moral and political implications. It chips away at the lock on a canon that is guarded by people 
who are wrong in their metaphysics and politics. If comparative philosophy can become 
reflexive, if it does not content itself with cataloging the differences between heterologous 
traditions or trap itself in ideological triumphalism, it will not only find wisdom in more and 
more places, it will start to produce it here and now.  
                                                
155 Harding, Sandra. “The Method Question.”Hypatia. Vol. 2, No. 3., Feminism & Science, 1 (Autumn, 1987). 
Blackwell Publishing. 
156 ibid. 31 
157 ibid. 32-33. 
 186 
     
 
APPENDIX: 
AXES OF OMNISCIENCE: 
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Very few philosophical considerations seem as anachronistic as those about omniscience and 
absolute knowledge. Only a few extant systems of philosophy have the hubris to maintain that 
absolute knowledge or omniscience is possible. Most have banished any such notions to the 
mists of theology. Mainstream metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, have generally embraced 
unknowing, turning doubt and lacunae into the insignia of their rigor and humility. Among 
those who stubbornly insisted that their speculations led to the elusive pinnacle of knowledge 
are G.W.F Hegel and several representatives of the Indo-Tibetan tradition mahāyāna 
tradition.  
Omniscience, generally speaking, implies maximal epistemic greatness. It is an 
epistemological concept that entails an awareness of the limits of knowing. Limits do not 
contradict the absoluteness of the knowledge, they only mark the line past which knowledge 
has no purchase. Though Hegel and the Buddhists in question are confident about the 
realizability of absolute knowledge, they construct vastly different theories about what such 
knowledge consists in.  
For Hegel, absolute knowledge is a retrospective knowledge that understands the 
Reason at work in the unfolding of world history; it is the view from the top of a mountain 
that understands the structure of everything that has led up to the present. It is an immanent 
awareness, but one that can always opens up onto the past. It is a self-recognition and self-
confidence that has a causal thread going through it, connecting it absolutely to the past and 
future, which can be decoded with the perfection of knowledge. This knowledge unfolds 
inexorably, motivated by a telos. Moreover, it is cumulative and shared by all of humanity; 
hence, omniscience is eschatological. 
 For the Buddhists, absolute knowledge resembles an aesthetic awareness of the 
 188 
present—an awareness that penetrates all that comes into its immanent sphere. This thorough 
comprehension, or seeing through the present brackets the past and the future. It entails the 
same penetration of the past and future. It lies is wait for them, since the past, present, and 
future all share the same structure. The past can be analyzed according to its causal details, 
and the future can be reasonably inferred sometimes, but those have nothing to do with 
omniscience for the Buddhists. Collective knowledge may pile up, but no matter how vast its 
mass, it will not be maximal epistemic greatness. Omniscience worth the name must be 
soteriological. 
 To put the Hegelian and Buddhist attitudes into an analytical framework, they can be 
best compared by using two unfamiliar, if not entirely novel terms: diachronic omniscience and 
synchronic omniscience.  
While the category of omniscience marks the extreme limit of all possible knowledge, 
these divergent types of omniscience betray very different attitudes about knowledge itself, 
what types of knowledge are superior, and why. These different attitudes mobilize intellectual 
resources in different directions, yielding different productions, including different attitudes 
about history and ethics. However, the gulf between them is not simply the proverbial gulf 
between East and West. The orientations that these two orientations represent are 
transcultural and transhistorical; even though the two philosophical streams aim at one type of 
absolute knowledge or the other, the distinction does not entail  that no one in the 
surrounding social milieu aspires to the other type. It may be that those aspirations simply 
express themselves through diverse means. For example, a great number of western poets 
could be said to believe in synchronic omniscience, while in Asian contexts, believers in 
diachronic absolute knowledge may be found amongst grammarians and proponents some of 
the innumerable lesser known schools of philosophy on that vast continent.  
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HEGEL’S ABSOLUTE KNOWING: DIACHRONIC OMNISCIENCE 
One of Hegel’s most enduring statements comes from the preface of his mature work, 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, where he writes:  
Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be. 
For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy, as the 
thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative 
process, and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the 
conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to 
the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual 
kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, 
and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva, 
takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.158 
 
Coming near the end of Hegel’s prolific writing career, when his accomplishments were 
presumably in full bloom, this is among the clearest windows into what it means for him to 
achieve the acme of his philosophical program. What is striking about this statement is that 
through the metaphor of the owl it describes absolute knowledge (or wisdom, or, by 
extension, omniscience) as a backward gaze; a retrospective. Its present aspect is a synthetic 
act that interprets what has come before it, understand its etiology, and continues to discover 
the mysteries of its own causes. Yet, as a phenomenological experience, it remains notoriously 
indeterminate. It does not seem to be reactive; it is not a lens through which you encounter the 
rush of the world’s ever-manifesting phantasmagoria. Rather, it understands that 
phantasmagoria according to its causes. The world’s appearances come on too fast to know 
them absolutely in their immediacy. Training to react to them is less important than 
understanding them after they have impacted us; first the storm of the present must pass, then 
the mud can settle and clarity, absolute philosophical knowledge can unfold. Thus, Hegel’s 
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absolute knowledge is significantly abstract; no affective content describes it. Its 
phenomenology consists in a kind of reflective confidence in which the mind recognizes its 
own centrality in the drama that unfolds to it. Its experience is like riding the crest of a wave 
with one’s gaze fixed on the water below and back out to sea. It understands the wave to be 
caused by that water, and looks into it for deeper and deeper explanations about how one 
ended up on the crest. This retrospective gaze leads to various insights of very different 
character. There is a lot of water to account for beneath that lifting wave. It demands curiosity 
about the etiology of the present, encouraging scientific analysis and rigorous historical work.   
The subtlest insight the gaze produces is into the character of the knowing subject 
itself. Looking at the path behind him, the antecedents to his own mind, he discovers his 
destiny—that he was already entailed in antecedents. Thus, objective reality loses its 
foreignness, recognized as structurally and substantially the same as the subject. This is the 
threshold of absolute knowledge, for it uncovers the fundamental secret that was previously 
obscured. In his foreword to the Phenomenology of Spirit, J.N. Findlay describes Hegel’s 
absolute knowledge as 
 . . . the realization that all forms of objectivity are identical to those essential to the 
thinking subject, so that in construing the world conceptually it is seeing everything in 
the form of self, the self being simply the ever-active principle of conceptual 
universality, of categorical synthesis. In its conceptual grasp of objects it necessarily 
grasps what it itself is, and in grasping itself it necessarily grasps every phase of 
objectivity.159 
 
The mind with absolute knowledge then gazes confidently out over the objective world—all 
that has concretely manifested—and sees itself entailed there, making it feel at home, justified, 
no longer alienated. But this absolute knowledge knows itself in more detail than this vague 
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phenomenology of recognition. It understands the fullness of the Absolute Truth that it 
knows. “The True is the Whole,” he writes in the preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
presaging his “Owl of Minerva” statement later in his career,  
But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its 
development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in 
the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. To be 
actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself. Though it may seem contradictory 
that the absolute should be conceived essentially as a result, it needs little pondering 
to set this show of contradiction in its true light(11).  
 
Thus, the absolute is conditioned by causality, an a priori category he inherits from the 
tradition he is embedded in—a tradition resting heavily on both Aristotle and Kant, two of the 
preeminent theorists of causality qua a priori category. Aristotle in particular firmly established 
causality at the heart of all epistemological endeavors. In laying out the principles of his 
Physics, he says, “For our inquiry aims at knowledge; and we think we know something only 
when we find out the reason why it is so, i.e., when we find its primary cause.”160 If knowledge 
in general is qualified in such a way, it must also apply to absolute knowledge. Absolute 
knowledge, like the Absolute, is caused by something, and the path of knowledge consists in 
bringing to light the chain of causes that are responsible for it. The absolute is the result of the 
mind going through the process of perceiving objectivity, penetrating it, recognizing itself 
within it, and then reemerging with a new self-confidence. Thinking, by passing through 
objects in this way, ends up thinking itself, which is another characterization of the Absolute, 
and one that accords perfectly with Aristotle’s conception of God (the Absolute) as self-
thinking thought. Findlay explains: 
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The subject or Ego is thus for Hegel not what we ordinarily understand by a personal 
thinker, but the logical function of universality in a peculiar sort of detachment from 
its species and instances. The mind for Hegel, as for Aristotle, is thus the place of 
forms, a bustling Agora where such forms are involved in endless transactions and 
conversations, and though it is by the intermediation of such forms that there is a to 
their individual instances, they none the less enjoy a relative independence there, a 
detachment in the thought-ether, that they never enjoy elsewhere. (Phenomenology of 
Spirit xi). 
 
The mind with absolute knowledge therefore sees itself everywhere. In every object of the 
world bound by laws of causality and finitude, self-consciousness learns its secret history and 
understands its own necessity. It knows that it is the end of a rational process that always 
aimed at it. On this point Hegel writes in the “Absolute Knowing” section of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, “self-consciousness knows the nothingness of the object, on the one 
hand, because it externalizes its own self—for in this externalization it posits itself as the 
object, or the object as itself”(§788).  
This self-recognition is central to absolute knowing. It is a new way that the mind 
experiences the world, rising out of that world and reflecting on it. It is not a spontaneous 
insight but is the culmination of a process that then retrospectively understands its own 
history.  
Absolute knowledge as the structural reality of the interpenetration of subject and 
object is the perspective of his Science of Logic. However, the Logic only unveils the final truth 
about pure being, an indeterminate immediacy with nothing to grasp. It describes the 
fundamental structure of reality, which is the theoretical substrate of the whole system, and 
thus, in a sense, the beginning. But paradoxically, it is a beginning that only comes to light at 
the end of a process that illuminates it. The Science of Logic says,  
 
The beginning must then be absolute or, what means the same here, must be an abstract 
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beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose, must not be mediated by 
anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself the ground of the entire science. It 
must therefore be simply an immediacy, or rather only immediacy itself.161 
 
Rolf Ahlers, in an excellent essay entitled “The Absolute as the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic” 
clarified how the so-called “beginning” adumbrated in the Logic is really the end: “But the 
beginning of that development cannot start with that explication. This beginning of the 
dialectic remains rather something which is ‘inconceivable’”(292). He continues,  
It is important to note how unconstructed this notion of the absolute is. The very call 
to keep distant the categories of reflection and to simply look at the dynamic of 
thought itself by immersion into this dynamic prohibits a forced interpretation, such as 
that of Kojéve, indicating that "Hegel becomes God in thinking or writing the Logic" 
 
The unconstructed Absolute of the Logic is only possible as the end result of the path taken in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, which relies on an investigation of objective reality that slowly 
yields the hidden secret about that reality. Hegel explains how “In the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
which is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent to the understanding is made through stages 
of sensuous consciousness and then of perception.”162 When we follow the Phenomenology on the 
path to absolute knowledge, we are playing detective with the objects of our environment, and 
with the record of history. In those things we must dig for the causes of the appearances of the 
present. We must tell the story of what we are. Imagination, creativity, rigor and intelligence 
are required to tell the right story, the one that most fully explains the necessity of the things of 
the present, that shows they were always intended by their causes. Since the Absolute of the 
Logic would never have been revealed without the retrospective gaze that constitutes the 
narrative of reality’s history, Hegel had to tell the entire story of world history. The more that 
he could tell, the more the Absolute would be revealing itself, since the Absolute is entailed 
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there, hiding in the material of history. Absolute knowing is not the direct experience of the 
Logic’s immediacy, but immersion in the mediation that reveals it. Thus, historical events 
constitute the path to it and make it possible. 
As discussed extensively in earlier sections of this essay, Hegel’s historical attitude is 
grounded in the Aristotelian belief in teleology. All things have their ends—e.g., “But the end 
of action is not the individual act but the total betterment of the world”(Phenomenology of Spirit 
§619)— and the end of the march of history is the self-revelation of its own secret Reason:  
The realm of Spirits which is formed in this way in the outer world constitutes a 
succession in Time in which one Spirit relieved another of its charge and each took 
over the empire of the world from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of the 
depth of Spirit, and this is the absolute Notion… The goal, Absolute Knowing, as 
Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of the Spirits they are 
in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their 
preservation, regarded from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of 
contingency, is History; but regarded from the side of their [philosophically] 
comprehended organization, it is the Science of Knowing in the sphere of 
appearance…(§808). 
 
Thus, all of reality, unfolded as History, is guided by the inner teleology that aims at the self-
knowing Spirit. The only possible conduits of this revelation are human beings. They are the 
site of history’s apotheosis. Their activity, which follows the revelation of the absolute 
knowledge that is their essence, constitutes the teleological end of history. Hegel’s faith in this 
teleological account of history is explained easily enough. As his writings on the history of 
philosophy clearly express, he sees himself as the acme of the western philosophical tradition; 
and each element of that tradition is an indispensable brick in the edifice. Aristotle’s 
teleological view of nature, and his epistemology based on the elucidation of first causes are 
not to be abandoned. Rather, Hegel dialectically synthesizes Aristotle’s ideas, combining them 
with their equally teleological Judeo-Christian descendants. Both those traditions—along 
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with most of the other canonical figures of the western tradition—hold dearly to a belief in the 
beginning and end of time, as well as to a faith in the linear causal relationships between all 
things and events that appear between that beginning and end. Tracing the causal 
relationships between things, according to the Aristotelian/Judeo-Christian paradigm that 
pervades Hegel’s thinking, is what yields knowledge. Thus, his absolute knowledge follows 
these standards, perfecting them to the highest possible degree.  
In a fascinating exposition of the core presuppositions of classical Chinese thinking, 
French Sinologist François Julien describes the operations that render historical knowledge, 
describing it, as we did before, as a kind of imaginative detective work. He writes,  
A fictional procedure is also involved here, since imaginary evolutions are used to 
gauge the efficacy of causes: What would have happened “if,” i.e., in the absence of 
this or that antecedent? We engage in a retrospective evaluation of probability (a 
“backward” kind of prediction or a “retrodiction”), which, of course, is never 
exhaustive, since each fact and/or event is situated at an intersection with countless 
others, each of which could be traced back ad infinitum.163   
 
The complete integration of this knowledge with time and history is why Hegel’s absolute 
knowledge can be described as diachronic omniscience. It’s confidence in the linear causal chain 
at the heart of reality’s historical unfolding encourages an endless refinement of historical 
understanding. It invites complex intellectual histories of the world, producing a fecund 
literary tradition in which each version of world history competes for the place of the most 
accurate and subtle revelation of the world’s telos, the thread holding history together.  
 Hegel’s corpus reflects this attitude in its very structure. While the ultimate end is the 
subtle, nearly ineffable immediacy of the self-knowing whole, but the bulk of his letters 
narrate the history of the world, the history of philosophy, religion, art, and all other aspects 
of human thought and culture. Unlike evolutionary biology or geology, Hegel’s retrospective 
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storytelling privileges the Ideas at work through the unfolding of time; e.g., the thoughts of the 
Greeks matter much more than their soils and crops. As Julien points out, these histories 
engage in a “retrospective evaluation of probability” (212) under the guiding principle that all 
knowledge is grounded by linear causality. Many stories can be told about the past, but they 
can all be graded according to their accuracy, subtlety, and the depths of the truths at which 
they arrive. It is a perpetual competition to refine our understanding of the primary causes of 
things and of their internal logic, and what makes this long slog to absolute knowledge 
tolerable is our faith that there is and absolute end to it, one that is intuited as the natural 
Reason inherent in all appearance.           
The orientation toward diachronic omniscience has certain implication for the character of 
western intellectual productions. In the quote above, Julien voices some skepticism about the 
potential for the retrospective method to yield the absolute knowledge it aims at. He points 
out that no story that we tell about history can ever be exhaustive. If our knowledge rests on 
the causal links between things and events, thoughts and people etc., we still must concede 
that we have made certain limiting choices regarding the events, things, people, and thoughts 
that we train our analysis on. We construct stories about the relations between certain items, 
but those are only stories about those items. They are themselves situated in an infinite mesh of 
other conditions. Substitute certain terms, and the story changes like an alternative narrative 
of a Mad Lib game. There is also little to stop us from telling a different story about the same 
isolates. However, the diachronic paradigm is firmly bound to linear causality, and confident 
in the retrospective narrative building that leads to absolute knowledge. Thus, it has managed 
to sustain an almost quixotic—but perhaps justified—stream of energy on fleshing out the 
details that would actualize this diachronic omniscience.  
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In contemporary times, stunningly successful projects like the sequencing of genomes 
and the Global Ocean Sampling Expedition164, which seeks to catalog the genetic structure of 
the infinite bio-organisms in the world’s oceans, refelect the ideology of diachronic 
omniscience. With the data collected by that project, the idea is to extrapolate conclusions 
about all life from it, greatly refining our understanding of the causal links between things in 
the world. These projects benefit from the regularity of nature, on causal laws. We can 
reasonably infer that the laws of nature will not change anytime soon, so we can exploit those 
laws to increase our knowledge, which continues to expand as it swallows up more data.  
Since these laws are taken to be constant, the diachronic orientation also encourages 
speculation into the future, for example into artificial intelligence—its inevitability or 
impossibility. The diachronic orientation is essential for the work of someone like Ray 
Kurzweil, a wildly successful, some would say slightly crackpot, inventor and computer 
scientist affiliated with Singularity Theory. This theory relies on the “law of accelerating 
returns,” which claims that the rate of change in evolutionary systems, including technology, 
increases exponentially, producing ever more frequent revolutions that bring us closer to 
omniscience. Kurzweil is famous for making accurate bold predictions about technological 
and political developments, which he arrived at by extrapolating from the conditions of the 
present and the structures he recognized in the past. Because of the constant structure of 
reality that is revealing itself to us at an ever-increasing rate, Kurweil and others believe that 
soon we will be in an age in which humans meld seamlessly with the technology that they 
created. Our bodies will be swarming with nanotechnology that will conquer sickness and 
aging, and our minds will have unfettered access to all knowledge in the form of databases 
linked to our nervous systems. We will quite literally be omniscient, since all knowledge will 
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be right before us. It is an updated version of Hegel’s End of History speculation. 
Despite the dystopian frissons that people like Kurzweil’s theories may inspire, these 
contemporary knowledge-building projects are successful examples of the Hegelian method 
since they look at the past and pick it apart to better understand the causal genesis of the 
present. Once constant, universal laws have been established, we can then even make 
predictions about the future based on them. The Human Genome Project provides invaluable 
knowledge by telling a reliable story about the causal link between molecules and their ends, 
which manifest as our bodies, including all of its proportions, ailments and so forth. It is 
tremendously useful knowledge and there is nothing pernicious about it; nor is there anything 
inherently pernicious about the method used to arrive at it.  
However, as the bulk of the other sections of this essay contend, the method goes off 
track when it produces dogmatic narratives that can be criticized for their cultural, religious, 
and ethnic biases. When one tells the story of the world, it is a story pulled from the air, for 
infinite alternatives are also available. It depends on the elements one isolates. These are the 
basic principles of historiography. Therefore, an episteme oriented toward diachronic 
omniscience, which relies on narratives, is bound by these same historiographical limitations. 
It yields precious knowledge, but this knowledge can never be exhaustive.  
To echo earlier arguments, when we are so concerned with means and ends, as we 
have explored in previous chapters, we end up with an anthropocentric and hierarchical 
metaphysics. We believe that all objectivity is in service of the Subject as the ultimate end. 
Nature’s organic elements have been intending the Human Subject all along. It has been 
manifesting infinite abortive attempts in the form of animal and plant life. Those attempts 
finally got it right through European man who was able to understand his own Spirit. While 
there are many other parts of the world inhabited by humans, they did not achieve this same 
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absolute knowledge, since they were cut off from the same causal determinants that make it 
possible. Thus, non-Europeans, like plant and animal life, represent abortive attempts of 
Spirit striving to unfold in the world.  
Another limitation of diachronic omniscience is that—with all its glorification of the 
Subject—it does not necessarily train the subject to deal with the immediacy of its own 
experiences. Since it is always facing backward, experiences wash over one’s back and are 
only made sense of after they have entered into the past. Everything is to be interpreted in the 
diachronic orientation, including works of art. Even the aesthetic experience is interpretation. 
For Hegel, the secret of Beauty is that it is the unfolding of Freedom, which is itself a 
characteristic of the Subject, of self-knowing Spirit. Susan Sontag finds fault with this 
“perennial, never consummated project of interpretation,” in which “all observable 
phenomena are bracketed, in Freud’s phrase, as manifest content.”165 By treating the world as a 
hermeneutic work, we betray “a dissatisfaction (conscious or unconscious) with the work, a 
wish to replace it with something else”(19). She proposes a much different kind of aesthetic 
experience, which we will explore in the sections that follow.  
For now, what the diachronic paradigm needs us to believe is that all appearances are 
the unfolding of something else. If we fail to interpret each thing for what it really is in terms 
of its cause and end, then our reality is only half-lit, our knowledge full of shadows. Since it is 
based on interpretation—upon drawing on exponentially expanding resources to make sense 
of each moment of reality—this kind of absolute knowledge does not achieve full bloom in 
individuals’ affective realm. It achieves itself gradually through humanity as a whole. It is 
eschatological and not soteriological. Individual wisdom is telling the best story about reality 
to oneself and others. It is not about the private experience of the individual as reality 
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impinges on them and demands reaction. For an alternative orientation toward knowledge to 
be possible—a paradigm of synchronic omniscience—the presuppositions we have discussed 
so far must somehow be exchanged for others. The following sections will explore what these 
alternatives may be.  
 
 
CHINESE CLASSICAL THOUGHT AS A BRIDGE TO A PARADIGM OF 
SYNCHRONIC OMNISCIENCE 
 
If the entire western paradigm rests upon the Greek and Judeo-Christian confidence 
in causes and ends, is there a parallel foundation for one of the other great civilizations of the 
world, China. It is one that has managed to remain so foreign to the West, one about which 
Hegel writes, “everything which belongs to Spirit — unconstrained morality, in practice and 
theory, Heart, inward Religion, Science and Art properly so called — is alien to it.”166 He 
comes to this conclusion in his cursory investigations of Chinese texts because he does not see 
any evidence that the Chinese intellect is guided by the analysis into causes that grounds his 
own episteme. Because of his own certitude, Hegel does not grant even provisional validity to 
an alternative vision of reality. It is simply benighted. However, what may have been going on 
throughout Chinese intellectual history that has made it so different? Is it really just a stunted 
branch of humanity? Or is it just operating within a very different spectrum of 
presuppositions?  
Part of Hegel’s disappointment with Chinese thought comes from its seeming lack of 
                                                                                                                                                       
165 Sontag, Susan. Against Interpretation. New York: Laurel, 1964. pp. 15-16.  
166 Hegel, GWF. Philosophy of History. Part I: The Oriental World. 
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structure, or at least not one that readily presents itself to him. He dismisses Confucius, for 
example, as perhaps a good man, but a mere popular moralizer with no grasp of the 
interrelation of the parts to the whole. However, as explains comparative philosopher Young 
Kun Kim,  
A careful reader of the Analects will discern what might be called a deep structure of 
the book. For Confucius’ sayings revolve around notions such as human-heartedness 
(jen), rules of propriety (li), and knowledge (chi). It is noteworthy that Hegel does 
not comment on any of these concepts at all. Hegel has done us a service by noting 
similarities between the sayings of Confucius and the Proverbs of Solomon and the 
moral ideas of Cicero. But we wish he had examined carefully the theological and 
philosophical presuppositions on which the ideas of the three thinkers are based.167 
 
We know where Solomon and Cicero are coming from, permeated as they are with 
considerations of prime causes and ultimate ends, striving toward diachronic omniscience. 
Kim is suggesting, however, that it is futile to evaluate Confucius in terms of his system’s 
failure to conform to those standards. Confucius and other classical Chinese thinkers have 
very different priorities.  
Turning again to François Julien’s The Propensity of Things, we find a lucid explanation 
of the mysterious alternate orientation of classical Chinese thinking. For him, the principle we 
should all have a grasp of centers around the single Chinese term shi. This term, Julien shows, 
is as important as the concept of teleology in the western paradigm; yet it is a slippery, 
polysemous word that adapts to different contexts and field. It can be rendered as “position,” 
“circumstances,” “disposition,” “propensity,” “setup,” “configuration,” and even “tool,” 
“deployment,” or “instrument.” He writes, “nothing bestows on it the consistency of a proper 
concept—the kind that Greek philosophy has taught us to insist on—that can be used for a 
neutral, descriptive purpose”(14). If there is one word that betrays the classical Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/lectures1.htm 
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characterization of reality’s structure, it is shi, which claims that  
Reality—every kind of reality—may be perceived as a particular deployment or 
arrangement of things to be relied on and worked to one’s advantage. Art, or 
wisdom, as conceived by the Chinese, consequently lies in strategically exploiting the 
propensity emanating from that particular configuration of reality, to the maximum 
effect possible (15).  
 
It posits that reality is governed by order or logic, but it decouples logic from what usually 
grounds it in Western thinking: teleological ends and linear causality. Julien continues: 
When compared with the elaboration of Western thought, the originality of the 
Chinese lies in their indifference to any notion of a telos, a final end in things, for they 
sought to interpret reality solely on the basis of itself, from the perspective of a single 
login inherent in the actual processes in motion. So let us once and for all discard the 
Hegelian prejudice to which Chinese thought had remained forever in its infancy, 
never able to evolve beyond the cosmological point of view common to all ancient 
civilizations toward the more “self-conscious” and therefore superior stages of 
development, represented by “ontology” and “theology.” On the contrary, let us 
recognize the extreme coherence that underlies the Chinese mode of thought even 
though it never valued conceptual formalization at all (18). 
 
From ancient philosophers like Confucius and Zhuangzi to more modern historians and poets 
like Wang Fuzhi and Gu Yanwu, all of them have shared a common understanding of reality 
as a dynamic groundless arrangement or configuration of which they are a part, and which 
they can learn to ride with grace in proportion to wisdom. The concept of shi sheds some light 
on China’s unique aesthetics and political affairs. For example, China produced few, if any, 
systematic or popular myths. Hegel saw this as a sign of retardation, since he extolled the 
content (remember Sontag’s criticism) of myth as spiritual substance. For him, it is through 
myth and tragedy we recognize Spirit struggling to express itself. The Western tragic hero 
clashes against his environment, which is impeding the flourishing of his Spirit. He fails to 
overcome them, and after his demise we realize that it was his destiny to fall short all along. It 
                                                                                                                                                       
167 Kim, Young Kun. “Hegel’s Criticism of Chinese Philosophy.” Philosophy East and West vol. 28, no. 2, 
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could not have been another way.  
 In contrast to the tragic man torn between the absoluteness of his own Freedom and 
the limitations imposed on him by the teleological workings of the Whole, Julien notes that 
“the Chinese strategist prides himself on his ability to manage all the factors in play, for he 
knows how to go along with the logic behind them and adapt to it”(35). Such an attitude, at 
first blush, does not sound so different from Hegel’s, but the Chinese strategist goes along 
with the logic of appearances without believing that there is an ultimate end to the process; 
there is no solace through faith in eschatology. He is an element adrift in the swarm of other 
elements. His self-interest is also one of these evolutes. In this framework, his well-being is the 
most immediate goal—but not the teleological end—of reality’s ever-shifting configuration. In 
ancient times, Julien shows how this orientation to reality and to knowledge of it contributed 
to China’s precocious military theory. When the Greeks were still lining up phalanx to 
phalanx, gambling on their destinies that would be revealed through the thunks of the 
broadswords, the Chinese were exploiting the conditions of war, understanding that one’s 
destiny is never fixed but is completely contingent on infinite other conditions, a few of which 
are within one’s control. Thus, Chinese generals from the earliest times embrace guerrilla 
warfare, proto-Machiavellian statesmanship, and “dishonorable” technological battle aids like 
the crossbow and gunpowder.   
Neither Julien nor I suggest that such an orientation is intrinsically better than the 
teleological, diachronic orientation of the West. Julien is clear that the Chinese imagination of 
historical situations as non-teleological operations of a certain “setup” of factors has tended to 
promote the kind of authoritarian politics that we are used to associating with the region. 
Factors can be manipulated, and a situation can then run itself more efficiently, 
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mechanistically, like a water-wheel. Mastering the complex of one’s conditions can even have 
the homogenizing effect that Hegel sees as a virtue of the ultimate State in which “each man 
exists only through and for the whole, and the whole exists through and for each man.”168 In 
much classical Chinese political thought, such as that of the authoritarian Legalists, the goal is 
to achieve a historical “setup” in which it is no longer possible for the individual to disrupt the 
flow of smooth-running order. When a political regime is not master of its conditions, disorder 
rules, even if the realm is full of upstanding individuals; “The historical situation of its own 
accord either leads to order or, instead, to disorder”(Julien 178).  
For the Chinese, there is a way to understand the “propensity of things”—the 
directional energy of a certain configuration of factors—that benefits from the Hegelian 
retrospective gaze, but it does not constitute absolute knowledge by reading the past to 
interpret the present. That orientation of the Owl of Minerva, as already discussed, does not 
turn toward the stream of the future or seem to develop strategies to adjust one’s immediate 
experience of it. It remains looking backward, and understands moments of reality as they 
become past moments. In the orientation of shi, however,  
every moment produces a different situation, and one should neither lag behind one’s 
own age, placing faith in outworn policies, nor become bogged down in 
circumstances, clinging blindly to the present. One should evaluate the present by 
realizing that times moves forward; the newness of each successive moment must be 
appreciated. At the same time, however, one can also assess the precise logical nature 
of the situation and exploit the historical opportunity it offers by stepping back to 
acquire an abstract perspective (180).  
 
Here, the abstract perspective that one gains by stepping back, by using the retrospective 
gaze, is that history has not been governed by prime causes and ultimate ends; its essence is 
not one of progress, it is alternation and dynamism. Historical cataclysms are not, as they are 
                                                
168 Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980. 
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for Hegel, sacrifices that fuel progress, they are contingent shifts in an infinite dynamic web. 
Julien ventures that “this concept of a tendency toward alternation (shi), an upward surge 
followed by a decline, is shared by all the Chinese theorists of history and constitutes their 
dominant perspective”(188).  
 The great heroes of ancient China are people like the emperor Qin Shi Huang (259-
210 BCE), the great uniter of disparate warring state, the inaugurator of Chinese imperialism, 
and prolific builder of the most advanced infrastructure of his time. He is not, however, 
revered for the same reason as Caesar or Napoleon. Hegel saw them as pure conduits of 
Spirit, which streamed into the world through their short-lived ejaculations of ambition. Qin 
Shi Huang is not admired for his classical Virtues, but because he was the master of his 
historical conditions. He was dealt a certain slice of time, and he exploited it, manipulating it 
in a direction that would endure for millennia. His accomplishments were not entirely his 
own; he was not raging against the tide but thoroughly embedded in that tide, riding it. His 
submission to it is part of his strength. His reign was the perfect expression of the 
understanding that “phases of upward surging are not simply brought about by great 
sovereigns but are inherent tendencies in the regularity of historical processes. In this view, 
history loses in creative heroism but gains in internal necessity”(188).   
 There have been Chinese historical theorists who turn the logic of alternation into a 
closed system of predictable and understandable cycles of history “as though it were simply an 
uninterrupted chain of ‘reigns’: all of these are imagined as harmonious, united totalities, with 
one dynasty spontaneously giving way to the next and the successor taking over in all 
equity”(189). Yet the 17th century materialist philosopher Wang Fuzhi criticizes this view as 
reductionistic and misguided. While we can speak of internal necessity in history, it is so non-
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linear, so contingent and conditioned, that it does not reveal an ultimate end or any 
predictable or probabilistic pattern. Thus, “even the sage cannot foresee the next 
mutation”(191).  
 If the sage, or one who has achieved absolute knowledge cannot foresee the future—à 
la Kurzweil—based on an understanding of the causal laws of the past, then what does the 
sage know? He is poor in diachronic knowledge; he must be exchanging it for a different kind 
of knowledge, a synchronic one.  
 
 
THE I CHING’S SYNCHRONIC INSIGHT 
 
Hegel was no more impressed with the I Ching, the famous Book of Changes than he was with 
Confucius. In his Philosophy of History, he does consider the text, finding it to be a quaint 
attempt at abstract reasoning. However, it is one that fails to achieve the end of such 
reasoning, specifically the full exposure of spiritual substance. The problem with the I Ching is 
that it represents reality in symbols, which are reduced down to the system’s canon of 
hexagrams. The lines of the hexagrams symbolize different fundamental elements of reality—
Heaven, Earth, Water, Mountain, Rain etc.—which are read as a peculiar arrangement with a 
unique potentiality dwelling within it. However, Hegel believes it is a mistake for them to 
focus on such coarse elements without dialectically sublating those elements into their essence 
as spiritual substance. According to Kim, “Hegel maintains that the attempt to explain the 
nature of the reality by symbols denoting, for example, mountain and rain, reveals that they 
were approaching the reality as if they were dealing with ordinary objects of sense 
perception”(Kim 175). Understanding the causal relationship between the elements of sense 
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perception, for Hegel, is only the very first step toward understanding the deeper end of those 
causal laws, which is, of course, the unfolding of Spirit. For him, the Chinese are admirably 
conceiving of reality as a whole by looking into relations and attempting to uncover their inner 
logic, but they are barking up the wrong tree, since “they could not probe beyond the external 
order, or they could not investigate the inner order of the reality”(175) as teleologically bent 
toward the effulgence of Spirit. The I Ching’s reduction of reality into units and their 
representation in pseudo mathematical arrangements is inferior to western representations of 
reality through language, myth, and epics, since those mediums take a spiritual reality as their 
content. Western aesthetics in general, and particularly the mythical literature it developed 
from the Greeks to, most significantly, the myths of Christ and the Trinity, are indications of 
western spiritual superiority. They transform the sensual data of reality into spiritual 
substance by telling the story of how Spirit stands behind those raw elements, swelling with 
teleological potentiality. Heroic figures, whether they are fictional or as real as Alexander or 
Napoleon, are the purest symbols of the proper, spiritual substance of reality, a reality with its 
own ineluctable destiny.  
Hegel’s interpretation of the I Ching’s methodology is, however, completely determined 
by his certainty that reality has the teleology he says it does. The I Ching, though, is equally 
confident that the teleological model does not work. There is no point in telling a narrative 
about reality’s “long game,” since its own rules are forever shifting. While there is an inner 
sense, it is not pegged to an eternal end. Julien explains what Hegel was missing in the I 
Ching: 
The interior of each hexagram illuminates still more about this process of transition 
and inversion. For while the opposite principles (yin and yang, rise and decline) are 
categorically exclusive and mutually repulsive, at the same time they condition one 
another, each implying the existence of the other. An open conflict and a tacit 
entente: whichever principle is actualized, it always latently contains its opposite. At 
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every moment the progress of either principle necessarily leads to its own future 
regression. The future is already at work in the present, and the expanding present 
will soon pass away. Becoming is gradual; only transition actually exists (196).  
 
Rhetorically and structurally, this is very Hegelian language, especially the language of the 
Science of Logic that accounts for the coextension of identity and difference as the most 
fundamental condition of being/becoming. Julien’s description, however, totally departs from 
the method of the Phenomenology of Spirit, whose retrospective gaze sees the present as the 
linear product of the past. The I Ching’s logic leads to a synchronic comprehension of a cross-
section of reality. That cross section, of course, is embedded in a stream of diachronic time, 
but it is not logically bound to the rules of the past, nor is it leading to any predictable 
diachronic result. It is about the present, which entails all relevant knowledge. There is no 
imperative to interpret the present as a product, but rather to intuit the potentiality of the 
immediate arrangement of conditions; “True skill lies in being able to ride the change and 
always derive the greatest profit from it”(199). Tragic-heroic figures are fools for assuming 
that they stand above their situation, and we are fools for believing that their “destiny” is 
connected to some transcendental source: “the wise man, with minimum personal 
intervention, can reorient everything in the right direction and recuperate the situation. The 
course of things naturally meets us halfway, and we profit from the dynamism inherent in the 
situation at the heights of its intensity”(199).  
Were we to modify Hegelianism with some of the criticisms contained in the earlier 
chapters of this essay, we would not have to entirely abandon the Hegelian retrospective 
method, just its metaphysical presuppositions. Of course there is value in reading the past and 
appreciating its observable regularities. There is nothing stopping a European from achieving 
Julien’s description of the Chinese sage who “can understand the regulatory logic behind the 
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circumstances as well as perceive an opportunity as it begins to arise, thanks to his 
understanding of the processes”(203). The only difference between the advanced Hegelian 
and this sage is that the Hegelian’s knowledge is bookended by a prime cause and an ultimate 
end. It is rather more accurate to say that he is caught within a loop, the famous circularity of 
Hegel’s system, in which the end is also the beginning. Such a loop explains the curious order 
of Hegel’s corpus, in which the description of the ultimate end in the Science of Logic is also the 
beginning of things, but our knowledge of that beginning/end must be arrived at through the 
retrospective narrative building of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In classical Chinese thinking, 
however, there are no bookends to history. Citing 17th century materialist philosopher Wang 
Fuzhi, Julien explains:  
“If the moments differ, the tendencies which result from them (shi) also differ, and if 
those tendencies differ, the logics which govern the processes also differ”; “the 
tendency depends on the opportunity of the moment just as the internal logic depends 
on the tendency.” One cannot deliberate generally and hence abstractly on the course 
of things: “One must appraise the moment in such a way as to detect its tendency and, 
consequently, seek to conform with its coherence.” Once a historical moment is 
perceived as a particular setup to be exploited, every individual situation becomes 
intelligible; and it is from its tendency—and from it alone—that one can deduce what 
we are today accustomed to call “the meaning of history.”(209).       
 
Such an attitude has been scarce in the western philosophy until quite recently. Beginning 
with the resuscitation of Epicureanism in the 18th century, and down through the radical anti-
idealism of post-modern theories, the West has been looking for ways to cut away at its 
teleological tethers. Most recently, the Object Oriented and Speculative Realism movement 
that has been covered in previous chapters has approached what Julien is describing in the 
quote above. When we dislodge the human subject from the center of the universe, human-
linked teleologies make much less sense, especially as regulating principles of the history of 
reality writ large. Anthropocentric theories have loved to ponder the historical “long game” 
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but that long game is invariably human-bound, and thus clearly, not very long. History cannot 
be bookended by the advent of the Subject that endows the world with Being, and the 
ultimate end of the complete self-absorption of this Subject. Why not, rather, analyze more 
deeply cross sections of time, respecting the ability of each individual factor—human or non-
human— to contribute to a direction, propensity, or vectored potentiality of that particular 
moment of reality? Helping OOO and SR in their theories have been Epicurus and Lucretius, 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, but to study these Chinese ideas would certainly not distract them 
from their points. 
Carl Jung, ignoring Hegel’s previous dismissal, was one of the earliest to understand 
the subtle logic of classical Chinese thought. In his foreword to Wilhelm’s 1950 translation of 
the I Ching, Jung writes sympathetically about the I Ching’s refusal to sublate its hexagrams 
into spiritual substance—something that was such a failure in Hegel’s eyes:  
The actual form [of the hexagrams], seems to appeal more to the Chinese sage than 
the ideal one. The jumble of natural laws constituting empirical reality holds more 
significance for him than a causal explanation of events, that, moreover, must usually 
be separated from one another in order to be understood… While the Western mind 
carefully sifts, weighs, selects, classifies, isolates, the Chinese picture of the moment 
encompasses everything down to the minutest nonsensical detail, because all of the 
ingredients make up the observed moment (Jung 4).  
 
He realizes that the Chinese sage should first be understood on his own terms before judging 
him. How is he able to so calmly dispense with the teleology that so comforts the West? Why 
is the Chinese sage so disdainful of our diachronic knowledge? Again, it is because he 
exchanges it for the synchronic. Jung sees this with surprising clarity, describing a principle 
that,   
I have termed synchronicity, a concept that formulates a point of view diametrically 
opposed to that of causality. Since the latter is a merely statistical truth and not 
absolute, it is a sort of working hypothesis of how events evolve one out of another, 
whereas synchronicity takes the coincidence of events in space and times as meaning 
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something more than mere chance, namely, a peculiar interdependence of objective 
events among themselves as well as with the subjective (psychic) states of the 
observer or observers (6).169 
 
Finally, with some echoing of earlier comments, this orientation toward a synchronic 
paradigm of absolute knowledge results in a far different man or woman than the diachronic 
model. The sage is not the one who can tell the most complex story about the causal genesis of 
the present. The sage’s activity has nothing to do with constructing a communal, ever-larger 
edifice of knowledge consisting of details, such as the great database projects of contemporary 
material science. It is not about making probabilistic predictions about the future, confident in 
the coming “Singularity” in which we will all, eschatologically, achieve omniscience qua 
unfettered access to all diachronic knowledge. Of course, rejecting the presuppositions that 
undergird these projects, one also forfeits their benefits, which are substantial. But that is a 
choice the Chinese tradition has been willing to make. To what degree contemporary China 
still holds these attitudes is up for debate among experts greater than I, but it remains true 
that contemporary China continues to exasperate the West with, on the one hand, its 
willingness to bend to Western expectations, but on the other hand, its unwillingness to adopt 
Western presuppositions wholesale. There is evidence that the the logic of (shi) is alive and 
well today:  
The advice of the Chinese thinkers is always to aim to evolve, to adapt totally to the 
movements of the enemy, rather than to attack him head on. A general should always 
act with a view to profiting from the dynamism of this partner, his enemy, for as long 
as it operates, so as to allow himself to be renewed by it at the expense of his 
                                                
169 Just as causality describes the sequence of events, so synchronicity to the Chinese mind deals with the 
coincidence of events. The causal point of view tells us a dramatic story about how D came into existence: it took 
its origin from C, which existed before D, and C in its turn had a father, B, etc. The synchronistic view on the 
other hand tries to produce an equally meaningful picture of coincidence. How does it happen that A', B', C', D', 
etc., appear all in the same moment and in the same place? It happens in the first place because the physical 
events A' and B' are of the same quality as the psychic events C' and D', and further because all are the exponents 
of one and the same momentary situation. The situation is assumed to represent a legible or understandable 
picture (Jung 6), 
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opponent and at no cost to himself. In this way he will be maintain his own energy as 
completely as at the beginning. Any head-on attack will always be costly and risky. 
All one needs to do is remain safe.(Julien 263).  
 
In this attitude, while the Subject is not the metaphysical end of the processes of reality, it is the 
practical one. The person is part of the psychophysical swarm of realities aggregates, and its 
self-interest is taken for granted. It could be characterized as hedonistic in that it aims at the 
subject’s ataraxia. The subject waits, prepares, “rides” and exploits, all in order to maximize its 
benefit and minimize its pains. Thus, there is a greater degree of affectivity in the Chinese 
system that we find in the Hegelian. A notoriously hard question to answer is “how should a 
Hegelian act?” since the conclusion seems to only be that the Hegelian sage is a consummate 
interpreter, the perfect reader and critic who employs his backward gaze to understand reality 
as a perpetual past-tense history. He is very intelligent, compensating for his lack of 
spontaneity and for turning away from the onrush of the present-future. His conduct is 
undetermined. In the case of Hegel himself, it was to adopt the prevailing Protestant 
conventions of the time. The Hegelian sage does not really believe in the moral maxims of his 
time, but he is able to tell an ingenious story about why the things of the present are necessary. 
Those without absolute knowledge follow, and the sage understands.  
 Just as ethics must be imported from elsewhere, the sage of diachronicity sometimes 
even abandons the Epicurean, Stoic, and Socratic project of overcoming the fear of Death. 
Cryogenic science subsists on the presupposition that we need not overcome the fear of death, 
since there is no reason we can’t simply overcome death itself through the construction of a 
critical mass of diachronic knowledge. The diachronic sage looks forward to a time when 
omniscience, as a cumulative, shared, eschatological knowledge, will dispel our mortal fears. 
  This attitude is ubiquitous in contemporary technology advertising. Sprint Mobile, for 
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example, adopts the diachronic omniscience model to market its unlimited data plans. Their 
commercials highlight the building up of such a critical mass of knowledge through the image 
of all humanity uploading their experiences into the digital realm. This cumulative knowledge 
then becomes accessible to anyone else with a data connection. All of this uploading is 
teleologically heading toward diachronic omniscience. The language they use perfectly 
encapsulates this attitude:  
My Iphone 5 can see every point of view,  
every panorama,  
the entire gallery of humanity.  
I need—no, 
 I have the right— 
to be unlimited! 
 This leads to the hopeful mantra, “I am unlimited!” Another of their ads states, “for all the 
unlimited potential of life, Sprint offers unlimited data.170”  
The Chinese sage, by contrast, is concerned with his reactivity to the moment; he 
wants it to be as spontaneous and unimpeded as possible. Eschatological deliverance is 
impossible, since there is no teleological thread through humanity’s drama. Since it has an 
affective dimension, it is soteriological. However, it strangely gives no ontological privilege to 
the individual subject that would be soteriological freed. Despite its soteriological and 
hedonist elements, there is very little interest in introducing universal ethical imperatives into 
the picture, since ethics are always entirely relative to each particular “setup” of a reality-
moment. The classical Chinese sage deconstructs the metaphysical foundation of causality,171 
                                                
170 Sprint commercial 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=frKZyFYxQCY 
171 As a reminder that there is nothing “Chinese” about this kind of skepticism about causality, we can look at 
Nietzsche, who deserves much more involvement in this conversation. Section 287 of The Gay Science dismisses 
the extrapolation of diachronic lessons,  
 
Delight in blindness.— “My thoughts,” said the wanderer to his shadow, “should show me where I stand; 
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despite its apparent coherence, but does not train that same deconstructive analysis on the 
subject itself. To do so may problematize the ethics of self-preservation and profit that the 
system promotes. What happens if the concrete subject and all of its experiences is shown to 
be as illusory as causality itself? Not only will diachronic knowledge that relies on causality be 
demoted, the very character of synchronic knowledge will have to be amended to account for 




A DIFFERENT KIND OF SYNCHRONIC OMNISCIENCE: INDO-TIBETAN 
BUDDHISM 
 
Unlike China, the Indian milieu that produced Buddhism abounds in myths. In the Hindu 
tradition of course there are the famous Ramāyana and Mahābhārata depicting the deeds of 
heroic figures in a way not unfamiliar to Western heroic literature. In such epics, the heroes 
are conduits for a greater truth that unfolds through them. Otherwise, gods representing 
those truths reveal themselves to them. In Tibetan and Mongolia, there is the massive Epic of 
                                                                                                                                                       
but they should not betray to me where I am going. I love my ignorance of the future and do not wish to 
perish of impatience and of tasting promised things ahead of time.”    
 
This attitude is based on his refutation of teleological causality. For example, in section 477 of The Will to Power he 
writes,  
 
I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of which we become conscious is 
arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through—the actual process of inner 
“perception,” the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, are 
absolutely hidden from us—and are perhaps purely imaginary. The “apparent  inner world” is governed 
by just the same forms and procedures as the “outer world.” We never encounter “facts”: pleasure and 
displeasure are subsequent and derivative intellectual phenomena— 
“Causality” eludes us; to suppose a direct causal link between thoughts, as logic does—that is 
the consequence of the crudest and clumsiest observation. Between two thoughts all kinds of affects play 
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Gesar, a bricolage of ancient central Asian shamanism, Turkik poetry, and Buddhist 
syncretism. It depicts a hero with supernatural abilities and alliances taming all kinds of forces 
hostile to the order that he represents. In general, however, the Buddhist tradition builds its 
myths around its buddhas and bodhisattvas, who are not necessarily heroic for being conduits 
of a higher truth; for telling the most detailed narrative about the past; for predicting the 
future; or for exploiting the present for their own benefit. They are wise in a very different 
way.  
A common epithet for a buddha, or for a bodhisattva (among them many of the great 
philosophers of India) is the Sanskrit term sarvajña or sarvajñatva, “one who possesses” sarva-
jña, (“everything-knowing; omniscience”). The Tibetan Buddhist tradition has even more 
enthusiasm for this epithet, granting the directly translated title kun mkhyen pa to several 
learned and accomplished scholar-meditators in each generation. They also frequently use the 
related term dus gsum mkhyen pa (“knower of the three times”: past, present, and future) for 
anyone who has attained the highest levels of knowledge. But what do they mean by these 
terms? Kun mkhyen pa, seems to imply encyclopedic knowledge of all the details of the world’s 
causal relations. This would be like the diachronic knowledge that is aimed at in 
contemporary technological sciences. Similarly, Dus gsum mkhyen pa (“three-time-knower”) 
seems to imply the knowledge that is the fruit of the Hegelian method: reading the past to 
interpret the present and predict the future. However, the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist framework 
cannot grant such meanings to these terms; it lacks the metaphysical presuppositions that 
would fuel them, including the teleological: prime causes and ultimate ends.  
However, unlike the classical Chinese thinking, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism does not 
reject diachronic omniscience because of an indifference to diachronic causal reasoning. In 
                                                                                                                                                       
their game: but their motions are too fast, therefore we fail to recognize them, we deny them— 
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Chinese Buddhism, unsurprisingly, we find theoretical adaptations that favor a vision of 
synchronic causality such as that put forward in the I Ching. For example, Fazang’s (643-712) 
remarkable essays “On the Golden Lion,” “On a mote of Dust,” and “A Jewel In Indra’s Net” 
embody the buddhification of Chinese synchronicity perfectly. The Indo-Tibetan tradition 
also reserves an important place for the contemplation of synchronic causality, but in certain 
discourses it privileges the investigation of diachronic causality. In fact, the highly developed 
epistemological theories of Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti and Dignāga conclude 
that an entity is “real” or “unreal” based on whether it performs a causal function. However, 
careful investigations of causality do not always lead to its absolutization. As with Hume, 
Indian mahāyāna philosophers are led to an acceptance of the explanatory power of 
diachronic causality, while refusing to grant it any ontological transcendence. In her 
philological and philosophical tour de force, Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason, Sarah 
McClintock couches the Indian Buddhists Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s views on 
omniscience firmly in the discourse on causality: 
The example that Kamalaśīla cites is of farmers, and even though the details of the 
process are not spelled out, they are nonetheless fairly clear. That is, farmers know 
that certain seeds, when planted and tended, have the capacity to produce desired 
crops. When they examine their seeds at the beginning of the planting season, there 
arise for them a definitive determination that the seeds that appear in their present 
awareness are capable of fulfilling their goal of raising crops. However, because the 
goal is distant in time, the farmers cannot be sure that some obstacle to the 
development of the crops will not arise between the time of their planting and the 
time of their harvest. In this sense, the farmers can be said to have doubt, despite the 
presence of the definitive determination of the capacity for the accomplishment of 
their goals. Nonetheless, for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the farmers are not 
irrational to plant crops. Indeed, as Śāntarakṣita explains, in such cases “the 
intelligent person acts precisely due to doubt, and no diminishment of that person’s 
intelligence is entailed thereby.” (McClintock 294).      
 
Again, just as Hume exploits observable diachronic regularity to build a skeptical-empirical 
epistemology, Indian mahāyāna philosophers take it as the foundation of inference, which 
 217 
along with direct perception, is the only other form of “valid cognition” (pramāṇa). Diachronic 
knowledge is thus valued, but its ontological absoluteness runs into trouble as it is subjected to 
further analysis. If sarvajña means the kind of absolute knowledge we might get from 
investigating diachronic causality, we need to be able to explain how we could construct an 
infinite mass of this kind of knowledge, such that we could call it omniscience. Can we really 
know all things at any given time? Is it possible to access some kind of database that lays all 
the details of existence out before us?  
 In their idiom, the mahāyāna philosophers ask if the person (such as the Buddha) who 
we call omniscient knows how many bugs are in the world, or if they know how many hairs 
are on the head and body. Their opponents raise the same questions. On what grounds do 
they claim that their source of authority, the Buddha, is trustworthy? Of what does his 
knowledge consist? To answer this, they develop two different models of omniscience, and 
ask if they mutually entail one another.  
 The first theory of omniscience they call total omniscience, and it corresponds to what we 
have been calling diachronic omniscience. It is the sort that would simultaneously discern all 
of the details of the world, including their causal relations with each other. But they are aware 
of the epistemological hurdles that must be overcome for this to be possible; not least of all 
that causality is an occluded object of knowledge that always seems to slip away when we try 
to pinpoint it.  
 On this very point, Dharmakīrti asks in his famous Pramāṇavārttika,  
Of what use to us is that person who’s knowledge if the number of bugs in the 
world? One who knows the reality of that which is to be abandoned and that which 
is to be taken up, together with their means, is asserted to be a means of trustworthy 
awareness (pramāṇa); not, however, one who knows everything.” (McClintock 135).  
 
Dharmakīrti, and after him Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, change the course of the discussion. 
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They remain agnostic regarding the possibility of someone who “knows everything,” 
relegating such knowledge to an epistemologically inaccessible category. What is 
epistemologically available to us is the structure of our own minds, which seems to only be 
able to cognize things it turns its attention to. Moreover, that faculty of attention is limited. It 
does not perceive four dimensionally etc., nor can it perceive more than a few objects at a 
time. If, as humans, the same limitations apply to those we might call omniscient, then what is 
special about them?  
 One theory put forth in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu is that of “capacity 
omniscience.”172 This theory argues that the omniscient person does not in fact know the 
number of teeth on fish X in the Amazon River, nor do they necessarily know the causal 
details of igneous rock formation or the winner of next week’s greyhound race. What sets 
them apart from other people is that they are capable of knowing whatever object comes into 
their attention.  
 “Know what about that object?”, we must ask. They know the object synchronically, 
they what matters about the object that passes before them.       
Causality comes back into play here. The details of an object’s causal genesis are 
significant, but they cannot accumulate into omniscience. However, the investigation of 
causality reveals something much deeper about the object, which is what matters the most. 
What the investigation of causality reveals is the exact opposite of the teleological bookends of 
the diachronic orientation: it reveals that there are no prime causes and ultimate ends. In fact, 
becoming is only possible because of the incoherence of causes and ends. This is the conclusion 
of Nagārjuna’s famous “diamond splinters” analysis that opens his seminal text, the 
                                                
172 This theory of omniscience is also found earlier, in the writings of the fifth century Theravādin scholar 
Dhammapāla (McClintock 32). 
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Mūlamadhāyamakakārikas:  
Not from self, not from other,  
Not from both and not from neither— 
Not from any entity at all anywhere,  
Is there ever any production.173  
 
These four verses encapsulate the incompatibility between the Buddhist and Western teleo-
theological tradition. A thing cannot produce itself, since it’s self-production would be 
redundant if it already preexisted its own self-production. The classical example used in this 
refutation is that of a seed and a sprout. Does a seed produce itself? It does not. Otherwise it 
would produce itself ad infinitum, in total stasis, never allowing for the irruption of a sprout or 
anything else. There would be a Parmenidean block of “seedness.” If somehow the seed and 
the sprout are the same entity, on what basis could one assign the different terms? If we can’t 
resolve this problem, then are cause and effect really different things? If a seed is other than a 
sprout, those two entities exist separately, and what need is there for the sprout to be 
produced from the seed? At what point does the seed cease and the sprout begin? And where 
can we isolate the causal relation between them? Moreover, if a seed and sprout are truly 
different entities, would it not be that any two different entities could produce each other? 
What is stopping darkness from producing light? Of course we don’t observe this happening, 
and we do observe rice seeds transforming into rice shoots—so on the conventional level it is 
coherent to speak of a rice seed and shoot belonging to a single causal continuum. However, 
that causal continuum cannot be verified on the ultimate level of analysis. A more modern 
                                                
173 Pearcey, Adam (translator). “The Four Great Logical Arguments of the Middle Way.” Taken from Mipham 
Rinpoche’s མཁས་འ&ག, with supplementary material from Khenpo Nüden’s commentary. 
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representative of this same philosophical tradition, Mipham Rinpoche (1846-1912) 
summarizes this point saying,  
As it is said, the appearances of dependent origination cannot withstand logical 
analysis, and when investigated using reasoning that inquires into the ultimate, not 
even the slightest so-called ‘production’ may be observed. Yet, when left unanalyzed, 
just like the appearances during a dream, a sprout appears to be produced from a 
seed. This is simply the way in which the conventional is presented.174 
   
Thus, investigations into causality yield valuable knowledge into conventional reality, such as 
what seeds you ought to plant if you want to eat throughout the year, what medicine you 
should take for a particular ailment, and so forth. But such knowledge, even if expanded to 
somehow encompass simultaneous knowledge of all causal relations between things, could 
ever be considered omniscience, since they would not fit what we would call maximal epistemic 
greatness.  
The important secret about causality is that two things with autonomous existence cannot 
possibly enter into a causal relation. The very appearance of causality that organizes our 
conventional reality is possible because all the appearances themselves are not ontologically 
grounded—they have no essence or nature or self. As McClintock writes,  
Causal function is then shown to be incompatible with an eternal or unchanging self 
(i.e., nature), leading to the position that what ever is real is necessarily selfless. 
Selflessness is thus shown to be a quality of all real things. Furthermore, selflessness 
is not just a quality like other universal qualities. As we have seen, selflessness for 
these authors is a quality that, when directly cognized, is deeply transformative, 
leading both to freedom from saṃsāra and to dharmic omniscience.(224).[Emphasis 
added].   
 
This dharmic omniscience is a type we have not yet seen in either the diachronic or Chinese 
synchronic model. Dharma in this context, simply refers to the Truth, which we find through 




analysis, is selflessness. The Buddhist tradition goes much farther with this insight, however; 
it is not just an epistemological breakthrough. They posit that when our epistemology is not in 
accord with reality (selflessness) we suffer. When we fail to overcome our habit of reifying 
our personal Self/Soul, assuming its permanence and inviolable coherence, we surround it 
with disturbing emotions like hostility, craving etc. The ways that we misperceive reality as 
being full of intrinsic natures is what is called, epistemic obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa), and the 
disturbing emotions that accompany such misperception are called the afflictive obscurations 
(kleśavaraṇa). Omniscience, then, relies on a strange circle. As the full comprehension of 
selflessness, it comes about through the removal of these two obscurations, “which itself is 
achieved through the long, continuous, and intense meditation on the antidote to ignorance, 
the vision of selflessness”(131). This is, for Indo-Tibetan mahāyāna philosophers, maximal 
epistemic greatness. It is not maximal because of its inexhaustible detail, but because the removal 
of the two obscurations removes the sting from existence. It is affective and soteriological. 
What need to develop advanced cryogenic technologies in order to avoid the pain and loss of 
death when we can avoid the pain and life of death affectively, by understanding that the self 
we are trying to save cryogenically has no Self to save? This imperative is what drives 
Dharmakīrti to ask ““Of what use to us is that person who’s knowledge if the number of bugs 
in the world?”, which should not be read as a complete denigration of conventional knowledge 
about the causal relations of the world’s appearances. Rather, it’s a statement about the 
absurdity of calling even the most detailed and subtle diachronic knowledge maximal 
epistemic greatness, since it never seems to entail the elimination of existential pain.  
 Vasubandhu’s capacity omniscience implies the same understanding. His omniscience has 
is distinct from the following account of diachronic omniscience as it could relate to 
contemporary global security:  
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Archives of satellite-image data create the potential for diachronic omniscience—
vision through time—because they enable us to generate, in the present, views of the 
past that have never been known to exist, much less been seen.175    
 
While the construction of such diachronic is extremely useful, even if were to attain infinite 
proportions, it could not be called omniscience qua maximal epistemic greatness. That exalted 
term demands what most deeply matters, freedom from existential pain. This is attainable, 
since it only requires the perfection of the vision of selflessness in any given appearance, 
including the appearance of the subject.  
 With these presuppositions, the Buddhist model remains highly skeptical or outright 
denies the perfectibility of diachronic knowledge. It is fair game then to ask if these attitudes 
about knowledge have contributed to the Buddhist tradition’s relatively modest historical 
contribution to advanced physical technologies. The same observation/accusation cannot be 
made about classical Chinese thought, however, so it would seem that the Buddhist emphasis 
on deeply personal soteriological knowledge causes it to mobilize its intellectual resources in a 
direction opposite to that which would produce archives of satellite images etc. Omniscience 
consists in a sustained aesthetic experience.  
  
 
THE AESTHETIC CHARACTER OF BUDDHIST SYNCHRONIC OMNISCIENCE 
 
As mentioned before, Indo-Tibetan mahāyāna philosophers do not accomplish a damning 
logical refutation of the theory of diachronic omniscience, they merely push it to the side as a 
jumble of information that is not soteriologically relevant. Because of this agnosticism, there 
                                                
175 Parks, Lisa. “Satellite Imaging and Global Security.” Rethinking Global Security: Media, Popular Culture, and the 
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remain plenty of practicing Buddhists who still believe that those who presumably have 
dharmic omniscience necessarily have diachronic omniscience as well. They believe people with a 
reputation for being wise can be relied on for iron-clad advice about the future, for they 
literally see what will happen down the line. This is based on the assumption that if an 
omniscient one’s knowledge includes maximal affective or moral greatness—which amounts to 
leading all beings out of the suffering of delusion because of the two obscurations—they must 
also have infinite practical wisdom regarding all the things in the world, including their causal 
potentiality. Dharmakīrti, more than Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, thinks it is safe to infer 
that the Buddha has such diachronic knowledge. For him “it is impossible for a buddha not to 
be paying attention to all things at all times, for otherwise he might miss something 
necessary—something to be abandoned and something to be taken up—in his quest to help 
sentient beings”(136). However, we have seen that this is not the crux of omniscience, only a 
vaguely inferable by product of Dharmakīrti’s own dharmic omniscience, the thorough 
comprehension of selflessness and the concomitant elimination of the epistemic and afflictive 
obscurations. With diachronic omniscience still a theoretical possibility, many people are 
drawn to it; they would like to know if they will get a job next month, or how their health will 
hold up. Hoping to get a glimpse into the future, acolytes will frequently request divinations 
from teachers who are presumed to have wisdom, presenting them with offerings in exchange 
for advice. Thus, the specter of diachronic omniscience becomes central to the hierarchical 
institutions of the tradition. In Tibet, there is a significantly numbered class of semi-educated 
lamas, often referred to pejoratively as “village lamas,” who make a living off of common 
people’s expectations that the details of the future are graspable. These lamas are often 
lampooned by sophisticated, nuanced meditators and philosophers like Milarepa and Paltrul 
                                                                                                                                                       
“War on Terror.” Andrew Martin and Patrice Petro eds. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2006. 
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Rinpoche as embodying the wrong approach to spirituality: they privilege soteriologically 
irrelevant knowledge over that which is soteriologically relevant.176 In fact, according to the 
rationale of the tradition, the point of divination is not to peer clearly into the details of the 
future at all, but to act as a gateway to synchronic insight into the way that reality works. As 
the 41st Sakya Trizin writes,  
The central, most profound teaching of the Buddha is Pratitya Samutpada, which 
may be translated as interdependent origination, or co-dependent arising. This 
teaching simultaneously explains the essence of the interplay of causes and 
conditions on the relative, worldly level of reality and the essence of emptiness, or 
selflessness, on the ultimate level of reality. Although diligent efforts are needed in 
concentration and insight to attain a realization of interdependent origination, a 
system such as Mo [divination] reveals a glimpse of the interdependence and causal 
play of the world in which we live and may hopefully induce one to investigate it on 
a deeper level.177      
 
While even the most educated Tibetan often employ divinations to make decisions, the 
implication is that the synchronic insight that the divination inspires—by taking a cross-
section of diachronic reality and examining its relational structure—prepares one to encounter 
whatever comes to be. In the I Ching, the same synchronic logic is at work, but the Buddhist 
tradition stresses the soteriological potential of the insight instead of the potential to exploit 
conditions for personal gain etc. What really matters is that whatever appearances unfold to 
you, neither your own subjectivity, nor the appearances’ objectivity are taken as ontologically 
grounded—they are like a magic show or a dream and can be experienced as such, in repose 
and levity.  
The tension between the diachronic and synchronic paradigms for knowledge is nicely 
illustrated by an anecdote about the prophetic tradition of Tibet told by the important 
                                                
176 For example Milarepa:  
 “Divination, astrology, and Bon rituals— 
 These three Dharmas-of-the-town are like swindler’s tricks…”(Chang 155). 
177 Mipham. Mo: Tibetan Divination System. Jay Goldberg trans. Ithica: Snow Lion, 1990. p. 8 
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contemporary figure, Thrangu Rinpoche. In it he recounts a time in his youth, just before the 
Chinese invasion, when he got to meet the famously eccentric lama Khenpo Gangshar. One 
day the Khenpo appeared distant and suddenly uttered a cryptic and ominous statement that 
concluded with the lines, 
Within the Sixth [month] the Chinese shout So! will ring out.   
Within the seventh, they’ll control the realm of Tibet.   
If… you do not go to a hidden land, delaying,  
There is no doubt you will be made Chinese.178  
 
By that time the writing was on the wall with the Chinese; their propaganda was already 
streaming into Eastern Tibet, making people uneasy. Therefore, it would be rather cynical if 
all that Khenpo Gangshar was doing was venturing a prediction about impending trouble. He 
was, however, using reason and inference to construct some very useful diachronic 
knowledge. His disciple Deshung Rinpoche recounts Khenpo Gangshar’s activities at the 
time:  
…Khenpo Kangshar had been a strict monk and a highly respected scholar, but in the 
intervening period he had gone through a radical transformation. News had reached 
Tharlam about the unusual teachings he had been giving at Surmang. He convoked 
large public meetings. He had also begun to practice tantric rites openly and literally, 
like a realized adept. Many monks and nuns who had been in retreat for years he 
suddenly called back into normal life. Many he encouraged, directly or indirectly, to 
disrobe.  
Some people later interpreted these actions as showing great foresight in 
preparing them for the radical secularizing changes that were just around the corner; 
others attributed them to his enlightened siddhis [spiritual attainments]. But a few 
remained skeptical about his behavior and strongly opposed radical breaches of the 
monastic rule. “the khenpo has gone mad!” they uttered.(Jackson 211).  
 
In this context he was, in fact, acting as a skillful diachronic sage. He was piecing together 
whatever he could discern about the Chinese to make an educated prediction about what 
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would soon happen. This is just like the role of the skillful intellectual historian, who often 
successfully predicts stock markets collapses, political crises, or warns us in time for us to 
avoid effect X coming from cause Y. However, if some considered Khenpo Gangshar to 
embody the highest attainments of the tradition—enlightenment or omniscience—it is not 
because of this practical intelligence about diachronic causal relations. His siddhis are 
soteriological.  
 Regarding his previously quoted “prophecy,” Thrangu Rinpoche unpacks what the 
Khenpo’s deeper intentions may have been. The prophecy’s allusion to “hidden lands” has a 
history in Tibetan literature. The towering eighth century figure Guru Rinpoche issued a very 
similar prophecy, which were exploited as harbingers of every invasion of the region from the 
Mongols to the British. In his prophecy, Guru Rinpoche explicitly referred to the regions of 
Assam, Bhutan, Sikkhim, and Nepal as refuges from hostile outside forces. Many people 
throughout Tibetan history took the prophecies quite literally and benefited from the safety 
those areas provided. However, Thrangu explains in detail the deeper, often ignored 
soterioligical meaning of Guru Rinpoche’s prophecies:  
What Guru Rinpoche’s prophecy says is that when we want to go to the hidden 
lands, first we will come to a great river. We could try many different ways to cross 
it, but we will not find any way to cross it except for one. What is this one way? On 
the banks of the river there grows a great tree. We need to chop the tree down, but 
it cannot be felled by any ordinary axe or saw. So how can we chop it down? We 
need to dig at the base of the tree, and there at its very root we will find a crystal 
axe. We can use this crystal axe to fell the tree, and when we do, it will fall across 
the river, becoming a bridge that we can walk across. this is how we will be able to 
cross the river and reach the pure island of a dharmakaya, enjoyment body, or 
emanation body.179   
…Khenpo Gangshar said that the words of the prophecy were actually quite 
                                                                                                                                                       
178 Thrangu, Khenchen. Vivid Awareness: The Mind Instructions of Khenpo Gangshar. Boston: Shambhala, 2011. Kindle 
Edition chapt. 2 “Prophecies of Hidden Lands.” 
179 These are the names of the aspects of the mahāyāna’s tripartite conception of reality. The dharmakāya (truth-
body) is the abstract undetermined principle of reality, basic space as the precondition for any kind of 
appearance. The samhogakāya (enjoyment body) the dharmakāya’s latent potentiality appearing in subtle, astral 
form. The nīrmanakāyaī is the full concretization of this potentiality. 
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good, but we have to read them symbolically, not literally. So what does the great 
river mean? It is the great river of samsara, filled with the afflictions and our bad 
karma. It is something we must cross, but how? We need a method, and that 
method is the tree on the riverbank. What does the tree represent? It is the tree of 
clinging to a self. We need to cut down this tree of ego-clinging, which means we 
need to get rid of it. But after we have chopped it down, it becomes something we 
can use—this is what we call “taking ego-clinging as the path.” We can practice 
relative bodhicitta,180 saying, “I am going to attain buddhahood in order to bring 
benefit to all sentient beings.” Then we can use it as a bridge to cross the river of 
samsara and arrive in the great city of omniscience and freedom.  
 We cannot chop down the tree of ego-clinging  and make it into a bridge 
in the ordinary way. But if we dig next at its root, we will find intelligence that 
realizes the lack of a self. That intelligence is the crystal axe. The only place you can 
find it is at the base of the tree of ego-clinging. If we find that intelligence, realize 
that the self actually has no essence, and look at what the nature of the self really is, 
that is the crystal axe. We can then use this crystal axe of the intelligence that 
realizes selflessness to cut down the tree. One we have cut down the tree of ego-
clinging, we can take it as the path to cross the river of samsara… Khenpo 
Gangshar stressed that this means that it is critical for us to practice meditation—it 
is on the basis of our practice that we will be able to reach the hidden lands. 
(Thrangu 10). 
 
Thus, Khenpo Gangshar’s own activities reflect the benefits of diachronic intelligence, while 
his teachings emphasize the importance of soteriological, synchronic insight. When theorized 
the right way, that insight is eminently accomplishable.  
Despite all of the nearly impenetrable philosophy and the florid rhetoric of the poetic 
tradition, accomplishability is a major priority for the Buddhist theory of omniscience or 
enlightenment. Confusing and paradoxical terms are, as we see in the logic of Japanese koans, 
invitations to insights that come in the wake of a paradox’s resolution. These include the 
aforementioned terms “all-knowing one” (Tib. kun mkhyen pa) and “knower of the three times” 
(dus gsum mkhyen pa). Once we understand the soteriological, synchronic orientation 
                                                
180 There are relative and ultimate bodhicittas, “minds of enlightenment.” Relative bodhicitta entails no particularly 
sophisticated wisdom. It is the affective yearning to eliminate all beings’ suffering. Nevertheless, it is a 
prerequisite for the attainment of enlightenment, since it is precisely our lack of compassion and ego-clinging that 
has us stuck in ignorance and its concomitant pains. Thus, to cultivate relative bodhicitta, one vocalizes 
aspirations to help beings, and one pays close attention to the motivations and consequences of one’s actions. 
Relative bodhicitta paves the way for ultimate bodhicitta, which is synonymous with the full realization of 
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underlying the meanings of those terms, they are demystified and can be incorporated into the 
overall theoretical structure of the system.  
A related phrase that is quite popular in Tibetan literature is “Knowing One Liberates 
All” (gcig shes kun grol). This phrase is so widely used as a title of texts that it has nearly 
attained the status of genre. Such texts always present what the author believes is the key 
point of soteriology—always some version of the insight into selflessness. It suggests that only 
one (gcig) essential insight is needed to completely transform our relationship to the world. The 
same idea is expressed by cognate terms like “enough by itself” (gcig chod), and  “the one that 
makes all possible” (gcig thub). Samten Karmey points out the ubiquity of such terminology in 
Tibetan literature: “The conception of gCig thub already occurs in songs of Milarepa: “As I 
know on I am learned in all” (gCig shes kun la mkhas pa yin)” is later adopted to denote a similar 
idea with regard to rDzogs chen by certain Nyingmapa masters eg. Guru Chowang (1212-1270) 
who has composed several treatises on rDzogs chen entitled gCig shes kun grol” (Karmay 198). 
Thus, the orientation toward synchronic omniscience spawns its own lexicon and variations 
on the theme abound. For example, the same Khenpo Gangshar we just discussed wrote a 
highly respected text entitled, “Naturally Liberating Whatever You Meet” (‘phrad tshad rang 
grol), which is itself a well-worn title. As is demanded in high Tibetan literature, the text’s 
entire contents can be gleaned from the title.181 The title encapsulates the synchronic 
                                                                                                                                                       
metaphysical selflessness. 
181 This is a literary convention adopted from the highly developed Sanskrit tradition. For an example of it, see 
Longchen Rabjam 2001 p. 5 where Longchenpa offers a commentary to his own verse-work entitled The Precious 
Treasury of the Basic Space of Phenomena (chos dbyings mdzod):  
 
“In this case I have carefully chosen the title by the method of combining a metaphor and its underlying 
meaning. The metaphor is “The Precious Treasury,” while its underlying meaning is “the Basic Space of 
Phenomena.” The basic space of phenomena—naturally occurring timeless awareness, totally pure by 
nature—is mind itself, ultimate truth. The metaphor and underlying meaning are thus connected, 
because all phenomena of nirvana and samsara without excpetion occur due to awareness or a lack of 
recognition of awareness. This is analogous to all that is desired coming from a treasury of jewels that 
grant whatever one imagines…”. 
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paradigm: “Whatever You Meet” means that no matter what appearances unfold to you—
appearances often unforeseeable through diachronic inference—they have no intrinsic nature; 
they are not good or bad, painful or pleasant in themselves, and they needn’t be experienced 
that way. With the synchronic, soteriological insight that those very appearances are selfless 
or empty, they are “naturally liberated” to simply unfold as they will, according to their own 
diachronic causal laws, and we are liberated from the anxiety we used to experience in the 
face of appearances. This synchronic insight is the subject of a great deal of phenomenological 
description, hard as it is to describe.  
Traditionally, when someone has such an insight, they are expected to express it in a 
poem, and such poems are innumerable. A felicitous example is “Gampopa’s Song When He 
Reached Enlightnement,” which Gampopa (1079-1153) purportedly addressed to his pupils: 
 
…If you wish to realize what all this is actually about,  
Make it a living experience like the continuous flow of a river.  
Don’t get into lots of maneuvers, rest loosely.  
Don’t seek further, just leave it in its own place.  
Don’t ruffle your mind, leave it just as it is.  
 
Experience and realization have become one. 
If you realize this uninterruptedly, that’s it!  
If it is as even as space, that’s it!  
If you see your own mind as Buddha, that’s it!  
 
I think, the nature of phenomena is directly realized.  
I think, characteristics are liberated in their own place.  
I think, this is not thought up, but spontaneously present… 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
The explanation of the title goes on for several more pages. 
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Do you realize in this way, all you great meditators? 
It is not some kind of thing that you tell just everybody.182      
 
This is a description of Buddhist omniscience, buddhahood. Of course, classical exoteric texts 
describe the qualities of a Buddha in much more exalted terms,183 but in the esoteric tradition, 
to quote Gampopa, “that’s it!”  
 This is an important point that is often lost sight of by scholars of Buddhism who don’t 
pay attention to the phenomenological side of the tradition. I once found myself at an informal 
table of such scholars, one of whom posed the question, “do you think maybe the term 
‘enlightenment’ in all the buddhist literature has always just been a heuristic term designed to 
get people to study and simply have better ethics?” In the case of some of the strange exoteric 
characterizations of enlightenment, this might be a fair question, but there is a vast obverse 
literature that deals with the question of enlightenment directly, as an eminently 
accomplishable, essentially aesthetic sustained experience. Gampopa’s verses give a window 
onto this, but it is also discussed more prosaically. For example, the fourteenth century 
philosopher/meditator Longchen Rabjam is famous for his nuanced theories and 
phenomenological descriptions of the ultimate synchronic, soteriological insight. In his 
commentary to his own Precious Treasury of the Basic Space of Phenomena, he describes what is, at 
the end of the day, the experience that defines an enlightened person, a buddha. The 
experience, while perhaps unfamiliar to us, strikes us as disarmingly possible, not at all a 
weird mystical rapture:  
Before, you perceived outer manifestations—sense objects—as existing in their own 
                                                
182 Brunnholzl, Karl. Straight From the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithica: Snow Lion, 2007. p. 218 
183 For example, the 32 major and 80 minor marks of the Buddha, including all kinds of physical criteria and 
telepathic capabilities. 
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right. But now that you have realization, the very essence that you have certainty of is 
such that your holding to things as having true existence is overturned. So you think, 
“I perceive all these reified sense objects as though dream images, or the reflection of 
the moon in water, or forms in mirages—they are unobstructed, vivid yet ephemeral.” 
Whatever manifests arises as awareness’s own manifestation, randomly and without 
any particular reference point, leaving you wondering whether any of it exists or not.  
You might wonder whether the conduct and character of ordinary beings are 
different from what they were before. As things seem to manifest with no reference 
point, you might think, “Does everyone realize this?” With all reference point fading 
away in emptiness, you experience, feel, think, and are aware as never before, so that 
you experience awareness as an infinite evenness. You might wonder how you have 
ended up in such a state in which thoughts never arise, for your consciousness is 
completely open and your ordinary experiences are naturally pristine, inherently 
pure. Occasionally you may burst out laughing at the way your behavior and all that 
you see and hear are continually without any frame of reference. You may become 
aware of thoughts like “Am I crazy? Is everyone else crazy? Is this a dream or the 
intermediate state after death?” The thought may occur to you: This awareness, 
bursting forth in all its nakedness, in which all reference points fade away, is present 
in everyone.  What, then, is the problem in realizing it? It’s right here!” With your 
unconditional compassion arising unchecked, you also speak of these things to others, 
sing vajra songs, and act without inhibition, all of which show that your awareness 
has no fixation. All sensory appearances manifest unobstructedly in the moment. 
(165). 
 
And also,  
 
In my case, the concept that I previously had—that naturally lucid dharmakaya in all 
its nakedness was some amazing “thing”—was left behind, leaving no trace of where it 
had gone. Thus, with any concept of “is”or “is not” or any reification of the way of 
abiding having now been cast aside, what previously seemed relevant did not exist in 
the natural place of rest that is the true nature of phenomena. So what was there for 
me to do about freedom or confusion or some fruition state of dharmakaya? As I 
looked out outwardly at sensory appearances, there were unobstructed, vibrantly 
clear, ephemeral, and not to be reified. They did not fall within any extreme or 
division of being something or not, or of being located anywhere. As I looked 
inwardly at the conscious quality of self-knowing awareness in its natural place of 
rest, it could not be pinned down but faded into emptiness, indivisible, clear of 
concept—a decisive experience that left no trace. Having merged with the empty 
space of openness that is my nature, it I am nothing whatsoever in the present 
moment, where do that leave all of you? Ha! Ha! (342).    
   
Rather than shoehorning this description into the Religious Studies discourse of mysticism, it 
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is more productive to relate to it as a type aesthetic experience, even if it does not correspond 
to anything we know about classical Greek, Romantic, or Western “modern” aesthetics. In 
Japan, a comprehensive, fecund aesthetic theory, Wabi-Sabi, developed out of the Buddhist 
synchronic insight. That untranslatable term connotes a sense of immanent awareness of the 
absolute contingency of the present, an instant recognition of its transitoriness. Indian 
aesthetics also accounts for it in the theory of Rasas, “flavor;” “juice” etc.). It was first 
developed by the early advaita (non-dualist) philosopher Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and expanded by 
the eleventh century polymath Abhinavagupta. Raniero Gnoli summarizes it as an induced 
state of generality or freedom from individuality that occurs when a work of art particularly 
“hits the mark”:  
 
This state of generality, implies the elimination of any measure of time and space 
(time  and space belong to discursive thought) and, by implication, of the limited 
knowing-subject, who is conditioned by these, but who, during the aesthetic 
experience, raises himself momentarily above time, space, and causality and, 
therefore, above the stream of his practical life, the samsāra.184(xxi). 
 
One common preconception, even in classical India, is that this kind of aesthetic experience 
differs from the more “mystical” experience of the meditating yogin, in that “The yogin 
remains, as it were, isolated in the compact solitude of his consciousness, far beyond any form 
of discursive thought. In aesthetic experience, however, the feelings of everyday life, even if 
they are transfigured, are always present.” (xxiv). Indeed there are meditative traditions that 
fit that stereotype, however, it should be clear that the experience described by Longchenpa is 
something quite different. His experience is marked by the vibrancy of the ordinary, the total 
preservation of the appearances of the world; even the appearance of innocuous somewhat 
                                                
184 Gnoli, Raniero. “Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta.” Serie Orientale Roma. Roma: Istituto 
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wandering thoughts. The point is to let them occur naturally (Tib. rang ‘bab, lit. “dropping into 
itself”), without becoming entangled in a self-constructing quagmire of antagonistic subject 
and object. In Rasas theory, “There is a sense of repose in consciousness (saṃvidviśrānti) when 
we are immersed in the aesthetic object to the exclusion of everything else. The feelings 
evoked do not struggle for an outlet. They enact themselves on the stage of our 
consciousness.”185 Important metaphysical principles notwithstanding, the Buddhist 
synchronic insight essentially transforms the entire world of appearances into this kind of 
aesthetic object. 
Approaching Buddhist synchronic omniscience as a sustained aesthetic experience, 
helps to demystify and de-romanticize it. It is not intrinsically bound to anything “Buddhist,” 
much less “Oriental” or any other limiting category. In many ways, it resonates with the 
synchronic insights of so many poets all over the globe. A certain kind of poet isolates a cross-
section of time and penetrates it; she understands what it’s made of, that it is fleeting and 
contingent; all of the elements of the moment, including the perceiver and the perceived, relate 
unobstructedly, naturally. I believe it is the what Wallace Stevens is describing in his poem 
“An Ordinary Evening in New Haven:”  
 
We keep coming back and coming back 
To the real: to the hotel instead of the hymns 
That fall upon it out of the wind. We seek 
 
The poem of pure reality, untouched 
By trope or deviation, straight to the word, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1956. 
185 Thampi, G.B. Mohan. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 24, No. 1, Oriental Aesthetics. (Autumn, 
1965), pp. 75-80. 
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Straight to the transfixing object, to the object 
 
At the exactest point at which it is itself, Transfixing by 
being purely what it is, 
A view of New Haven, say, through the certain eye, 
 
The eye made clear of uncertainty, with the sight 
Of simple seeing, without reflection. 
We seek Nothing beyond reality. Within it, 
 
Everything, the spirit’s alchemicana 
Included, the spirit that goes roundabout 
And through included, not merely the visible, 
 
The solid, but the movable, the moment, 
The coming on of feasts and the habits of saints, 
The pattern of the heavens and high, night air. 
 
Contemporary meditation teachers in the West, including respected old-school figures like 
Chagdud Tulku Rinpoche, have had to answer many questions about the similarity of this 
kind of aesthetic experience and the one aimed at in meditation, often simply referred to as 
“awareness” (Tib. rigpa). I have been present for many personal communications in which the 
similarity was fully acknowledged; at times acknowledged as identical. The same sometimes 
for moments of hallucinogenic experience. These experiences often happen accidentally haunt 
the person who had them. Some stumble into meditation looking for a way to access that kind 
of insight again. What sets the experiences apart, however, is the both their duration and the 
reliability of the method for achieving it. The aesthetic experience is almost by definition 
unsustained, likely unsustainable. It comes and goes with the thief-like muse who almost 
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always abandons its tragic supplicant. Thus, the meditator makes what is perhaps the most 
unpoetic of decisions: to systematize the aesthetic experience; to sneak up on it from every 
possible angle—analytical, phenomenological, physical, and aesthetic.  
Nietzsche has been a silent interlocutor throughout this discussion. His entire corpus 
inveighs against the teleological causality that founds the diachronic paradigm of 
knowledge.186 Moreover, he adopts the same buddhist negation of the self that makes it 
incoherent as a diachronic, causal entity, and demands that it be made sense of with a 
synchronic insight into its apodictic but groundless appearance.187 An aesthetic experience 
accompanies this insight:  
Will and wave.— How greedily this wave approaches, as if it were after something! 
How it crawls with terrifying haste into the inmost nooks of this labyrinthine cliff! 
It seems that it is trying to anticipate someone; it seems that something of value, 
high value, must be hidden there.—And how it comes back, a little more slowly but 
still quite white with excitement; is it disappointed?—But already another wave is 
approaching, still more greedily and savagely than the first, and its soul, too, seems 
to be full of secrets and the lust to dig up treasures. Thus live waves—thus live we 
who will—more I shall not say.  
 So? You mistrust me? You are angry with me, you beautiful monsters? 
Are you afraid that I might give away your whole secret? Well, be angry with me, 
arch your dangerous green bodies as high as you can, raise a wall between me and 
the sun—as you are doing now! Truly, even now nothing remains of the world but 
                                                
186 For example Will to Power § 477. See note on p. 28 of this paper. In Human, All Too Human § 106, he clearly 
theorizes what diachronic omniscience would be, though he doesn’t think it much worth pursuing:  
By the waterfall.—At the sight of a waterfall we think e see in the countless curving, twistings 
and breaking of the waves capriciousness and freedom of will; but everything here is necessary, 
ever motion mathematically calculable. So it is too in the case of  human actions; if one 
were all-knowing, one would be able to calculate every individual action, likewise every 
advance in knowledge, every error, every piece of wickedness. The actor himself, to be sure, is 
fixed in the illusion of free will; if for one moment the wheel of  the world were to stand 
still, and there were an all-knowing, calculating intelligence there to make use of this pause, it 
could narrate  the future of every creature to the remotest ages and describe every track 
along which this wheel had yet to roll. The actor’s deception regarding himself, the assumption 
of free will, is itself part of the mechanism it would have to compute. 
187 Will to Power § 485:  
The subject: this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the 
highest feeling of reality: we understand this belief as the effect of one cause—we believe so 
firmly in our belief that for its sake we imagine “truth,” “reality,” “substantiality” in general.— 
“The subject” is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum: but it 
is we  who first created the “similarity” of these states; our adjusting them and making them 
similar is the fact, not their similarity (—which  ought rather to be denied—). 
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green twilight and green lightning. Carry on as you like, roaring with overweening 
pleasure and malice—or dive again, pouring you emeralds down into the deepest 
depths, and throw your infinite white mane of foam and spray over them: 
Everything suits me, for everything suits you so well, and I am so well-disposed 
toward you for everything; how could I think of betraying you? For—mark my 
word!—I know you and your secret, I know your kind! You and I—are we not of 
one kind?— You and I—do we not have one secret? (The Gay Science §310).  
 
And this experience demands familiarization. It has to be embraced, and as 
systematized as far impossible, though no formal approach will do. it demands an aesthetic 
outlook, one of immanent spontaneity in the face of things:  
 
One thing is needful.—To "give style" to one's character—a great and rare art! It is 
practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and 
then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason 
and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been 
added; there a piece of original nature has been removed—both times through long 
practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; 
there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted 
shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views... In the end, when the 
work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed 
and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less 
important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste! (GS, 290). 
 
Here maximal epistemic greatness is affective and aesthetic. Taste, “Rasas”, Juice, Flavor: 
the essences of Abhinavagupta’s aesthetic transports. In Tibetan literature, one of the 
descriptive terms of the pinnacle of spiritual experience is ro gcig, “single taste”—a sustained, 
aesthetic, spontaneous naked awareness of each thing as it appears to you188. These things lack 
any intrinsic nature whatsoever and are thus naturally free, freeing us as a matter of course. 
This kind of aesthetic experience allows us to escape the endless deferral of presence that 
                                                
188 The mahāmūdra tradition theorizes four subtle variations on this experience: one pointedness (rtse gcig); 
simplicity (spros bral); one taste (ro gcig); and non-meditation (sgom med). Its sister tradition, dzogchen, echoes these 
essentially aesthetic themes: ineffability (med pa, “non-existence”); openness (phyal ba); spontaneous presence 
(lhun grub); and oneness (gcig pu). 
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happens when we always interpret things. Sontag sensed this when she called for us to 
experience works of art more nakedly, to see them as themselves, and in a sense to see 
through them. She writes,  
Transparence is the highest, most liberating value in art—and in criticism—
today. Transparence means experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself, 
of the things being what they are[…] The function of criticism should be to 
show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than what it means[…] In 
place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art.”(23).      
 
Likewise, if we transform the things of the world into aesthetic objects, interpretation—the 
heart of the diachronic paradigm—is not the only way to relate to them: naked synchronic 






Perhaps I have not been able to escape Hegel after all. An Hegelian dialectic has brought us 
here to the end. I started by criticizing Hegel’s instance that we sublate the concrete into 
spiritual substance, seeing though the concrete, interpreting it as its own occluded content. The 
antithesis to this is the Chinese paradigm that stops at the concrete, seeing it for what it is in a 
synchronic slice of time. And then we have the Buddhist view, which synthesizes both 
orientations. It looks at the concrete synchronically, but still sees through it, not into its hidden 
substance, but into its total groundlessness, basic space.  
 Regardless of this overall structure of the paper, the terms diachronic and synchronic 
omniscience are valuable for the way that they highlight two very different paradigms of 
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knowledge. Those paradigms are general and ultimately not culturally and historically bound. 
Not only do they help us isolate two radically different ideas about what constitutes valid 
knowledge, they help us envision the implications of such knowledge, including what kinds of 
cultures might adhere to one or the other, and why those cultures produce the things that they 
do.  
At the most reductionistic level of analysis, it should be clearer now why cultures that 
privilege a diachronic paradigm have recently been and continue to prolific in the creation of 
technology, which is an essential instrument for the accomplishment of that paradigm’s 
absolute knowledge. Likewise, the synchronic paradigm should in some ways justify the 
quietistic caricature of cultures that value it. Such reductions, however, should be put aside 
and we should see how any given culture contains those who dissent from the prevailing 
episteme. There are engineers and rebel poets in every corner. Understanding the two 
paradigms of knowledge a bit more subtly should help us unite the two, benefitting from what 
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